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Resumen en Castellano
Mi trabajo de investigacio´n realizado para la obtencio´n del grado de Doctor en Economı´a
consta de tres cap´ıtulos: 1) ”The effect of Medicaid on Children’s Health: A Regression
Discontinuity Approach”, 2) ”Spillovers of Health Education at School on Parents’ Physical
Activity” (en coautor´ıa con Lucila Berniell y Nieves Valde´s), y 3) ”Estimating a dynamic
discrete choice model of health prevention decisions. An application to flu vaccination”.
En el primer cap´ıtulo estudio el efecto causal de Medicaid, un programa de seguros de salud
pu´blico en los Estados Unidos, sobre la utilizacio´n de servicios me´dicos y sobre la salud de
los nin˜os afectados por el programa. Para estimar los efectos causales del programa uti-
lizo la metodolog´ıa denominada Regression Discontinuity (RD). Esta metodolog´ıa explota
la discontinuidad en la probabilidad de participar en Medicaid generada por la regla de
elegibilidad del programa, basada en que el ingreso familiar se inferior a un umbral. Una
particularidad de este caso de estudio es que los umbrales de elegibilidad var´ıan segu´n
estado, y para cada estado, estos umbrales han variado a lo largo del tiempo. Esta carac-
ter´ıstica del programa permite estimar los efectos del programa para diferentes umbrales
de ingreso familiar. Los datos utilizados provienen del Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) y de la base suplementaria Child Development Study (CDS).
La principal contribucio´n del trabajo es, primero, mostrar que Medicaid tiene efectos
positivos contempora´neos sobre la utilizacio´n de servicios de salud preventivos, pero het-
eroge´neos dependiendo del nivel del umbral. Los efectos son positivos y estad´ısticamente
significativos para niveles bajos del umbral (entre 100% y 185% de la l´ınea de pobreza) y no
significativos para umbrales altos (entre 185% y 250% de la l´ınea de pobreza). En segundo
lugar, encuentro que Medicaid tiene efectos nulos y en algunos casos negativos sobre la
salud de los nin˜os en el mediano plazo. Medicaid incrementa la probabilidad de ser obeso
y reduce la probabilidad de estar en excelente estado de salud. Los efectos negativos son
persistentes entre 1 y dos an˜os despue´s de ser elegible, y luego desaparecen. Estos efectos
negativos esta´n presentes tanto a bajos (100-185%) como a altos (185-250%) niveles del
umbral.
En el trabajo se discuten posibles mecanismos a trave´s de los cuales Medicaid puede tener
efectos negativos sobre la salud de los nin˜os. Una explicacio´n posible es que Medicaid
genera un efecto desplazamiento en la cobertura de seguros privados. Los padres pueden
verse incentivados a inscribir a sus hijos en Medicaid en lugar de comprar un seguro privado,
ya que esto permite liberar recursos para consumos alternativos. Este cambio de seguros
de salud puede implicar una ca´ıda en la calidad del servicio me´dico que los nin˜os pueden
acceder, generando un efecto negativo indeseado sobre su salud. Asimismo, los per´ıodos
de espera necesarios para acceder efectivamente a Medicaid o efectos de consumo negativos
pueden generar tambie´n impacto negativo en la salud de los nin˜os.
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En el segundo cap´ıtulo estudiamos el efecto indirecto de la educacio´n para la salud recibida
por los nin˜os en las escuelas, sobre los ha´bitos de salud de sus padres, en particular en la
probabilidad de hacer actividad f´ısica. En nuestro estudio mostramos que si bien este tipo de
programas de educacio´n para la salud pueden estar destinados a mejorar los conocimientos
y ha´bitos de salud de los nin˜os, tambie´n pueden tener un efecto indirecto sobre la poblacio´n
no directamente afectada por esta pol´ıtica, en este caso, los padres. Tambie´n discutimos
posibles mecanismos a trave´s de los cuales esta pol´ıtica puede afectar a los padres.
Para estimar el efecto causal de la educacio´n para la salud recibida por los nin˜os en las
escuelas sobre los ha´bitos de actividad f´ısica de sus padres, explotamos como ”quasi-
experimentos” las reformas que se produjeron en los programas de educacio´n para la salud
en los Estados Unidos, a nivel estadual, entre los an˜os 1999 y 2005. La estrategia de
identificacio´n es una metodolog´ıa de ”triples diferencias” permitiendo distintos tipos de
tratamientos, dado que las reformas no fueron homoge´neas entre estados. Las bases de
datos utilizadas son el Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) y las bases de datos sobre
programas de educacio´n para la salud a nivel estadual en EEUU, provenientes de la Na-
tional Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE) Health Policy Database y de la
School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS).
El principal aporte de este trabajo es mostrar que la introduccio´n de educacio´n para la
salud en las escuelas primarias tuvo un efecto indirecto positivo y significativo sobre la
probabilidad de que los padres realicen actividad f´ısica. La probabilidad de hacer actividad
f´ısica fue 20 puntos porcentuales mayor para aquellos padres cuyos hijos estuvieron afectados
por la pol´ıtica, respecto de los padres con similares caracter´ısticas pero que cuyos hijos no
estuvieron afectados por la pol´ıtica. Los efectos son mayores para los padres con menor
educacio´n y menor ingreso. Los efectos solo se encuentran sobre los padres pero no sobre
las madres. En el trabajo se proponen dos mecanismos a trave´s de los cuales la educacio´n
para la salud en las escuelas puede tener un efecto indirecto sobre los hombres y que a
su vez este efecto sea mayor sobre los padres con menor nivel socioecono´mico. El primer
mecanismo explica por que´ los padres y no las madres pueden verse afectados, y esta´
relacionado con decisio´n o´ptima de complementar la educacio´n recibida por los nin˜os en las
escuelas con cambios de ha´bitos dentro de la familia. Cuando los padres saben que sus hijos
reciben educacio´n para la salud en la escuela, e´stos intentan complementarla cambiando ellos
mismos sus ha´bitos relacionados con la salud, de modo de educar a sus hijos con el ejemplo.
Dado que existe una especializacio´n por ge´nero dentro del hogar en las tareas relacionadas
al cuidado de los nin˜os y, en particular, dado que los hombres esta´n especializados en las
actividades recreacionales, se espera que el efecto de los programas de educacio´n para la
salud en la actividad f´ısica de los padres recaiga sobre los hombres y no sobre las mujeres. El
segundo mecanismo explica por que´ los padres con menor nivel socioecono´mico se ven ma´s
afectados, y esta´ relacionado con la transmisio´n de informacio´n sobre ha´bitos saludables
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de los nin˜os a sus padres. Un menor nivel socioecono´mico esta´ relacionado con un menor
conocimiento sobre el cuidado de la salud, por lo tanto los padres con menores conocimientos
deber´ıan ser los ma´s afectados con el arribo de nueva informacio´n.
En el tercer cap´ıtulo realizo una investigacio´n emp´ırica de los determinantes socioe-
cono´micos de las decisiones de vacunacio´n contra la gripe. La evidencia emp´ırica muestra
que las decisiones de vacunacio´n tienden a ser muy persistentes entre la poblacio´n mayor a
65 an˜os. A pesar de esta persistencia, la probabilidad de vacunacio´n tambie´n aumenta con
la edad y tiende a ser mayor entre los individuos en peor estado de salud. Para estudiar
el comportamiento preventivo de los individuos, primero formulo un modelo estilizado de
decisiones de prevencio´n primaria a lo largo del ciclo de vida. El modelo esta´ basado en
un modelo de capital humano e intenta capturar la importancia de los aspectos dina´micos
que motivan las decisiones de prevencio´n. El ana´lisis emp´ırico consiste en estimar la forma
reducida de la demanda de prevencio´n que se deriva del modelo teo´rico utilizando modelos
probit dina´micos con datos de panel. Esta metodolog´ıa permite separar el efecto que tiene
la experiencia previa con la vacuna, la heterogeneidad inobservada individual, los factores
de riesgo y otras caracter´ısticas personales observables sobre la persistencia en las decisiones
de vacunacio´n observadas. Tambie´n analizo co´mo los incentivos a vacunarse cambian a lo
largo del ciclo de vida. Los datos utilizados corresponden a la poblacio´n mayor en Estados
Unidos y provienen de la Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (an˜os 2001-2004).
El aporte principal del trabajo es mostrar que tanto la experiencia previa con la vacuna,
como la heterogeneidad inobservada individual, los factores de riesgo y otras caracter´ısticas
personales observables explican parte de la persistencia en las decisiones individuales. En
el trabajo se muestra la importancia de controlar por la persistencia en ha´bitos que genera
la experiencia previa sobre las decisiones actuales de prevencio´n. Al tener esto en cuenta,
la importancia de los factores de riesgo se reduce sustancialmente. Los resultados tambie´n
muestran que los incentivos a vacunarse aumentan con la edad a tasa decreciente. Los
resultados son consistentes con las predicciones del modelo teo´rico propuesto. Se discuten
finalmente las implicaciones de estos resultados para las pol´ıticas pu´blicas que intentan
incrementar la cobertura de la vacunacio´n contra la gripe en la poblacio´n mayor.
vi
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Medicaid on
Children’s Health: A Regression
Discontinuity Approach
Abstract
In this paper I estimate the impact of Medicaid on children’s health care utilization and their
subsequent health outcomes. I estimate the causal effects using a Regression Discontinuity
(RD) design. I exploit the discontinuity generated by Medicaid’s eligibility rule, based
on family income, on program participation rates. In contrast with a standard regression
discontinuity approach, here there are multiple eligibility thresholds that vary across states.
This feature allows me to estimate heterogeneous effects of the program at different income
thresholds. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and its Child
Development Study (CDS) supplement, first, I find that Medicaid increases the use of
preventive medical care. The effect is heterogeneous, and it is positive and significant
only at low thresholds −between 100% and 185% of the poverty line. Second, I find that
Medicaid has a null or a even negative impact on health outcomes in the medium run. It
increases the probability of being obese and it reduces the probability of being in excellent
health. The negative effects are persistent between 1 and 2 years after being eligible, and
them they vanish, and they appear both at low (under 185%) and high (between 185 and
250%) eligibility threholds levels. One likely explanation for the observed negative effects
is that Medicaid induces families to drop private health insurance and, through different
channels (e.g., health care quality reductions, waiting periods, negative consumption effects)
it generates a negative impact on children’s health.
1
Chapter 1 The Effect of Medicaid on Children’s Health
1.1 Introduction
There is strong evidence showing a positive relationship between parental socioeconomic
status and children’s health, leading to health inequalities in early childhood. To the extent
that poor health affects the formation of human capital, health may play a key role in the
intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic inequalities (Currie, 2009; Almond and
Currie, 2010). Currie (2009) suggests that children’s health inequalities may be partially
explained by disparities in the access to health care services. The provision of public health
insurance coverage to children in low income families facilitates the access to medical care
and, therefore, may help to weaken the link between socioeconomic status and health.
The US does not have a universal health care system which makes family income an impor-
tant factor determining access to health care. Public health insurance programs in the US
are designed to improve the access to medical care for low income individuals. Medicaid
is a means-tested program and entitles those meeting the required conditions to have pub-
lic health insurance coverage (Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010).
Medicaid is the largest source of insurance coverage for children in the US, covering about
30% of all children and 59% of low income children.1
In this paper, I address three questions. First, I study whether Medicaid contributes to
enhance children’s utilization of health care services, and, more important, whether it
contributes to improve their health outcomes. Second, I analyze whether Medicaid has
lagged effects over health. Since health is a stock, the effects of insurance coverage may not
be visible immediately but with some lag. Finally, I investigate whether the provision of
free health insurance to relatively high income families can have some unintended negative
effect on their children’s health as a consequence of crowding out private insurance coverage.
The provision of a public free health insurance to children in certain ranges of family
income may compete with private insurance and induce some of these families to drop
the private alternative. If switching from the private to the public occurs then this could
have a negative effect on children’s health, as long as the switch implies a reduction in
the quality of health care. Also, waiting periods until effectively accessing Medicaid may
have unintended effects on health. Consumption effects, due to the resources freed when
dropping the private insurance, may have negative effects as well, for instance, through an
increase in the consumption of “junk” food.
I exploit the particular characteristics of Medicaid’s eligibility rules to identify the causal
effects of the program on children’s outcomes. A child is eligible to receive Medicaid coverage
if his family income, as a percentage of the federal poverty line, is below a given threshold.
1Low income children are those with family income below 200% of the federal poverty line. Source:
Urban Institute and Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured estimates based on the Census
Bureau’s March 2009 and 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS: Annual Social and Economic Supplements).
http://www.statehealthfacts.org.
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This rule generates a discontinuity in the enrollment rates of children with family income
close to the threshold, which allows me to implement a regression discontinuity (RD) design.
The eligibility criteria for the Medicaid program are set at the state level, therefore the
income threshold that determines eligibility varies among states and has been changing
through time. With multiple thresholds, the effects estimated pooling all thresholds are not
restricted to the individuals located around a single income threshold, but they are averages
of the effects across the different thresholds (Black, Galdo, and Smith, 2005; Bloom, 2009;
Carneiro and Ginja, 2009). The multiplicity of thresholds also allows me to investigate
whether the effects of Medicaid are heterogeneous for the different thresholds, hence, at
different family income levels.
I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Child Development
Study (CDS) supplement, which provide rich information about children’s health and health
care utilization as well as detailed information on socioeconomic characteristics of the family.
The PSID data allows tracking of children’s Medicaid status at different ages through
childhood.
In the first part of the paper (Section 1.5) I test the internal validity of the RD design
by performing a number of checks which support the RD local assumption stating that
eligibility is randomly assigned in the neighborhood of the thresholds. First, I show there is
no evidence that families have perfect control over their income so that their children just
qualify for Medicaid. Second, I show that the eligibility rule generates a discontinuity in
Medicaid enrollment rates at the threshold. Third, I provide evidence that the discontinuity
in participation rates at the threshold is not generated by discontinuous changes of other
individual characteristics.
My results indicate that Medicaid increases the utilization of health care for preventive
purposes (measured as whether the child has visited a doctor at least once in the last
12 months for a routine health check-up) in the same period in which a child is eligible
for Medicaid coverage. Allowing for heterogeneous effects across thresholds, I find that
Medicaid only has a positive effect on utilization for children at relatively low eligibility
thresholds (between 100% and 185% of the poverty line, which I call the “low” thresholds
group hereafter). Medicaid does not induce higher preventive health care utilization at
relatively higher threholds (between 185% and 250% of the poverty line, which I call from
now onwards the “high” threholds group).2
The results also suggest that the short run effects of Medicaid on children’s health are null
2Note that the effects estimated at higher thresholds are associated with a marginal group of children
with higher family income levels. However, in terms of the overall US household income distribution, these
targeted families have still low levels of income. For instance, the poverty line for a family of 4 members
was $ 21,203 in 2007 and the median household income was $ 50,233. Then, children with family income
equal to the “high” thresholds are those with annual family income between $39,226 and $ 53,008, hence
only some of them are slightly above the median household income.
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in the three outcomes analyzed: probability of being in excellent health, the probability
of being obese, and the number of school days missed due to illness. In the medium run
−between 1 and 5 years after being eligible for Medicaid coverage− I find that Medicaid
only has some negative effects on children’s health outcomes. These lagged effects appear
after one or two years on the probability of being in excellent health and the probability of
being obese. I do not find a clear pattern across threshold groups, and the results indicate
that the effects are negative both at low and high thresholds. These negative effects vanish
after the third year, and cumulative effects are null afterwards.
I discuss possible mechanisms that may explain explain why Medicaid has some negative
effects on children’s health outcomes in the medium run, which are consistent with the
findings. The negative effects may reflect only a “perception” effect triggered by an in-
crease in the contacts with physicians for preventive checkups, but not a real change of
children’s health. Parents may be now more aware a health problems their children have.
This explanation is more appealing for results obtained at low threshold levels. Also, a
“quality” effect, as a consequence of Medicaid crowding out private insurance may explain
these results. The quality channel may be more suitable to explain the negative impact of
Medicaid at high threshold levels, where the marginal groups are composed of children with
higher family income levels. The quality channel explanation states that targeting higher
income families with Medicaid may induce a crowding out effect and, although it might
not affect health care utilization, it might affect the quality of care a child can have access
to. This switch may have undesirable health consequences for children as long as there are
health care quality differences between Medicaid and private insurances.3 In an indepen-
dent and simultaneous work, Koch (2010) also finds evidence that supports this hypothesis.
Finally, I also discussed two alternative mechanisms (waiting times and consumption ef-
fects) through which the crowding out effect generated by Medicaid may negatively impact
children’s health outcomes.
Some previous studies address the question of whether health insurance has a positive
effect on children’s health. Among those analyzing Medicaid, the results are mixed. For
example, Currie and Gruber (1996) find evidence that the expansions in Medicaid eligibility
thresholds between 1984 and 1992 increased the utilization of medical care and reduced child
mortality. In contrast, Currie, Decker, and Lin (2008) find that expansions in Medicaid
eligibility thresholds from 1986 to 2005 had no contemporaneous effects on the health of
children between 9 and 17 years old, as reported by their parents. Their estimates, however,
suggest that expansions that affected children of ages between 2 and 4 are associated with
3Even when Medicaid may induce a crowding out effect at low thresholds, where the marginal affected
group has lower levels of family income, it may not have an unintended effect on children’s health. The
reason is that if insurance quality is a normal good, then this group is more likely to buy, in the absence of
Medicaid, low quality private insurances. Hence, at low thresholds, switching into Medicaid is more likely
to imply an increase in the quality of care.
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better health by the time they are 9-17 years old. Koch (2010) finds a contemporaneous
negative impact of Medicaid on children’s health and he associates it to a decrease in health
insurance quality. He finds that Medicaid reduces the probability that the child has a usual
source of care and it increases the child’s BMI.
There is also an extensive literature studying the extent to which Medicaid expansions
have led eligible families to switch from the private to the public health insurance (Cutler
and Gruber, 1996; Lo Sasso and Buchmueller, 2004; Card and Shore-Sheppard, 2004; Ham
and Shore-Sheppard, 2005; Gruber and Simon, 2007; Koch, 2010)). None of these papers,
except Koch (2010), addresses the consequences of this “crowding-out” effect on children’s
health.
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, I analyze both the contem-
poraneous and the lagged effects of Medicaid on different measures of health. The paper
by Currie, Decker, and Lin (2008) is among the first to attempt estimating these lagged
effects. However, in the cross sectional datasets they use, they must impute the family
income and the state of residence of the child, since these variables are not observed during
childhood. In contrast, I exploit the panel dimension of PSID data to match past eligibility
with current health outcomes. Second, the identification strategy I propose allows for the
estimation of Medicaid effects that vary across different levels of income. This identification
is similar to Koch (2010), but extends the analysis to the medium run effects. Finally, I
propose possible explanations for the existence of persistent negative effects of Medicaid,
suggesting that the “crowding-out” effect the public insurance generates may have a cost
in terms of children’s health.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 describes the Medicaid
program; Section 1.3 presents the empirical strategy; Section 3.3 describes the data; Section
1.5 validates the regression discontinuity strategy; Section 3.5 presents and discusses the
results; and Section 3.6 concludes.
1.2 Medicaid Program
The Medicaid program was introduced in the late 1960s as a health insurance component for
state cash welfare programs targeting low-income single female head families. Medicaid is
jointly financed by the federal government and the states. The federal government matches
state spending on Medicaid.4 The program is administered by the states and each state sets
its own guidelines regarding eligibility and services, but subject to federal rules requiring
minimum levels of coverage and services.
4The federal share of Medicaid spending is determined by the Federal Medical Assistance Percentage
(FMAP), which varies by state based on state per capita income relative to national average (Kaiser Com-
mission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010).
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Medicaid eligibility for children was in its origins tied to the participation in the Aid for
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. Since the mid 1980s the linkage
between AFDC coverage and eligibility for Medicaid has been gradually weakened, by
eliminating the family structure requirements for young children and by allowing states to
increase the income thresholds that determine eligibility (Currie and Gruber, 1996). The
increase in the thresholds was first a state option, but later minimum levels of coverage
were imposed by federal mandates. By April 1990, states were required to offer coverage
to all children under 6 years old in families with income up to 133% of the poverty line
and, starting in July 1991, they were required to provide coverage to all children under
age 19, who were born after September 1983 and lived in households with incomes below
100% of the poverty line. As a result, by the mid-1990s, most children in the US living in
households with incomes below 100% of the poverty line, and all young children living in
households with incomes below 133% of the poverty line were eligible for Medicaid.
In practice, most states opted to raise the income thresholds beyond 133% of the poverty
level and some did further increases using own state funds. States also set different threshold
levels for different age groups. In 1997, the Medicaid program for children was augmented by
the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP), which provided extra funds to expand
eligibility for children beyond the existing limits of the Medicaid program. The CHIP
program was implemented either by expanding the Medicaid program, or designing a new
program, with features that mimic private health insurance (Gruber and Simon, 2007).
Some states set thresholds up to 4 times the poverty line.
State Medicaid programs must cover mandatory services specified in federal law in order
to receive federal matching funds. Medicaid covers a very comprehensive set of benefits
and services for children under 21, defined by the pediatric Medicaid benefit also known
as Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment (EPSDT) (Kaiser Commission
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010). The type of services that Medicaid must cover for
children according to the federal rules include screening, preventive, and early detection
services.5 Health care must be made available to correct or ameliorate defects and physical
and mental illnesses or conditions discovered by the screening services. Children also have
access to physician and hospital services (impatient and outpatient). These services are
provided with little or no copayment required (Gruber and Simon, 2007).6 In terms of
the package of services covered, Medicaid tends to be more generous than many private
5Screening services include all the following services: comprehensive health and developmental history,
immunizations, laboratory tests, lead toxicity screening, vision services, dental services, and hearing services.
6Copayments for some services were allowed to be higher for those above 150% of the poverty line since
2005. Cost-sharing for preventive care is prohibited for children. Premiums were prohibited for children
until 2005 and remain prohibited for children under 150% of the poverty line. However, for those above
150% the poverty line, premiums and cost sharing cannot exceed 20% of the cost of the service. Additionally,
total premiums and copayments cannot exceed 5% of family income for any family (Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010).
6
Chapter 1 The Effect of Medicaid on Children’s Health
insurance plans.
Medicaid buys services primarily in the private health care sector. States pay health care
providers on behalf of the Medicaid beneficiaries. States may purchase services on a fee-for-
service basis or by paying premiums to managed care organizations (Kaiser Commission on
Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2010). States also determine the rules to reimburse health
care providers. In most cases, Medicaid’s reimbursement is lower than the obtained from
private insurance, which may induce some physicians to reject Medicaid patients or to lower
the quality of the service provided.7
1.3 Empirical Research Design
1.3.1 Contemporaneous Effects
The main objective is to estimate a simple model of the causal effect of Medicaid coverage
on children’s health care utilization and health outcomes
yit = α+ βMit + uit, (1.1)
where yit is child i ’s outcome (utilization or health) in period t and Mit indicates whether
the child had Medicaid coverage that same period. A simple OLS regression of equation
(1.1) would yield a biased estimate. Medicaid coverage is an endogenous variable, because
the access to this type of coverage is correlated with family income. Even after controlling
for family income, selection problems may still be present because Medicaid enrollment is
not mandatory. Among eligibles, the decision to take Medicaid may be correlated with
other unobserved characteristics that are correlated with the outcomes.
In order to identify the effect of interest, I exploit the rule of assignment into Medicaid that
allows me to implement a Regression Discontinuity (RD) design. The RD design is a quasi-
experimental design with the defining characteristic that the probability of receiving the
treatment changes discontinuously as a function of the variable that determines eligibility,
called the assignment or forcing variable (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw, 2001).8
The intuition behind the RD is the following. Assuming that the eligibility threshold is
exogenously given and families have imperfect control over their income, the eligibility
status of a child with family income in the neighborhood of the threshold is randomly
7For example, Decker (2007) finds that higher Medicaid fees increase the number of private physicians,
especially in medical and surgical specialties, who see Medicaid patients. She also finds that higher fees
also lead to visit times with physicians that are more comparable to visit times with private pay patients.
Another paper by Cunningham and O’Malley (2009) finds that not only reimbursement fees matters, but
also delays in reimbursement. They find evidence that Medicaid reimbursement time affects physicians’
willingness to accept Medicaid patients.
8For a comprehensive discussion of the RD design and its application in economics see Imbens and
Lemieux (2008), van der Klaauw (2002), and Lee and Lemieux (2010)
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assigned, i.e., the rule generates a “local” randomized experiment. Making the additional
assumption that in the absence of the treatment the outcome is a smooth function of
income, the causal effect of Medicaid eligibility can be identified by comparing the average
outcome of children just below the income threshold (“treatment group”) with that of
children just above it (“control group”). Any difference observed between these two groups
can be attributed to the availability of treatment for treatment group members. Since
enrollment in Medicaid is not mandatory −i.e., the coverage indicator, Mi, is not necessary
equal to an indicator of eligibility status, Elii, which takes the value one if the child is
eligible for Medicaid− comparing outcomes of eligible and non eligible individuals close to
the threshold identifies the average effect of assignment into treatment or the intention to
treat effect (ITT) at the threshold.9
The ITT effect can be significantly lower in absolute value than the effect the program has
on those who are actually covered by Medicaid. Under the assumptions that the probability
of having Medicaid coverage as a function of income is discontinuous at the threshold and
that, in the absence of the treatment, the association between the outcome variable and
income is smooth, the parameter β can be estimated using the eligibility indicator Elii
−which is randomly assigned in the neighborhood of the threshold− as an instrument for
Medicaid coverage. This is called a “fuzzy” RD design (Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw,
2001; Imbens and Lemieux, 2008).10
Ideally, to identify the causal effect it would be sufficient to compare outcomes of individuals
above and below the threshold, in a very narrow interval around it. In practice, however, this
is sometimes not possible because only few observations close to the threshold are available
in the dataset. To overcome this problem, I implement a parametric RD specification, that
controls for a flexible function of the family income −assignment variable. I estimate β by
2SLS, where I instrument the treatment dummy, Mi, with the eligibility status, Elii.
The two equation system is given by
yit = α+ βMit + k2g(zit) + k2g(zit)× Eliit + uit, (1.3)
Mit = pi0 + pi1Eliit + k1g(zit) + k1g(zit)× Eliit + vit, (1.4)
9For instance, studies such as Currie and Gruber (1996) and Currie, Decker, and Lin (2008), although
using different identification strategies than in this paper, identify the intent to treat effects of Medicaid on
children who where newly eligible to receive Medicaid benefits with the Medicaid expansion.
10As shown by Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001), the treatment effect can also be recovered by
dividing the “jump” in the relationship between the outcome and eligibility −the ITT at the threshold− by
the fraction of individuals induced to take Medicaid at the threshold
β =
lim
z→z−0
E[yi|zi = z]− limz→z+0 E[yi|zi = z]
lim
z→z−0
E[Mi|zi = z]− limz→z+0 E[Mi|zi = z]
, (1.2)
where zi is the family income and z0 is the eligibility threshold.
Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) were the first to show the connection between how the treatment
effect is defined in the fuzzy RD design and the estimation of the treatment effect in an instrumental variables
setting, when the instrument is a binary variable.
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where Eliit = 1{ zitPLt ≤ Tt}, is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the child is
eligible for Medicaid, i.e., when family income (zit), as a percentage of the poverty line
(PLt), is below the eligibility threshold (Tt); k1g(.) and k1g(.) are polynomials of order g
of family income which are allowed to be different at each side of the threshold, and uit
and vit are unobserved error components. Given that the poverty line varies with family
size,11 in all specifications I control for this variable. Additionally, some states set different
thresholds for different children’s age groups, hence, I also control for child’s age. The
periods for which I observe the outcomes are t=1997, 2002, 2007, as I explain in Section
3.3. Since the model is exactly identified, 2SLS estimates of β are numerically identical to
the ratio of the reduced form coefficients θ/pi1, provided the same order of polynomial is
used for k1(.) and k2(.) (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
The parametric specification in equation (1.3) allows to retain observations that are not
necessarily close to threshold. The polynomial function of income controls for variation
in the outcome and participation coming from income differences far from the threshold.
Hence, β captures differences in the outcome variable for individuals just at the threshold.
To check the robustness of the results, as suggested by Lee and Lemieux (2010), I run the
regressions narrowing the width of the interval in the neighborhood of the threshold and I
control for different orders of polynomials, selecting the optimal order for each bandwidth
according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) of model selection.
Hahn, Todd, and Van der Klaauw (2001) were the first to suggest estimating the treatment
effect in the fuzzy RD setting using two-stage least-squares (2SLS). Furthermore, they
also point out that the estimate of β can be interpreted as a Local Average Treatment
Effect (LATE) at the threshold under the same assumptions as in Imbens and Angrist
(1994). Under these assumptions, the LATE is defined as the average effect of treatment
on the population of “compliers”, those eligible individuals at the threshold who receive
the treatment if and only if they are assigned to it.
I also estimate the reduced-form equation that recovers the IIT effects
yit = α+ θEliit + fg(zit) + fg(zit)× Eliit + uit, (1.5)
where fg(zit) is a polynomial of order g of income. The parameter θ captures the ITT effect
at the threshold, and, given that there is not perfect compliance, this parameter is always
a lower bound of β.
Medicaid is a state administered program in which each state sets its own eligibility thresh-
old, hence there are multiple thresholds at a given point in time. Therefore, to implement
the RD design some clarifications are required. First, the RD assumptions should hold
11For example, the poverty line in 2007 was $16,530 for a family of 3 members and $21,203 for a family
of 4 members.
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for each state in each year. In principle, I could estimate the model in equation (1.3) or
(1.5) for each separate state and year. However, due to sample size restrictions, throughout
the paper I either pool all the thresholds (pooling states and years, which I call the “full
sample”) or I divide the sample in two subgroups of thresholds (“high” and “low” threshold
groups). Second, I need to make family income comparable in terms of the distance from
their respective eligibility threshold, so I rescale it subtracting the respective threshold.
Third, the pooled analysis imposes a common treatment effect β or a common intention
to treat effect θ at each threshold (i.e., the eligibility indicator in equations (1.3), (1.4),
and (1.5) takes the value 1 if family income is below the threshold, but it does not distin-
guishes which threshold it is). Hence, the estimated effect is a pooled treatment effect or a
pooled intention to treat effect, respectively, as in Carneiro and Ginja (2009) and Listing
(2010). I also allow for Medicaid effects to differ between groups of thresholds. I define as
“low” thresholds all those thresholds that are between 100% and 185% the poverty line and
“high” threhsols all those threhsolds between 185% and 250%.12 I assume a common effect
of Medicaid across all thresholds that are classified as “low” thresholds and a common effect
across all thresholds classified as “high” thresholds. I allow these two effects to be different
and test wehther the difference is statistically significant.13 When I allow for heterogenous
effects across groups, the estimated models are
yit = α0 + β0M0it + β1M1it + α1T1it + kg(zit) (1.6)
+kg(zit)× T1it + kg(zit)× Eli1it + kg(zit)× Eli1it × T1it + uit,
and
yit = α0 + θ0Eli0it + θ1Eli1it + α1T1it + fg(zit) (1.7)
+fg(zit)× T1it + fg(zit)× Eli1it + fg(zit)× T1it × Eli1it + uit,
where Tj,it is an indicator that takes the value one if child i lives in period t in a state where
the eligibility threshold is Tj% of the poverty line, and Elij,it = Eliit×Tj,it, is an indicator
that takes the value one if the child is eligible for Medicaid and lives in a state where the
eligibility threshold is Tj%. I consider two categories of T : thresholds lower than 185% of
the poverty line (baseline category, T0), thresholds between 185% and 250% of the poverty
12Some states set thresholds above 250% the poverty line. I do not consider them because, as I discuss in
Section 5.2, there is not a visible discontinuity in the probability of participating in Medicaid at these higer
threholds.
13Note that, in general, the effects of Medicaid at different threshold levels will be estimated with different
states −because not all states have the same threshold in a given moment of time, except those states that
set different eligibility threhold for different age groups. To be able to compare the effects of the low and high
threhold groups, in the sense that the only difference across groups is the income level but not other state
specific characteristic, we require no correlation between the state threshold level and state characteristics,
which are correlated with the potential effect the state Medicaid program may have on children’s outcomes.
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line (T1). I instrument medicaid coverage with the eligibility indicators, Eli0,it and Eli1,it.
1.3.2 Lagged Cumulative Effects
In order to estimate the medium run causal effects of Medicaid on children’s health I also
take advantage of the “local” random assignment that the eligibility rule generates in a
period t−τ to estimate the effects that Medicaid has, τ periods later, on period t outcomes
using the following specification
yit = α+ θτElii,t−τ + fg(zi,t−τ ) + fg(zi,t−τ )× Elii,t−τ + uit, (1.8)
where Elii,t−τ is a dummy variable that takes the value one if the child was eligible for
Medicaid in period t−τ and fg is a polynomial of order g of income in period t−τ , zi,t−τ .14
The parameter θτ does not isolate the direct effect of eligibility in period t − τ on period
t outcomes, because of the possibility of multi-treatment. That is, between periods t − τ
and t a child may have multiple opportunities to be eligible and enrolled in Medicaid. To
the extent that period t− τ eligibility affects posterior participation in Medicaid, then the
parameter θτ will also capture the indirect effect that subsequent participation may have
on health outcomes of period t.
Given the possibility of multi-treatment, the marginal effect of making a child randomly
eligible for Medicaid in a period t− τ on health outcomes in period t reflects a cumulative
effect which is the sum of: 1) a direct effect on health outcomes τ years later, if it were
possible to prohibit the child from being assigned to treatment in any other subsequent
period; 2) an indirect effect on health outcomes through the effects on subsequent partic-
ipation in the program. The total effect or medium run ITT effect of Medicaid eligibility
on subsequent health, captured by θτ , is the effect of exogenously making a child eligible in
a given period, without controlling for the family behavior in subsequent years. Following
Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) the ITT parameter is15
θITTτ =
dyit
dElii,t−τ
=
∂yit
∂Mi,t−τ
× ∂Mi,t−τ
∂Elii,t−τ
+
τ∑
h=1
(
∂yit
∂Mi,t−τ+h
× ∂Mi,t−τ+h
∂Elii,t−τ
)
, (1.9)
where ∂yit∂Mi,t−τ is the direct effect of Medicaid in period t− τ under the assumption that the
child would not have access to Medicaid in the subsequent years, and
∂Mi,t−τ+h
∂Ei,t−τ is the effect
that eligibility in period t− τ has on subsequent Medicaid participation. For the medium
run analysis I also consider specifications that allow for heterogeneous effects effects by
14For the medium run analysis I restrict to estimating the ITT effects given that these effects provide a
lower bound of the average treatment effects and the IV estimates tend to be more imprecisely estimated.
15The main difference with Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) is that in their paper they have a
“sharp” RD design, that is, being eligible is equivalent to receiving the treatment.
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eligibility threshold levels.
1.4 Data
The datasets used in the analysis are the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the
Child Development Study (CDS) supplement. The CDS is a sample of children who were
between 1 and 12 years old by 1997 and it contains information about children’s health care
utilization and health outcomes, obtained from the children’s primary caregiver, as well as
characteristics such as age and race of the child. Data for this cohort of children were
collected in three waves: 1997, 2002, and 2007. Information on family income, Medicaid
coverage, and family characteristics comes from the PSID dataset which can be matched
with the CDS. I use the three CDS waves-matched with PSID data as repeated cross-
sections, and I restrict the sample to children between 5 and 18 years old in any of the
three waves. I keep only children for whom I can keep track of their eligibility and Medicaid
status up to 5 years before the outcomes are observed.
I assign the Medicaid eligibility status of each child in the survey on a yearly basis. To
impute eligibility I compare the annual family income as a percentage of the poverty line
with the corresponding eligibility threshold, that is
Eliit = 1{ incomeit
PLt(fasizeit)
≤ Tt(stateit, ageit}, (1.10)
where PLt is the federal poverty line in period t (a function of the family size), and Tt(.)
is the state-age specific threshold in period t. I use the family income and the annualized
official poverty threshold provided in the PSID data file for each family.16 I get the infor-
mation of state-age-year specific threshold from various reports of the National Governors’
Association.
I use three types of outcome variables: one measure of preventive health care utilization;
one objective measures of health; and two subjective measures of health. The measure of
preventive health care utilization is a variable that indicates whether the child had visited
a doctor at least once in the last 12 months for a routine health check-up. This measure is
generally used to capture the utilization of medical resources for preventive purposes.17
As an objective measure of health I use the Body Mass Index (BMI).18 A child’s weight
status is determined based on an age and sex-specific percentile for BMI. A child is classified
16See Grieger, Danziger, and Schoeni (2009) for further details on the measures of family income and
poverty thresholds in PSID. All income measures are expressed in 2000 US dollars.
17Other measures of health care utilization, such as the number of hospitalizations, may confound access
and morbidity, as pointed out by Currie and Gruber (1996). An absence of a doctor visits for a regular
check-up, however, better reflects an “access” problem.
18Although it is not completely “objective”, since during the interview, the primary caregiver reports the
weight of the child, and the interviewer measures his or her height.
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as obese if her BMI is at or above the 95th percentile of the BMI distribution of children
of the same age and sex.19 Medicaid coverage may facilitate and increase the contact with
physicians, which in turn increases the likelihood that children’s weight status is monitored.
Physicians recommendations about the quality of the diet and the adequate level of physical
activity may be critical inputs to improve children’s health status.
Additionally, I use two subjective health measures, both reported by the child’s caregiver:
an indicator of whether the child has an excellent health status and the number of school
days the child missed due to illness during the last 12 months. The first measure reflects
the caregiver’s perception about the child’s overall health status.20 The second measure
links child’s health status and school attendance, capturing a key aspect of how health may
affect her human capital formation. If Medicaid allows to prevent illnesses it might also
help to avoid missing school days.
One drawback of measuring the effects of Medicaid on subjective health measures is that
these effects may be difficult to interpret. Currie and Gruber (1996) argue that these
measures may capture two possible effects. If the public insurance coverage leads individuals
to increase the contacts with the medical system, then there could be a “true” effect on child
health, resulting in better child’s health reports. The increased contacts with physicians,
however, may also affect parents’ perception about the health of the child. Parents may
learn about health conditions the child already had but they were not aware of because they
did not contact physicians so frequently before having the public insurance coverage. Also,
if targeted children are switching from a private insurance to the public, parent’s reports
may be sensitive to perceived changes in the quality of health care they have access to with
the public insurance instead of the private one.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.2 present descriptive statistics of children’s and family
main characteristics, for the full sample. I refer as “full” sample as the sample pooling all
eligibility thresholds. Here, I consider all children whose annual family income is within
a distance of ± 50 thousand dollars in period t, for t=1997, 2002, and 2007, although for
the empirical analysis I restrict to narrower intervals in the neighborhood of the threshold.
Columns (3) to (8) present the same descriptives but for three subsamples, defined by the
level of Medicaid “generosity” in each state, where the generosity is determined according
to the level of the income threshold, as a percentage of the poverty line, that determines
eligibility. The first subsample consists of children living in states where the generosity
of Medicaid coverage is relatively low (the eligibility thresholds are lower than 185% the
19The CDS dataset provides indicators of the child’s obesity and overweight status according to this
definition, based on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) growth charts. Each of the CDC
BMI-for-age gender specific charts contains a series of curved lines indicating specific percentiles. See the
CDC Growth Charts for children at: http:\www.cdc.gov\growthcharts.
20Parent’s report about child’s health status can fall in one of four categories: Excellent, Good, Fair, and
Poor. In general parents tend to report either Excellent or Good, hence I constructed a dummy variable
that takes the value one when excellent is reported and zero otherwise.
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poverty line); the second subsample includes children living in states with a middle level of
generosity (the eligibility thresholds are set between 185% and 250% the poverty line); and
finally, the third subsample consist of children living in states with relatively high levels of
generosity (the eligibility thresholds are above 250% the poverty line).21
From columns (1) and (2) it is clear that Medicaid eligibles are more disadvantaged than
non-eligibles in several dimensions. They have lower family income −by definition of
eligible−, they are more likely to be minorities, to live in a female-headed family, and
to live with a less educated head of household. They are worse off in terms of health out-
comes. However, they are more likely to have visited a doctor for a check up in the last
12 months. A similar pattern emerges if I split the sample according to the different levels
of Medicaid’s coverage generosity. In the three groups, eligible children are always more
disadvantaged in terms of socioeconomic characteristics, they tend to have worse health
outcomes, and to use more preventative health are services. The only exception is the
states with higher levels of generosity, where utilization is higher for non-eligibles.
Only 54% of eligible children are actually enrolled in Medicaid, although enrollment is
heterogeneous depending on family income level.22 The incentives to enroll in Medicaid
decrease with income, as it can be observed by comparing eligible children in states with
higher levels of Medicaid generosity. The take-up rate is 64% in states with modest Medicaid
coverage generosity, where eligibles’ average family income is 11.8 thousand dollars per year.
This proportion falls to 53% in states with middle level generosity and where eligibles’
average income is 20.9 thousand dollars, and it is even lower (39%) in states with the most
generous coverage, where eligibles’ average income is 33.0 thousand dollars. The incentives
to enroll in Medicaid may decline with income because, as income rises, the family’s financial
constraint is less binding, which allows them to acquire an alternative source of coverage in
private markets.
21The choice of the limits of the groups is done in such a way that the 200% eligibility threhold falls in the
second group, because of the large number of observation associated to this cuttof. I also tried alternative
groups and in general the reults of the paper are not sensitive to this classification. Alternative grouping
were: T ≤ 185, 185 < T < 250, and T ≥ 250, and T < 200, T = 200, and T > 200.
22Note that among non-eligibles there are individuals with Medicaid coverage. This happens because
there may be timing problems in the reports of individuals family income −from which I infer eligibility
status− and Medicaid coverage. Also, income fluctuations during the year can make an individual eligible
for Medicaid at some point of the year but according to the annual income I they re clasified as non-eligible.
Approximately 10% of the non-eligibles in the full sample report having Medicaid, although this percentage
rise up to a 20% for the subgroup of individuals just above the eligibility threshold, as will be showed in
Section 1.5.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
Full sample Thresholds [100%-185%) PL Thresholds [185,250]% PL Thresholds>250% PL
Eligible Non-Eligible Eligible Non-Eligible Eligible Non-Eligible Eligible Non-Eligible
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Outcome Measures
Visited a doctor at least once in last 12 months 0.75 0.68 0.73 0.63 0.77 0.72 0.74 0.75
Obese 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.18
Overweight 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.15
Obese + Overweight 0.39 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.39 0.35 0.40 0.33
BMI 21.77 21.06 20.00 19.91 22.43 22.10 22.19 21.54
School days missed due to illness 2.60 2.64 3.23 2.38 2.33 2.88 2.65 2.58
(5.76) (4.86) (7.58) (3.61) (5.14) (5.86) (3.77) (3.67)
Health Excellent 0.41 0.52 0.34 0.47 0.43 0.56 0.45 0.60
Insurance Coverage
Medicaid Coverage 0.54 0.11 0.64 0.13 0.53 0.09 0.39 0.07
Private Insurance 0.30 0.78 0.20 0.76 0.30 0.79 0.53 0.88
Medicaid and Private 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.02
Family and Child Characteristics
Family Income (2000 dollars) 19,916.53 52,139.65 11,799.60 43,732.20 20,868.69 56,673.64 33,023.05 78,163.68
(12,412.04) (18,517.90) (7,371.64) (15,269.43) (10,788.69) (16,531.64) (16,248.02) (19,740.05)
Income Cutoff (Poverty Line × T) 35,689.21 30,314.07 22,589.13 21,279.56 37,397.48 35,195.15 55,891.68 58,202.88
(13,298.81) (12,435.80) (6,503.69) (6,058.63) (9,078.54) (8,236.56) (13,876.26) (13,979.42)
Income threshold as % of poverty line 198.28 172.06 124.17 119.72 203.51 200.80 337.17 329.69
(64.51) (59.51) (23.72) (23.61) (15.62) (15.34) (46.14) (41.66)
Metropolitan Area 0.72 0.65 0.77 0.65 0.70 0.64 0.67 0.82
Rural Area 0.13 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.07
Family Size 4.27 4.07 4.29 4.10 4.35 4.04 3.79 4.05
(1.41) (1.17) (1.37) (1.14) (1.42) (1.19) (1.30) (1.16)
Education (yrs.) of the Head of the Household 11.58 12.88 11.61 12.70 11.40 12.91 12.46 14.02
(2.49) (2.07) (1.98v (2.04) (2.70) (2.05) (2.08) (2.11)
Female Head 0.61 0.26 0.71 0.29 0.59 0.24 0.49 0.14
Child Age 11.03 10.84 9.46 9.54 11.59 11.89 11.48 11.75
(3.26) (3.28) (3.13) (2.95) (3.14) (3.13) (3.01) (3.42)
Male 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.55 0.53
Black 0.62 0.40 0.75 0.47 0.60 0.34 0.42 0.28
Birth Weight (kg) 3.19 3.34 3.15 3.34 3.19 3.34 3.24 3.36
(0.69) (0.64) (0.72) (0.65) (0.67) (0.64) (0.71) (0.60)
Mother Age at Child’s Birth 24.96 26.84 24.80 26.45 24.92 27.04 25.51 28.18
(5.87) (5.57) (5.71) (5.49) (5.95) (5.63) (5.78) (5.38)
N 1577 2115 414 972 986 1024 177 119
Notes: Observations are restricted to children in the CDS whose family income is at a distance of ± 50 thousand dollars from the threshold in years 1997, 2002 or 2007. Columns (1) and (2) present descriptive
statistics for the full sample. Columns (3) and (4) correspond to the subsample of children living in states where the generosity of Medicaid coverage is relatively low −the eligibility thresholds are lower than
185% of the poverty line; Columns (5) and (6) correspond to the subsample of children living in states with a middle level of generosity −the eligibility thresholds are set between 185% and 250% of the poverty
line; Columns (7) and (8) correspond to the subsample of children living in states with relatively high levels of generosity −the eligibility thresholds are above 250% of the poverty line.
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1.5 Validity of RD Design: Robustness Analysis
A first step in the analysis involves testing the identification assumptions of the RD to check
its internal validity. The empirical strategy is based on the assumption that eligibility to
receive Medicaid coverage is as good as randomly assigned in the neighborhood of the
income thresholds. This assumption requires families to be unable to manipulate their
incomes perfectly well so that they cannot control if their children qualify for Medicaid.
Additionally, for the validity of the design, the probability of participating in Medicaid
as a function of family income should show a discontinuity at the threshold. Finally, an
implication of the “local” randomization is that individuals at either side of the threshold
should be similar both in observed and unobserved characteristics.
To check the validity of the RD design I perform the following robustness analysis, as
proposed by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010). First, I inspect the
histogram of the family income −the assignment variable− to check whether families have
imprecise control over it. A spike to the left of the threshold may indicate that families
are manipulating their income to fall below the eligibility threshold. Second, I estimate the
participation equation to check whether Medicaid eligibility rule induces a discontinuity at
the threshold. Finally, I examine whether baseline covariates (variables that should not
be affected by the program as well as individual characteristics not taken into account to
determine eligibility) are balanced on either side of the threshold.
1.5.1 Manipulation of the assignment variable
Figure 1.1 presents an histogram with the distribution of family income, pooling all observa-
tions for all years in which I observe the family income of children in the CDS (1991-2007).
This graph shows the number of observations within bins of 2.5 thousand dollars width.
Given that there are multiple thresholds, income is normalized by subtracting the corre-
sponding eligibility threshold. A negative value indicates that income is below the threshold
and the child is eligible for Medicaid. An accumulation of observations below the normal-
ized threshold (equal to zero) may be an indication of income manipulation. At first sight
families do not seem to be manipulating their income in order to be below the threshold.
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of the Family Income (normalized). All thresholds pooled. Years
1991-2007.
McCrary (2008) proposes a simple two-step procedure for testing whether there is a discon-
tinuity in the density of the assignment variable. Figure 1.2 graphically displays the results
of the density discontinuity test at the cutoff for different samples. Figure A presents the
density estimate for the full sample. The estimate of the log difference in the height of
the density function at the threshold is -0.027 (standard error 0.045). The test suggests no
discontinuity in the density at the normalized threshold (t-statistic of -0.590).23
To check whether the incentives to manipulate family income vary across different eligibility
thresholds I perform the test on three subsamples. The first subsample consists of families
who reside in states where the eligibility threshold is lower than 185% the poverty line
(Panel B of Figure 1.2), the second subsample considers families who reside in states with
eligibility thresholds between 185% and 250% the poverty line (Panel C of Figure 1.2), and
finally, a the third subsample consists of families residing in states with thresholds above
250% the poverty line (Panel D of Figure 1.2). In all the cases the test fail to reject the
null hypothesis of no discontinuity at the threshold.
1.5.2 Discontinuity in the probability of participating in Medicaid
As discussed in Section 1.3, despite of imperfect compliance, the fuzzy RD analysis can
identify a LATE at the threshold as long as the eligibility rule generates a jump in the
participation rate at the threshold.
Figure 1.3 plots the proportion of children who are enrolled in Medicaid over family income
for the years 1997, 2002, and 2007. Each dot is the proportion of children with Medicaid
coverage within a family income bin of 2 thousand dollars width. The solid lines are
predictions from local linear regressions with bandwidth of 5 thousand dollars estimated
with the raw data. We can observe that at the threshold −normalized to 0− the probability
of participation has a discontinuity of about 15 percentage points.
23I also I perform the same exercise on the sample that that pools years 1997, 2002, and 2007. I also
reject the null hypothesis of a discontinuity of the density distribution at the threshold.
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Figure 1.2: Testing Manipulation of Assignment Variable. Years 1991-2007.
A. Full Sample B. Thresholds under 185% PL
C. Thresholds [185, 250]% PL D. Thresholds over 250% PL
Dots are density with the indicated binsize (in thousands dollars). Solid lines are predictions from local linear
regressions using triangle kernel. Standard errors, binsize b, and the bandwidth h are calculated as in McCrary
(2008). Full sample: h=12.82 b=0.288 Under 185: h=12.24 b=0.349. 185-250: b=0.481 h=15.865. Over 250:
h=25.59 b=1.388
Table 1.2 reports the results of the parametric estimation of the participation equation
specified as
Mit = pi0 + pi1Eliit + k1g(zit) + k1g(zit)× Eliit + uit, t = 1997, 2002, 2007, (1.11)
where Eliit is the eligibility indicator in period t, Mit is Medicaid enrollment status in the
same period, and k1g(.) is a polynomial of order g of family income, zi.
The table presents the estimated jump in the full sample (pooling all thresholds), and in
three separate subsamples for different groups of threshold levels. Each column of this table
shows the estimates of the same model but considering windows of different widths around
the threshold.24 The results indicate that making a child with family income equal to the
threshold eligible for Medicaid increases the probability of enrollment by between 12 and
16 percentage points in the full sample, depending on the width of the interval around the
threshold.25
The results show that the discontinuity in Medicaid participation is larger in states with
24I select the order of the polynomial according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC) of model
selection, AIC = N ln(σˆ2) + 2p., where σˆ2 is the mean squared error of the regression, and p is the number
of parameters in the regression model. The AIC favors in most of the cases polynomials of order 1 or 2.
25Excluding the case for a bandwidth of 30 and polynomial of order 1, that seem to overestimate the jump
at the threshold.
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Figure 1.3: Medicaid Participation. Full sample. Years 1997, 2002 and 2007.
Table 1.2: Participation Equation. “Jump” at the threshold. Years 1997, 2002, 2007.
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
One
All Thresholds 0.236*** 0.108* 0.096 0.251*** 0.178*** 0.149**
(0.056) (0.057) (0.070) (0.052) (0.059) (0.068)
Thresholds under 185% 0.275*** 0.220*** 0.142** 0.248*** 0.164*** 0.128*
(0.056) (0.057) (0.071) (0.057) (0.061) (0.075)
Thresholds 185-250% 0.236*** 0.108* 0.096 0.251*** 0.178*** 0.149**
(0.056) (0.057) (0.070) (0.052) (0.059) (0.068)
Thresholds over 250% -0.003 0.059 -0.070 0.039 0.088 -0.016
(0.088) (0.108) (0.125) (0.083) (0.108) (0.113)
Two
All Thresholds 0.136*** 0.122*** 0.126*** 0.149*** 0.163*** 0.137**
(0.036) (0.039) (0.047) (0.041) (0.046) (0.058)
Thresholds under 185% 0.176*** 0.154** 0.123 0.155** 0.159** 0.150
(0.063) (0.069) (0.083) (0.073) (0.079) (0.106)
Thresholds 185-250% 0.110** 0.144** 0.174** 0.173*** 0.174** 0.227**
(0.050) (0.066) (0.073) (0.061) (0.079) (0.094)
Thresholds over 250% 0.031 0.102 0.054 0.088 0.168 0.255*
(0.088) (0.108) (0.101) (0.109) (0.120) (0.131)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
N 2163 1738 1361 2163 1738 1361
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. All regressions are linear
probability models and all include a polynomial of the indicated order of log income (rescaled to equal zero at the
threshold); age and family size and its squares; year and state dummies. In each column the sample is restricted to
observations with family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated.
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the lower eligibility thresholds, except in the smaller bandwidth considered. In states
where T < 185% the jump is between 12 and 22 percentage points, while in states where
185% ≤ T ≤ 250% it is between 10 and 22 percentage points. In states where the thresholds
are above 250% the poverty line I do not find evidence that making a child eligible for
Medicaid increases the chance that she receives Medicaid coverage. Higher-income families,
targeted by Medicaid in more generous states, may not find beneficial to enroll their children
in Medicaid because they may have better options available. This result is consistent with
the quality of private health insurance being a normal good.26
Additionally, I take advantage of the panel structure of my dataset to perform a placebo
test to check whether Medicaid participation in a period t − τ as a function of income
in period t changes discontinuously at period t thresholds. If eligibility in period t is
truly exogenous in the neighborhood of the threshold, then the only variable that should
change discontinuously as a function of income in period t is Medicaid coverage in period
t. Although there could be some correlation between income in period t and Medicaid
participation in a period t− τ (because income is serially correlated), I should not observe
any discontinuity in period t − τ participation at the period t threshold (i.e., eligibility
in the neighborhood of the threshold in period t is exogenous and does not depend on
previous Medicaid participation.) Since Medicaid participation across periods can be highly
correlated, finding a discontinuity in participation in period t but not in t − τ would be a
strong piece of evidence supporting the validity of the RD design (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
In Section 1.8.2.1 of Appendix B, I present graphs showing the relation between Medicaid
coverage in period t− τ and family income in period t. The graphs show that participation
in t− τ is negatively correlated with income in t and that it is a smooth function of family
income in period t . Medicaid participation in periods t − 2 and t − 3 does not change
discontinuously at the threshold although for period t − 1, there is a small jump at the
threshold. This is likely to happen because, on the one hand, most states guarantees a
minimum of six months to one year of permanence in Medicaid with independence of their
family income and, on the other hand, because family income may not change substantially
from one year to the other.
1.5.3 Balance of individual characteristics on either side of the thresholds
The third robustness analysis consists on checking whether children characteristics are
“locally” balanced, which is an implication of the “local” randomization generated by the
eligibility rule. To check for this, I run regressions of the form
yit = γ0 + γ1Eliit + fg(zit) + uit, t = 1997, 2002, 2007, (1.12)
26These results remain the same when considering the sample that includes all years for which I can keep
track family income in PSID (period 1991 and 2007). See Appendix 1.8.2.
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where yit are child and family characteristics not taken into account at the moment of
determining Medicaid eligibility. I also consider pre-treatment variables which should not
be affected by eligibility status, such as child’s birth weight or mother’s age at child’s birth.
If any of the observable characteristics changes discontinuously at the threshold, it is an
indication that the eligibility rule does not generates a “local” randomization.
Table 1.3 presents the results and there are no signs of systematic discontinuous changes of
characteristics at the threshold.
Table 1.3: Balance of covariates on either side of the threshold. Full sample. Years 1997,
2002, 2007.
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Dep. Var. ±30 ±20 ±15
Male 0.083** 0.068 0.069
(0.038) (0.042) (0.045)
Black 0.016 0.025 0.018
(0.033) (0.036) (0.038)
Metropolitan Area 0.044 0.066 0.061
(0.040) (0.042) (0.044)
Rural Area -0.034 -0.047 -0.037
(0.035) (0.038) (0.039)
Child Birth Weight -0.019 -0.039 -0.047
(0.059) (0.062) (0.068)
Head Education (yrs) 0.047 0.095 0.057
(0.181) (0.189) (0.205)
Mother age at child birth 0.481 0.436 0.523
(0.493) (0.527) (0.555)
N 2163 1738 1361
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the family level. Each entry comes from a separate
linear regression, yit = γ0 + γ1Eliit + fg(zit) + uit, where the dependent variable is replaced by children and family
characteristics, and pre-treatment covariates. The reported coefficient is γˆ1 of equation (1.12). Each regression
includes 2th order polynomial of log of income, age, and family size as well as year and state dummies.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Contemporaneous Effects
Preventive health care utilization. Table 1.4 presents the results of the contempora-
neous effects of Medicaid −equations (1.3) and (1.5)− on utilization of preventive medical
care for the full sample (pooling all eligibility thresholds), and the equations (1.6) and (1.7)
when allowing for heterogeneous effects for the two groups of thresholds, “low” (thresholds
lower than 185%) and “high” threholds (thresholds between 185 and 2055%).27 The table
present the results for different orders of polynomials and different bandwidths. For each
bandwidth, the optimal order of the polynomial is selected according to the Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC) of model selection, which in most cases is of order 1 or 2, so I report
both specifications.
27We showed in previous period that the discontinuity condition in the first stage is not satisfied for the
group of thresholds higher than 250% of the poverty line.
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The intention to treat estimates for the full sample show that making a child, with family
income equal to the threshold, eligible for Medicaid increases his health care utilization
by 5-10 percentage points relative to a similar child but non-eligible.28 The IV estimates
for the pooled thresholds indicate that Medicaid increases by 25-45 percentage point the
probability of visiting a doctor for preventive purposes in the subpopulation of compliers
−those who, made eligible for Medicaid, would enroll into the program. The results are
not, however, statistically significant under all specifications.
When I allow for heterogeneous effects by threshold groups, a clear pattern emerges. The
results indicate that Medicaid eligibility induces a 15-20 percentage points increase in uti-
lization for children in the group of low thresholds, with an average effect of about 50 to
80 percentage point for the compliers.29 However, Medicaid does not have a statistically
significant impact on utilization at higher thresholds. The difference between the estimated
intention to treat effects at low and high eligibility thresholds is always statistically different
from zero, but not always for the LATE estimates.
Health outcomes. Tables 1.5 to 1.7 present the estimated contemporaneous effects of
Medicaid on some measures of children’s health: an indicator of whether the child has
excellent health, obesity, and the number of school days missed due to illness. Each table
presents the results for different model specifications and bandwidth choices, for the sample
pooling all the thresholds, and for the subsamples of low and high thresholds. According
to these results, Medicaid does not seem to have a positive effect on health in the short
run for children between 5 and 18 years old. In all cases, the effects of Medicaid on these
health measures are null. Even at low threshold levels the effects are null, despite Medicaid
increases preventive health care utilization.
28Figure 1.4 in the appendix gives the graphical representation of this intention to treat effect.
29The estimated jump with the largest bandwidth and using a polynomial of order 1 tend to be overesti-
mated , which gives a bias downward the LATE estimate.
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Table 1.4: Contemporaneous effects of Medicaid on utilization. Children between 5 and
18 years old. Dep. Var.: The child has visited a doctor for a routine health check-up in the
last 12 months.
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
A. Intention to treat
One
All Thresholds 0.080** 0.089** 0.050 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.057
(0.029) (0.033) (0.039) (0.033) (0.039) (0.043)
Low Thresholds 0.155*** 0.177*** 0.172*** 0.184*** 0.227*** 0.188***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.055) (0.053) (0.059) (0.071)
High Thresholds 0.025 -0.015 0.005 0.044 -0.018 0.011
(0.035) (0.042) (0.052) (0.043) (0.053) (0.062)
Two
All Thresholds 0.056* 0.069** 0.062 0.064 0.046 0.048
(0.034) (0.038) (0.047) (0.043) (0.048) (0.057)
Low Thresholds 0.152*** 0.181*** 0.196*** 0.184** 0.203*** 0.213**
(0.050) (0.054) (0.070) (0.076) (0.078) (0.090)
High Thresholds -0.012 -0.016 0.029 -0.016 -0.051 -0.026
(0.039) (0.052) (0.059) (0.056) (0.072) (0.088)
Polynomial Order B. Outcome Equation. IV-RD
One
All Thresholds 0.298*** 0.403*** 0.311 0.396*** 0.454*** 0.329
(0.107) (0.148) (0.243) (0.131) (0.175) (0.252)
Low Thresholds 0.385*** 0.473*** 0.611** 0.509*** 0.647*** 0.661**
(0.115) (0.144) (0.246) (0.159) (0.197) (0.284)
High Thresholds 0.169 -0.133 0.150 0.252 -0.110 0.191
(0.178) (0.647) (0.583) (0.214) (0.445) (0.515)
Two
All Thresholds 0.330 0.447* 0.372 0.358 0.237 0.312
(0.204) (0.258) (0.293) (0.248) (0.247) (0.383)
Low Thresholds 0.490** 0.617** 0.660** 0.615** 0.673** 0.833*
(0.201) (0.240) (0.297) (0.290) (0.311) (0.462)
High Thresholds -0.135 -0.108 0.338 -0.137 -0.367 -0.134
(0.612) (0.534) (0.571) (0.541) (0.633) (0.612)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
N 2613 1904 1486 2613 1904 1486
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. All regressions are linear
probability models and all include a polynomial of log income (rescaled to equal zero at the threshold); age and
family size and its squares; year and state dummies. In each column the sample is restricted to observations with
family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated. The intention to treat estimates in each column,
when not allowing for heterogeneous effects (“all thresholds” pooled), come from the following model:
yit = α+ θEliit + fg(zit) + fg(zit)×Eliit + uit. The IV-RD estimates for the full sample (“all thresholds”) in each
column come from the following model: yit = α+ βMit + kg(zit) + kg(zit)× Eliit + uit, where eligibility
instruments for Medicaid coverage. The intention to treat estimates in each column, when allowing for
heterogeneous effects by threshold groups (“low” and “high” thresholds), come from the following model:
yit = α0 + θ0Eli0it + θ1Eli1it + α1T1it + fg(zit) + fg(zit)× T1it + fg(zit)× Eli1it + fg(zit)× T1it × Eli1it + uit,
where Eli0it indicates eligibility in a low threshold state, and Eli1it indicates eligibility in a high threshold state.
The IV-RD estimates in each column come from the following model:
yit = α0 + β0M0it + β1M1it + α1T1it + kg(zit) + kg(zit)× T1it + kg(zit)× Eli1it + kg(zit)× Eli1it × T1it + uit,
where eligibility instruments for Medicaid coverage. The first three columns do not allow for different polynomials
at each side of the cutoff.
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Table 1.5: Contemporaneous effects of Medicaid on the probability of being in Excellent
Health. Children between 5 and 18 years old.
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
A. Intention to treat
One
All Thresholds -0.053 -0.012 -0.011 -0.062* -0.018 -0.015
(0.034) (0.036) (0.045) (0.038) (0.042) (0.050)
Low Thresholds -0.071 -0.023 -0.001 -0.100 -0.031 -0.010
(0.053) (0.053) (0.069) (0.062) (0.065) (0.076)
High Thresholds -0.041 -0.018 -0.054 -0.016 -0.023 -0.050
(0.039) (0.053) (0.065) (0.051) (0.065) (0.077)
Two
All Thresholds -0.036 0.003 -0.029 -0.009 -0.006 -0.064
(0.038) (0.042) (0.055) (0.049) (0.058) (0.071)
Low Thresholds -0.046 0.009 -0.010 -0.022 0.031 -0.014
(0.064) (0.066) (0.087) (0.081) (0.088) (0.115)
High Thresholds -0.040 -0.044 -0.066 -0.060 -0.118 -0.203**
(0.048) (0.064) (0.072) (0.071) (0.091) (0.102)
Polynomial Order B. Outcome Equation. IV-RD
One
All Thresholds -0.204 -0.062 -0.071 -0.243* -0.094 -0.092
(0.126) (0.182) (0.301) (0.145) (0.214) (0.302)
Low Thresholds -0.232 -0.098 -0.039 -0.364 -0.148 -0.069
(0.164) (0.201) (0.398) (0.228) (0.302) (0.459)
High Thresholds -0.176 -0.129 -0.421 -0.059 -0.124 -0.328
(0.171) (0.454) (0.591) (0.201) (0.373) (0.518)
Two
All Thresholds -0.217 0.018 -0.194 -0.049 -0.033 -0.391
(0.237) (0.282) (0.374) (0.273) (0.298) (0.443)
Low Thresholds -0.263 0.021 -0.063 -0.151 0.120 0.005
(0.353) (0.337) (0.627) (0.458) (0.466) (0.702)
High Thresholds -0.312 -0.300 -0.407 -0.404 -0.913 -1.445
(0.441) (0.482) (0.521) (0.498) (0.809) (1.125)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
N 2178 1581 1242 2178 1581 1242
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. All regressions are linear
probability models and all include a polynomial of log income (rescaled to equal zero at the threshold); age and
family size and its squares; year and state dummies. In each column the sample is restricted to observations with
family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated. The intention to treat estimates in each column,
when not allowing for heterogeneous effects (“all thresholds” pooled), come from the following model:
yit = α+ θEliit + fg(zit) + fg(zit)×Eliit + uit. The IV-RD estimates for the full sample (“all thresholds”) in each
column come from the following model: yit = α+ βMit + kg(zit) + kg(zit)× Eliit + uit, where eligibility
instruments for Medicaid coverage. The intention to treat estimates in each column, when allowing for
heterogeneous effects by threshold groups (“low” and “high” thresholds), come from the following model:
yit = α0 + θ0Eli0it + θ1Eli1it + α1T1it + fg(zit) + fg(zit)× T1it + fg(zit)× Eli1it + fg(zit)× T1it × Eli1it + uit,
where Eli0it indicates eligibility in a low threshold state, and Eli1it indicates eligibility in a high threshold state.
The IV-RD estimates in each column come from the following model:
yit = α0 + β0M0it + β1M1it + α1T1it + kg(zit) + kg(zit)× T1it + kg(zit)× Eli1it + kg(zit)× Eli1it × T1it + uit,
where eligibility instruments for Medicaid coverage. The first three columns do not allow for different polynomials
at each side of the cutoff.
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Table 1.6: Contemporaneous effects of Medicaid on Obesity. Children between 5 and 18
years old.
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
A. Intention to treat
One
All Thresholds 0.003 -0.059 -0.011 -0.020 -0.059 -0.016
(0.031) (0.040) (0.043) (0.036) (0.043) (0.049)
Low Thresholds 0.005 -0.058 0.008 -0.015 -0.055 0.009
(0.050) (0.062) (0.064) (0.056) (0.068) (0.074)
High Thresholds 0.004 -0.078 -0.043 -0.037 -0.088 -0.053
(0.039) (0.056) (0.068) (0.046) (0.057) (0.071)
Two
All Thresholds -0.039 -0.055 -0.028 -0.058 -0.037 -0.045
(0.037) (0.045) (0.053) (0.049) (0.058) (0.067)
Low Thresholds -0.055 -0.052 -0.011 -0.017 0.008 -0.022
(0.059) (0.069) (0.081) (0.083) (0.094) (0.112)
High Thresholds -0.031 -0.061 -0.046 -0.094 -0.020 -0.015
(0.048) (0.062) (0.075) (0.065) (0.086) (0.102)
Polynomial Order B. Outcome Equation. IV-RD
One
All Thresholds 0.012 -0.423 -0.099 -0.606*** -0.625 -0.864
(0.117) (0.323) (0.400) (0.209) (0.407) (0.783)
Low Thresholds -0.015 -0.055 0.009 -0.062 -0.276 0.093
(0.056) (0.068) (0.074) (0.221) (0.401) (0.677)
High Thresholds -0.037 -0.088 -0.053 -0.193 -1.115 -1.277
(0.046) (0.057) (0.071) (0.245) (1.122) (2.725)
Two
All Thresholds -0.332 -0.595 -0.377 -0.880 -1.479 -2.284
(0.333) (0.561) (0.729) (0.866) (1.611) (2.673)
Low Thresholds -0.017 0.008 -0.022 -0.360 -0.048 0.052
(0.083) (0.094) (0.112) (0.852) (1.123) (4.703)
High Thresholds -0.094 -0.020 -0.015 -1.657 -1.304 1.993
(0.065) (0.086) (0.102) (2.327) (8.197) (43.402)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
N 2178 1581 1242 2178 1581 1242
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. All regressions are linear
probability models and all include a polynomial of log income (rescaled to equal zero at the threshold); age and
family size and its squares; year and state dummies. In each column the sample is restricted to observations with
family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated. The intention to treat estimates in each column,
when not allowing for heterogeneous effects (“all thresholds” pooled), come from the following model:
yit = α+ θEliit + fg(zit) + fg(zit)×Eliit + uit. The IV-RD estimates for the full sample (“all thresholds”) in each
column come from the following model: yit = α+ βMit + kg(zit) + kg(zit)× Eliit + uit, where eligibility
instruments for Medicaid coverage. The intention to treat estimates in each column, when allowing for
heterogeneous effects by threshold groups (“low” and “high” thresholds), come from the following model:
yit = α0 + θ0Eli0it + θ1Eli1it + α1T1it + fg(zit) + fg(zit)× T1it + fg(zit)× Eli1it + fg(zit)× T1it × Eli1it + uit,
where Eli0it indicates eligibility in a low threshold state, and Eli1it indicates eligibility in a high threshold state.
The IV-RD estimates in each column come from the following model:
yit = α0 + β0M0it + β1M1it + α1T1it + kg(zit) + kg(zit)× T1it + kg(zit)× Eli1it + kg(zit)× Eli1it × T1it + uit,
where eligibility instruments for Medicaid coverage. The first three columns do not allow for different polynomials
at each side of the cutoff.
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Table 1.7: Contemporaneous effects of Medicaid on Number of School Days Missed due
to Illness . Children between 5 and 18 years old.
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
A. Intention to treat
One
All Thresholds -0.097 -0.198 -1.107* -0.133 -0.279 -0.715
(0.333) (0.443) (0.596) (0.349) (0.398) (0.484)
Low Thresholds 0.550 0.635 -1.198 0.545 0.378 -0.981
(0.671) (0.749) (0.803) (0.725) (0.793) (0.795)
High Thresholds -0.131 -0.280 0.142 0.202 0.004 0.714
(0.361) (0.458) (0.639) (0.457) (0.524) (0.828)
Two
All Thresholds -0.753** -0.778* -0.267 -0.133 -0.279 -0.715
(0.380) (0.440) (0.496) (0.349) (0.398) (0.484)
Low Thresholds -0.713 -0.533 -0.469 -1.102 -1.130 -1.016
(0.665) (0.622) (0.799) (0.887) (0.911) (1.207)
High Thresholds -0.496 -0.087 0.951 0.416 0.951 1.232
(0.393) (0.519) (0.869) (0.603) (0.782) (0.862)
Polynomial Order B. Outcome Equation. IV-RD
One
All Thresholds -0.373 -0.997 -7.400 -1.789 -2.333 1.688
(1.291) (2.306) (4.453) (2.530) (2.661) (4.225)
Low Thresholds 1.649 2.183 -7.018 2.008 1.751 -5.765
(2.040) (2.810) (5.766) (2.625) (3.696) (5.633)
High Thresholds -0.455 -2.298 1.603 0.770 -0.072 5.097
(1.736) (4.033) (5.734) (1.793) (3.033) (6.123)
Two
All Thresholds -0.332 -0.595 -0.377 -0.880 -1.479 -2.284
(0.333) (0.561) (0.729) (0.866) (1.611) (2.673)
Low Thresholds -3.997 -2.797 -3.513 -5.882 -5.440 -6.528
(3.822) (3.474) (6.645) (5.777) (5.467) (8.902)
High Thresholds -3.836 -0.444 6.125 3.559 8.208 9.814
(3.793) (3.884) (6.443) (4.558) (8.091) (9.876)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
N 2178 1581 1242 2178 1581 1242
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. All regressions are linear
probability models and all include a polynomial of log income (rescaled to equal zero at the threshold); age and
family size and its squares; year and state dummies. In each column the sample is restricted to observations with
family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated. The intention to treat estimates in each column,
when not allowing for heterogeneous effects (“all thresholds” pooled), come from the following model:
yit = α+ θEliit + fg(zit) + fg(zit)×Eliit + uit. The IV-RD estimates for the full sample (“all thresholds”) in each
column come from the following model: yit = α+ βMit + kg(zit) + kg(zit)× Eliit + uit, where eligibility
instruments for Medicaid coverage. The intention to treat estimates in each column, when allowing for
heterogeneous effects by threshold groups (“low” and “high” thresholds), come from the following model:
yit = α0 + θ0Eli0it + θ1Eli1it + α1T1it + fg(zit) + fg(zit)× T1it + fg(zit)× Eli1it + fg(zit)× T1it × Eli1it + uit,
where Eli0it indicates eligibility in a low threshold state, and Eli1it indicates eligibility in a high threshold state.
The IV-RD estimates in each column come from the following model:
yit = α0 + β0M0it + β1M1it + α1T1it + kg(zit) + kg(zit)× T1it + kg(zit)× Eli1it + kg(zit)× Eli1it × T1it + uit,
where eligibility instruments for Medicaid coverage. The first three columns do not allow for different polynomials
at each side of the cutoff.
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1.6.2 Lagged Effects on Health
1.6.2.1 Full Sample
Now I turn to the analysis of the cumulative effects of Medicaid in the medium run, looking
first at the effects on the sample pooling all thresholds. Tables 1.8 and 1.9 report the
cumulative IIT estimates, which capture the effect of making a child randomly eligible for
Medicaid in a given period on the probability of being in excellent health and obesity after
τ periods −equation (1.8).30 These ITT estimates identify the effects of eligibility in one
moment of time on future outcomes, without controlling for behavioral changes between the
period of eligibility and the period in which outcomes are measured. Thus, IIT estimates
reflect accumulated effects as shown in equation (1.9).31
Results indicate that Medicaid has a negative effect on the probability of being in excellent
health after one and two years (and the effect then vanishes) and a positive effect on the
probability of being obese after two years (and the effect then vanishes). Making a child
eligible for Medicaid decreases the likelihood of being in excellent health in about 7-11
percentage points after one year, relative to a similar non eligible child. This negative effect
still persists after two years and it is almost of the same magnitude. Similarly, making
a child eligible for Medicaid increases the probability of being obese in 10-14 percentage
points after two years, relative to a similar child not eligible for Medicaid.32
1.6.2.2 Threshold groups
The finding that Medicaid has a differential impact on preventive health care utilization
by threshold groups, rises the question whether it also has a differential impact on health
outcomes in the medium run. Allowing for heterogeneous effects of Medicaid on the prob-
ability of being in excellent health by threshold groups, we can observe from Table (1.10)
that the negative effects after one and two years are, however, present at both low and
high threshold groups, although the results are weaker (the effects are not statistically sig-
nificant in many specifications but the magnitude of the effects are similar across models.)
The negative effects tends two vanish afterwards, since the effects are not significant for
neither group after 3 years onwards.
Similarly, results in Table 1.11 show that the same pattern emerges for the effect of Medicaid
on the probability of being obese after two years. Medicaid has a positive impact on (it
increases) the probability of being obese at both low and high thresholds after two years,
and the effects vanish afterwards.
30The lagged effects on school days missed due to illness are present in table 1.15 in the Appendix. No
effects are found on this variable.
31I do not report the IV estimates because they tend to be more imprecisely estimated. However, ITT
effects are lower bounds for the average treatment effects.
32I also find, consistent with this result, that Medicaid increases child BMI after two years.
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Table 1.8: Lagged cumulative intention to treat effects of Medicaid on Excellent Health.
Children between 5 and 18 years old. Full sample (all thresholds pooled).
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
Eligible One Year Before (θ1)
One -0.096*** -0.108*** -0.073* -0.093*** -0.115*** -0.090***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.042) (0.035) (0.042) (0.047)
Two -0.076** -0.082** -0.079 -0.056 -0.071 -0.065
(0.036) (0.040) (0.051) (0.048) (0.053) (0.063)
Polynomial Order Eligible Two Years Before (θ2)
One -0.070* -0.081** -0.081* -0.067* -0.078* -0.089*
(0.036) (0.040) (0.047) (0.040) (0.044) (0.051)
Two -0.067 -0.090* -0.093* -0.054 -0.065 -0.040
(0.043) (0.048) (0.054) (0.053) (0.059) (0.066)
Eligible Three Years Before (θ3)
One -0.048 -0.062 -0.060 -0.032 -0.041 -0.063
(0.033) (0.038) (0.045) (0.040) (0.044) (0.051)
Two -0.048 -0.075 -0.071 -0.030 -0.053 -0.022
(0.039) (0.046) (0.052) (0.047) (0.051) (0.062)
Eligible Four Years Before (θ4)
One -0.052 -0.048 0.001 -0.022 -0.027 0.012
(0.034) (0.037) (0.043) (0.040) (0.045) (0.051)
Two 0.012 0.006 -0.010 0.023 -0.013 -0.005
(0.041) (0.043) (0.054) (0.053) (0.060) (0.069)
Eligible Five Years Before (θ5)
One -0.065* -0.022 -0.042 -0.045 0.023 -0.008
(0.034) (0.036) (0.044) (0.038) (0.042) (0.050)
Two -0.031 -0.008 -0.030 0.020 0.022 0.021
(0.039) (0.043) (0.052) (0.049) (0.055) (0.064)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. All regressions are linear
probability models and all include a polynomial of log income (rescaled to equal zero at the threshold); age and
family size and its squares; year and state dummies. In each column the sample is restricted to observations with
family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated. The lagged intention to treat estimates in each
column come from the following model: yit = α+ θτElii,t−τ + fg(zi,t−τ ) + fg(zi,t−τ )× Elii,t−τ + uit. The first
three columns do not allow for different polynomials at each side of the cutoff.
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Table 1.9: Lagged cumulative intention to treat effects of Medicaid on Obesity. Children
between 5 and 18 years old. Full sample (all thresholds pooled).
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
Eligible One Year Before (θ1)
One 0.024 0.038 0.039 0.030 0.033 0.027
(0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.028) (0.032) (0.038)
Two 0.031 0.043 0.042 0.019 0.020 0.066
(0.029) (0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.042) (0.048)
Polynomial Order Eligible Two Years Before (θ2)
One 0.095*** 0.108*** 0.130*** 0.098*** 0.105*** 0.129***
(0.031) (0.033) (0.038) (0.032) (0.036) (0.042)
Two 0.119*** 0.125*** 0.142*** 0.136*** 0.130*** 0.081
(0.034) (0.038) (0.044) (0.042) (0.047) (0.055)
Eligible Three Years Before (θ3)
One 0.053 0.042 0.043 0.053 0.048 0.021
(0.032) (0.035) (0.042) (0.035) (0.041) (0.047)
Two 0.049 0.041 0.050 -0.017 -0.039 -0.033
(0.037) (0.042) (0.050) (0.049) (0.054) (0.063)
Eligible Four Years Before (θ4)
One 0.010 0.002 0.017 -0.022 -0.027 0.012
(0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.040) (0.045) (0.051)
Two 0.006 0.006 -0.001 0.023 -0.013 -0.005
(0.032) (0.034) (0.043) (0.053) (0.060) (0.069)
Eligible Five Years Before (θ5)
One 0.027 0.019 0.024 0.038 0.044 0.072**
(0.024) (0.027) (0.034) (0.028) (0.031) (0.037)
Two 0.025 0.020 0.076 0.060 0.079 0.067
(0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.050)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. All regressions are linear
probability models and all include a polynomial of log income (rescaled to equal zero at the threshold); age and
family size and its squares; year and state dummies. In each column the sample is restricted to observations with
family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated. The lagged intention to treat estimates in each
column come from the following model: yit = α+ θτElii,t−τ + fg(zi,t−τ ) + fg(zi,t−τ )× Elii,t−τ + uit. The first
three columns do not allow for different polynomials at each side of the cutoff.
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Table 1.10: Lagged cumulative intention to treat effect of Medicaid on Excellent Health.
Children between 5 and 18 years old.
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
Eligible One Year Before (θ1)
One
Low Thresholds -0.102** -0.094** -0.070 -0.085 -0.122** -0.095
(0.047) (0.049) (0.060) (0.056) (0.064) (0.073)
High Thresholds -0.087** -0.089** -0.089 -0.082* -0.067 -0.088
(0.036) (0.049) (0.059) (0.047) (0.058) (0.066)
Two
Low Thresholds -0.053 -0.062 -0.068 -0.031 -0.075 -0.028
(0.053) (0.059) (0.075) (0.079) (0.087) (0.108)
High Thresholds -0.093** -0.051 -0.067 -0.063 -0.075 -0.089
(0.044) (0.057) (0.065) (0.063) (0.078) (0.096)
Polynomial Order Eligible Two Years Before (θ2)
One
Low Thresholds -0.045 -0.070 -0.096 -0.076 -0.094 -0.129*
(0.055) (0.058) (0.066) (0.053) (0.059) (0.067)
High Thresholds -0.080** -0.060 -0.024 -0.060 -0.008 0.013
(0.042) (0.054) (0.065) (0.052) (0.060) (0.069)
Two
Low Thresholds -0.061 -0.119* -0.153* -0.108 -0.150* -0.155*
(0.063) (0.070) (0.078) (0.073) (0.083) (0.094)
High Thresholds -0.047 -0.004 0.014 0.025 0.057 0.052
(0.052) (0.063) (0.072) (0.068) (0.083) (0.099)
Polynomial Order Eligible Three Years Before (θ3)
One
Low Thresholds -0.037 -0.058 -0.096 -0.014 -0.051 -0.101
(0.046) (0.052) (0.060) (0.058) (0.067) (0.073)
High Thresholds -0.012 0.049 0.043 0.044 0.064 0.081
(0.054) (0.068) (0.083) (0.071) (0.087) (0.096)
Two
Low Thresholds -0.045 -0.089 -0.062 -0.075 -0.180 -0.085
(0.054) (0.058) (0.074) (0.079) (0.086) (0.099)
High Thresholds 0.056 0.040 0.081 0.077 0.070 0.135
(0.068) (0.083) (0.094) (0.102) (0.125) (0.146)
Polynomial Order Eligible Four Years Before (θ4)
One
Low Thresholds -0.063* -0.053 0.005 -0.019 -0.038 -0.003
(0.038) (0.041) (0.050) (0.052) (0.059) (0.066)
High Thresholds -0.023 0.024 0.043 0.020 0.060 0.109
(0.051) (0.063) (0.079) (0.064) (0.076) (0.090)
Two
Low Thresholds 0.020 0.007 -0.028 -0.010 -0.068 -0.071
(0.048) (0.051) (0.065) (0.071) (0.079) (0.091)
High Thresholds 0.037 0.066 0.098 0.146* 0.099 0.004
(0.063) (0.079) (0.091) (0.088) (0.106) (0.125)
Polynomial Order Eligible Five Years Before (θ5)
One
Low Thresholds -0.063* -0.032 -0.070 -0.052 0.006 -0.056
(0.035) (0.037) (0.047) (0.045) (0.049) (0.059)
High Thresholds -0.075 0.065 0.120 0.008 0.150** 0.204**
(0.050) (0.068) (0.090) (0.067) (0.081) (0.097)
Two
Low Thresholds -0.034 -0.026 -0.081 -0.019 -0.029 -0.056
(0.041) (0.044) (0.055) (0.059) (0.065) (0.078)
High Thresholds -0.022 0.141 0.208 0.199 0.147 0.048
(0.061) (0.088) (0.098) (0.088) (0.114) (0.134)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. All regressions are linear
probability models and all include a polynomial of log income (rescaled to equal zero at the threshold); age and
family size and its squares; year and state dummies. In each column the sample is restricted to observations with
family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated. The lagged intention to treat estimates in each
column come from the following model: yit = α0 + θlow,τEli0i,t−τ + θhigh,τEli1i,t−τ + α1T1i,t−τ + fg(zi,t−τ ) +
fg(zi,t−τ )× T1i,t−τ + fg(zi,t−τ )× Eli1i,t−τ + fg(zi,t−τ )× T1i,t−τ × Eli1i,t−τ + uit, where Eli0it indicates
eligibility in a low threshold state, and Eli1it indicates eligibility in a high threshold state. The first three columns
do not allow for different polynomials at each side of the cutoff.
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Table 1.11: Lagged cumulative intention to treat effect of Medicaid on Obesity. Children
between 5 and 18 years old.
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
Eligible One Year Before (θ1)
One
Low Thresholds 0.021 0.049 0.062 0.038 0.063 0.054
(0.039) (0.039) (0.054) (0.045) (0.051) (0.061)
High Thresholds 0.022 0.021 0.027 0.010 -0.004 0.014
(0.031) (0.042) (0.050) (0.037) (0.045) (0.051)
Two
Low Thresholds 0.043 0.068 0.082 0.055 0.071 0.136
(0.046) (0.051) (0.063) (0.063) (0.069) (0.078)
High Thresholds 0.014 0.004 0.007 -0.003 0.012 0.034
(0.037) (0.048) (0.055) (0.048) (0.060) (0.076)
Polynomial Order Eligible Two Years Before (θ2)
One
Low Thresholds 0.097** 0.105** 0.115** 0.085* 0.113** 0.134**
(0.049) (0.052) (0.058) (0.045) (0.049) (0.057)
High Thresholds 0.092** 0.109** 0.118** 0.087** 0.084* 0.070
(0.038) (0.045) (0.056) (0.042) (0.047) (0.053)
Two
Low Thresholds 0.110** 0.138** 0.165** 0.164*** 0.165** 0.119
(0.054) (0.060) (0.069) (0.059) (0.068) (0.079)
High Thresholds 0.122*** 0.103* 0.069 0.061 0.032 -0.017
(0.044) (0.053) (0.061) (0.053) (0.065) (0.081)
Polynomial Order Eligible Three Years Before (θ3)
One
Low Thresholds 0.022 0.013 -0.006 0.021 0.018 -0.022
(0.041) (0.044) (0.054) (0.051) (0.058) (0.068)
High Thresholds 0.091* 0.107** 0.094 0.069 0.101 0.048
(0.048) (0.060) (0.069) (0.054) (0.067) (0.072)
Two
Low Thresholds 0.009 0.000 0.008 -0.077 -0.114 -0.084
(0.048) (0.052) (0.067) (0.070) (0.078) (0.092)
High Thresholds 0.079 0.106 0.015 0.045 -0.009 -0.051
(0.059) (0.070) (0.075) (0.078) (0.096) (0.110)
Polynomial Order Eligible Four Years Before (θ4)
One
Low Thresholds 0.016 0.017 0.037 -0.019 -0.019 0.017
(0.032) (0.033) (0.043) (0.042) (0.049) (0.058)
High Thresholds -0.011 -0.018 -0.037 -0.018 -0.014 -0.020
(0.043) (0.051) (0.066) (0.052) (0.059) (0.069)
Two
Low Thresholds 0.023 0.029 0.020 -0.007 -0.012 -0.052
(0.042) (0.044) (0.057) (0.062) (0.070) (0.083)
High Thresholds -0.031 -0.036 -0.020 -0.052 -0.057 -0.039
(0.053) (0.064) (0.073) (0.073) (0.090) (0.108)
Polynomial Order Eligible Five Years Before (θ5)
One
Low Thresholds 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.026 0.045 0.075*
(0.026) (0.030) (0.038) (0.033) (0.037) (0.043)
High Thresholds 0.059 0.059 0.041 0.100* 0.058 0.056
(0.040) (0.055) (0.074) (0.054) (0.063) (0.076)
Two
Low Thresholds 0.014 0.020 0.083 0.041 0.086* 0.075
(0.034) (0.036) (0.044) (0.045) (0.049) (0.059)
High Thresholds 0.072 0.042 0.055 0.080 0.090 0.057
(0.050) (0.070) (0.079) (0.075) (0.094) (0.110)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. All regressions are linear
probability models and all include a polynomial of log income (rescaled to equal zero at the threshold); age and
family size and its squares; year and state dummies. In each column the sample is restricted to observations with
family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated. The lagged intention to treat estimates in each
column come from the following model: yit = α0 + θlow,τEli0i,t−τ + θhigh,τEli1i,t−τ + α1T1i,t−τ + fg(zi,t−τ ) +
fg(zi,t−τ )× T1i,t−τ + fg(zi,t−τ )× Eli1i,t−τ + fg(zi,t−τ )× T1i,t−τ × Eli1i,t−τ + uit, where Eli0it indicates
eligibility in a low threshold state, and Eli1it indicates eligibility in a high threshold state. The first three columns
do not allow for different polynomials at each side of the cutoff.
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1.6.3 Channels
While the findings so far indicate that Medicaid increases contemporaneously the utilization
of preventive health care services, the effects over health are null in the short run or even
negative in the medium run. Lagged negative effects are observed after one and two years,
and them vanish. A possible explanation for this somehow puzzling results could be that
these negative effects are just due to a “perception” effect and they do not reflect a real
change in children’s health. For example, since the excellent health indicator is a subjective
measure reported by children’s caregivers it can be argued that given that Medicaid induces
more contacts with physicians, parents become more aware of certain health problems their
children already had, and this is the effect which is captured. This explanation may be
only plausible to explain the negative effects of Medicaid on the probability of being in
excellent health for children in the low thresholds group. However, it is not so clear that
this mechanism can explain the negative effects on the high threshold group (for which
Medicaid does not induce higher use of preventive medical services) neither the negative
effects on obesity, which is a more objective measure of children’s health.
A second channel consistent with this result is the “quality” channel, that is, differences
in the quality of health care (real or perceived by parents) the child has access to through
Medicaid relative to the counterfactual situation without Medicaid. If Medicaid induces
targeted families to drop a private health insurance (crowding out effect), and if Medicaid’s
quality is lower than their previous private option, then this may translate to a negative
impact on their children’s health. Although PSID and CDS datasets do not provide infor-
mation about the quality of private insurance to directly test whether the quality channel
is operating, they do have information in some periods about private insurance coverage.
This allows me to check the presence of a crowding out effect.
Table 1.12 presents the contemporaneous effects of Medicaid on the probability of having
a private insurance. The results for the full sample suggest that making a child eligible
for Medicaid reduces the probability of having private coverage by 12-20 percentage points
relative to a similar non-eligible child.33 The crowding out effect seems to be larger at lower
thresholds (between 18-29 percentage points decrease), although in most cases they are not
statistically different to that of higher thresholds. Estimates at high thresholds are quite
imprecise, but the magnitude of the effect remains almost the same across specifications,
ranging from 3 to 9 percentage points reduction in the probability of having private coverage.
Provided that a crowding out effect is present, it could be possible then that quality dif-
ferentials lead to the negative effects of Medicaid on children’s health outcomes. There
is indirect evidence consistent with the quality differential between Medicaid and private
33Excluding the results for the specification with polynomial of order 1 in the largest sample (bandwidth
+-30).
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Table 1.12: Crowding out effect at the threshold. Years 1997, 2002, 2007.
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
One
All Thresholds -0.257*** -0.201*** -0.116** -0.220*** -0.165*** -0.126*
(0.049) (0.050) (0.059) (0.047) (0.049) (0.064)
Low Thresholds -0.366*** -0.293*** -0.224*** -0.286*** -0.220*** -0.199**
(0.072) (0.064) (0.076) (0.068) (0.071) (0.086)
High Thresholds -0.181*** -0.078 -0.079 -0.172*** -0.094 -0.088
(0.050) (0.060) (0.076) (0.058) (0.069) (0.082)
Two
All Thresholds -0.133*** -0.129*** -0.106 -0.116** -0.130** -0.041
(0.043) (0.047) (0.068) (0.054) (0.062) (0.086)
Low Thresholds -0.195*** -0.199*** -0.175* -0.286*** -0.220*** -0.199**
(0.068) (0.073) (0.097) (0.068) (0.071) (0.086)
High Thresholds -0.092* -0.080 -0.093 -0.053 -0.058 -0.031
(0.055) (0.074) (0.086) (0.076) (0.095) (0.112)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
N 2163 1738 1361 2163 1738 1361
insurances hypothesis. For example, according to the annual State of Health Care Quality
Report of the National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA), Medicaid plans tend to
perform worse, on average, than commercial plans in some important quality dimensions,
such as whether physicians regularly keep track of children’s health by calculating their
BMI, or whether during the visit the physicians give counseling about nutritions issues
and recommended levels of physical activity to maintain children’s health.34 During 2010,
among children between 2 to 17 years old enrolled in Medicaid and who had at least one
outpatient visit with a primary care physician during the year, 32.5% received counseling
about recommended physical activity levels to mantain health, while this percentage was
36.5% for children in private plans. Also, physicians documented the child’s BMI in 30.3%
of the Medicaid enrollees visits, while they documented it in 35.4% of the privately insured
chidren’s visits. There were no differenreces in the percentage of cases they give counseling
about nutritions issues to Medicaid and privately insured partients (NCQA, 2010).
Other measure of quality is whether physicians follow the recommended protocols to treat
certain illnesses such as pharyngitis or asthma.35 According to the NCQA report, the
percentage of children between 2 and 18 years old who were diagnosed with pharyngitis
and received an appropriate testing was 59.0% in Medicaid versus 74.7% in commercial
plans. Furthermore, the percentage of Medicaid patients with persistent asthma who were
prescribed medications acceptable as primary therapy for long-term control of asthma was
lower than that for patients enrolled in commercial plans (89.6% in Medicaid versus 96.4%
34The State of Health Care Quality report is produced annually by NCQA to monitor and report on
performance trends over time, track variations in patterns of care and provide recommendations for future
quality improvement. This report shows indicators coming from The Healthcare Effectiveness Data and
Information Set (HEDIS), a tool used by more than 90 percent of America’s health plans to measure
performance on important dimensions of care and service.
35The recommended testing for pharyngitis consist on giving an antibiotic and performing a Group A
streptococcus test for the episode.
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in commercial plans, for children between 5 and 9 years old; and 87.0% in Medicaid versus
92.9% in commercial plans, for children between 10 and 17 years old) (NCQA, 2007).
There is some research also providing evidence of a lower quality of Medicaid relative to
private insurances in other dimensions. For instance, the amount of time that a doctor
spends on average with a Medicaid patient during a visit is lower than that for a privately
insured patient, as shown by Decker (2007). She finds that in states where Medicaid pays
lower fees the amount of time a doctor spends with Medicaid patients is lower relative to
privately insured patients. Also, physicians are less likely to want to see a Medicaid patient.
Hence, a Medicaid beneficiary not only finds more difficult to locate a physician willing to
see him, but also the quality of care he receives, measured by the duration of the visit, is
also lower than that received by a privately insured patient. Cunningham and O’Malley
(2009) also find that Medicaid reimbursement delay affects physicians’ willingness to accept
Medicaid patients. They show that delays in reimbursement can offset the effects of high
Medicaid fees, thereby lowering participation to levels that are closer to those in states with
relatively low fees.
There are some limitations to the extent to which the quality channel is the one operating.
On the one hand, the evidence available about the differences in quality applies to the
average Medicaid population, but not to the marginal groups affected at the eligibility
thresholds. The fact that I estimate the effects across different threshold levels (i.e, across
different family income levels) gives more generality to my results, but still they do not
apply to the whole Medicaid population. On the other hand, the quality channel is more
likely to be applicable only to children in higher income families. The reasons are twofold.
First, higher income families are more likely to have private insurance coverage, as shown
in the Table 3.2 of Section 3.3. Indeed, the data show it is more likely that a non-eligible
child has private coverage the higher the family income. Second, the quality of care families
have access to through a private insurance may increase with income, i.e., health insurance
quality is a normal good. Then, it is more likely that a non-eligible child has a better
quality private coverage the higher the income. This intuition is consistent with the finding
in Section 1.5.2 that families at high thresholds are slightly less likely than families at low
thresholds to enroll their children in Medicaid despite being eligible. However, if a higher
income family is induced to drop a private insurance in favor of Medicaid, this may imply
a drop in health care quality and may have a negative impact on their child’s health.
There are at least two other channel through which the crowding out effect induced by Med-
icaid may generate a negative impact on children’s health: waiting times and consumption
effects effects. First, it may take some time until an eligible child have effective access to
Medicaid coverage and, hence, he may experience a transitory period of being uninsured
which entails a higher health vulnerability. Since 1997, when the Medicaid program for
children was augmented by the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) and the el-
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igibility for children was expanded beyond the existing limits of the Medicaid program,
most states required children to demonstrate being uninsured for certain period of time
before being eligible. In general the waiting time varies from 3 to 6 months and it applies
to children with family income above 150% of the poverty line (Lo Sasso and Buchmueller,
2004). Second, dropping a private insurance in favor of Medicaid would increase family in-
come, affecting negatively health outcomes through food consumption effects. For instance,
families may increase the consumption of “junk” food, which negatively affects children’s
health.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I analyze the effects of Medicaid on children’s health care utilization and
health outcomes. I estimate the causal effects of Medicaid taking advantage of Medicaid
eligibility rule that generates a discontinuity in the probability of participating in Medicaid.
In my analysis I account for potential heterogeneous effects of Medicaid on the health of
children at different income eligibility levels, which is possible due to the variability of
eligibility thresholds across states, time, and age groups.
My results highlight the importance of disaggregating the effects of Medicaid depending
on the threshold level for a better understanding of the effects of the program. Indeed,
my findings indicate that Medicaid induces a higher utilization of preventive medical care
for the group of children at low threshold levels (below 185% of the poverty line) while it
does not produce any significant change for the group of children at high threshold levels
(between 185% and 250% of the poverty line).36 The results also indicate that in the
medium run −between 1 and 2 years after being eligible− Medicaid is more likely to have
some persistent negative effects on some health outcomes, both at low and high threhold
levels, although these effects vanishes afterwardws.
I proposed possible channels to explain the negative impact of Medicaid on children’s health
outcomes in the medium run which are consistent with the findings. First, a “perception”
effect triggered by the increase in the contacts with physicians for preventive checkups.
This explanation is more appealing for results obtained at low threshold levels. Second, a
“quality” effect, as a consequence of Medicaid crowding out private insurance. The quality
channel may be more suitable to explain the negative impact of Medicaid at high threshold
levels, where the marginal groups is composed of children with higer family income levels.
The quality channel explanation states that targeting higher income families with Medicaid
may induce a crowding out effect and, although it might not affect health care utilization, it
36I cannot draw any conclusions for the threholds higher that 250% the poverty line, because the required
condition to apply the fuzzy RD design, i.e., the probability of paticipating in Medicaid as a function of
family income changes discontinuously at the threshold, is not satisfied.
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might affect the quality of care a child can have access to. This switch may have undesirable
health consequences for children as long as there are health care quality differences between
Medicaid and private insurances.37 Finally, I also discussed two alternative mechanisms
(waiting times and consumption effects) through which the crowding out effect generated
by Medicaid may negatively impact children’s health outcomes.
These findings can provide a guide for improving the design and targeting of Medicaid.
Medicaid is an effective tool to improve health care access at low threshold levels (hence at
lower family income levels), but not at higher threshold levels. In terms of health, Medicaid
seems to have null or negative effects on the dimensions analyzed in this paper. Given that
I am analyzing the effects at the threshold, finding null effects may indicate that thresholds
are optimally set, i.e., they are set such that the marginal beneficiaries obtain gains equal
to zero.38 The finding that Medicaid has some negative impact on children’s probability
of being in excellent health or that it increases the probability of being obese may be
an indication of the potential consequences of the crowding effect. If quality differentials
explains the negative impact on health, then there could be room for Medicaid quality
improvements, without involving budgetary changes, that may help to reduce the negative
unintended effects of Medicaid on higher income children. For example, better monitoring
of the simple practices physicians treating Medicaid patients should follow may lead to
better children’s health outcomes. Particularly, improving the percentage of physicians
that document the BMI and give counseling for nutrition and physical activity may be a
cost-effective way to reduce the incidence of obesity on Medicaid eligible children. However,
there is still a need for further research that tries to disentangle precisely the the mechanisms
generating the observed negative effects.
37Even when Medicaid also induces a crowding out effect at low thresholds, where the marginal affected
group has lower levels of family income, it may not have an unintended effect on children’s health. The
reason is that if insurance quality is a normal good, then this group is more likely to buy, in the absence of
Medicaid, low quality private insurances. Hence, at low thresholds switching into Medicaid is more likely
to imply an increase in the quality of care.
38In this sense, states with low thresholds would obtain larger improvements in preventive medical care
utilization by expanding their thresholds, because they are not exhausting all potential gains.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Graphs
Figure 1.4: Outcome Variables (contemporaneous eligibility)
UTILIZATION
A. Full Sample B. Thresholds under 185% PL C. Thresholds [185-250]% PL
EXCELLENT HEALTH
A. Full Sample B. Thresholds under 185% PL C. Thresholds [185-250]% PL
OBESITY
A. Full Sample B. Thresholds under 185% PL C. Thresholds [185-250]% PL
DAYS MISSED
A. Full Sample B. Thresholds under 185% PL C. Thresholds [185-250]% PL
Solid lines are predictions from local linear regressions using triangle kernel, with the raw data.
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Figure 1.5: Excellent Health (lagged eligibility)
Eligible/Non Eligible in t-1
A. Full Sample B. Thresholds under 185% PL C. Thresholds [185-250]% PL
Eligible/Non Eligible in t-2
Eligible/Non Eligible in t-3
Eligible/Non Eligible in t-4
Eligible/Non Eligible in t-5
Solid lines are predictions from local linear regressions using triangle kernel, with the raw data.
38
Chapter 1 The Effect of Medicaid on Children’s Health
Figure 1.6: Obesity (lagged eligibility)
Eligible/Non Eligible in t-1
A. Full Sample B. Thresholds under 185% PL C. Thresholds [185-250]% PL
Eligible/Non Eligible in t-2
Eligible/Non Eligible in t-3
Eligible/Non Eligible in t-4
Eligible/Non Eligible in t-5
Solid lines are predictions from local linear regressions using triangle kernel, with the raw data.
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1.8.2 Robustness Analysis of the Discontinuity in the Probability of Par-
ticipating in Medicaid
In this appendix I perform a robustness analysis to show that the probability of participating
in Medicaid as a function of family income is discontinuous at the eligibility threshold. I use
the sample that considers family income and Medicaid participation for the whole period
1991 and 2007. Table 1.13 shows the estimated jump for different parametric specifications,
confirming the pattern of Section 1.5.2.
Given that almost all states have thresholds set below 185% and between 185% and 250%
at least once during the period 1991-2007, as it is shown in Table 1.14, I can extrapolate
these results and say that on average children in higer income families are less likely to
participate in Medicaid.
1.8.2.1 Placebo test for discontinuity
Figure 1.7: Discontinuity in the probability of participation. Placebo tests.
A. Participation in t-3 B. Participation in t-2 B. Participation in t-1
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Table 1.13: Participation Equation. “Jump” at the threshold. Period 1991-2007.
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
±50 ±30 ±20 ±15 ±2
A. Full sample
Polynomial Order
One 0.208*** 0.199*** 0.158*** 0.093*** 0.074***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.028)
Two 0.126*** 0.104*** 0.083*** 0.063*** 0.075***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028)
Three 0.121*** 0.086*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.070***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015v (0.028)
Four 0.112*** 0.086*** 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.073***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028)
B. Model Interacted
Polynomial Order
One
Elit × 1{T < 185} 0.279*** 0.275*** 0.235*** 0.151*** 0.117***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.042)
Elit × 1{185 ≤ T ≤ 250} 0.188*** 0.178*** 0.106*** 0.095*** 0.059
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.041)
Elit × 1{T > 250} 0.022 0.051 0.029 0.053 -0.048
(0.037) (0.035) (0.040) (0.047) (0.081)
Two
Elit × 1{T < 185} 0.178*** 0.157*** 0.141*** 0.113*** 0.114***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.042)
Elit × 1{185 ≤ T ≤ 250} 0.115*** 0.098*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.056
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.042)
Elit × 1{T > 250} 0.036 0.041 0.013 0.039 -0.054
(0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.046) (0.081)
Three
Elit × 1{T < 185} 0.174*** 0.128*** 0.105*** 0.096*** 0.121***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.042)
Elit × 1{185 ≤ T ≤ 250} 0.112*** 0.076*** 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.056
(0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.042)
Elit × 1{T > 250} 0.053 0.031 0.017 0.037 -0.070
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.046) (0.089)
Four
Elit × 1{185 ≤ T ≤ 250} 0.163*** 0.130*** 0.107*** 0.100*** 0.129***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.025) (0.042)
Elit × 1{T > 250} 0.109*** 0.087*** 0.068*** 0.064*** 0.055
(0.020) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.042)
Elit × 1{T < 185} 0.058 0.036 0.017 0.039 -0.069
(0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.046) (0.090)
N 22,701 17,857 13,391 10,411 1,426
Notes: Panel A: Each entry comes from a separate linear probability model
Mi,t = pi0 + pi1Eliit + k1g(zit;α1g) + uit. All regressions include a polynomial of the indicated order of log
income, age, and family size; year and state dummies. Panel B: Each entry comes from a separate linear
probability model Mit = γ0 +
∑2
j=1 γjTj,it +
∑2
j=0 pijElij,it + k0g(zit;α0g) +
∑2
j=1 kjg(zit;αjg)×Tj,it +uit.
All regressions include a polynomial of the indicated order of the log income, age, and family size; year and
state dummies. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. In each column
the sample is restricted to observations with family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated.
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Table 1.14: Eligibility Thresholds by State
The state has at least once, during the
period 1991-2007, a threshold:
State under 185 % the FPL [185,250] % the FPL over 250 % the FPL
Alabama Yes Yes No
Alaska Yes Yes No
Arizona Yes Yes No
Arkansas Yes Yes No
California Yes Yes Yes
Colorado Yes Yes No
Connecticut Yes Yes Yes
Delaware Yes Yes No
District of Columbia Yes Yes No
Florida Yes Yes No
Georgia Yes Yes No
Hawaii Yes Yes Yes
Idaho Yes Yes No
Illinois Yes Yes No
Indiana Yes Yes No
Iowa Yes Yes No
Kansas Yes Yes No
Kentucky Yes Yes No
Louisiana Yes Yes No
Maine Yes Yes No
Maryland Yes Yes Yes
Massachusetts Yes Yes No
Michigan Yes Yes No
Minnesota Yes Yes Yes
Mississippi Yes Yes No
Missouri Yes Yes Yes
Montana Yes No No
Nebraska Yes Yes No
Nevada Yes Yes No
New Hampshire Yes Yes Yes
New Jersey Yes Yes Yes
New Mexico Yes Yes No
New York Yes Yes No
North Carolina Yes Yes No
North Dakota Yes No No
Ohio Yes Yes No
Oklahoma Yes Yes No
Oregon Yes Yes No
Pennsylvania Yes Yes No
Rhode Island Yes Yes No
South Carolina Yes Yes No
South Dakota Yes Yes No
Tennessee Yes Yes Yes
Texas Yes Yes No
Utah Yes Yes No
Vermont Yes Yes Yes
Virginia Yes Yes No
Washington Yes Yes No
West Virginia Yes Yes No
Wisconsin Yes Yes No
Wyoming Yes Yes No
51 49 10
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1.8.3 Lagged effects
Table 1.15: Lagged cumulative intention to treat effects of Medicaid on Number of School
Days Missed due to Illness. Children between 5 and 18 years old. Full sample (all thresholds
pooled).
Bandwidth (thousands dollars)
Polynomial Order ±30 ±20 ±15 ±30 ±20 ±15
Eligible One Year Before (θ1)
One
All Thresholds -0.032 0.188 0.090 0.154 0.210 0.348
(0.379) (0.322) (0.355) (0.339) (0.302) (0.358)
Two
All Thresholds -0.204 0.017 0.515 0.138 0.285 0.293
(0.431) (0.331) (0.379) (0.450) (0.386) (0.444)
Polynomial Order Eligible Two Years Before (θ2)
One
All Thresholds -0.341 -0.523 -0.473 -0.176 -0.323 -0.415
(0.321) (0.386) (0.393) (0.317) (0.377) (0.375)
Two
All Thresholds -0.384 -0.387 -0.264 -0.408 -0.422 -0.129
(0.359) (0.410) (0.397) (0.500) (0.579) (0.530)
Polynomial Order Eligible Three Years Before (θ3)
One
All Thresholds -0.032 -0.041 -0.063 -0.049 -0.041 -0.148
(0.040) (0.044) (0.051) (0.348) (0.418) (0.400)
Two
All Thresholds -0.030 -0.053 -0.022 -0.054 0.017 0.009
(0.047) (0.051) (0.062) (0.562) (0.616) (0.544)
Polynomial Order Eligible Four Years Before (θ4)
One
All Thresholds -0.300 -0.495 -0.150 -0.256 0.140 0.162
(0.365) (0.467) (0.424) (0.394) (0.448) (0.466)
Two
All Thresholds -0.931 -0.969 -0.177 -0.084 -0.114 -0.097
(0.573) (0.753) (0.509) (0.623) (0.737) (0.575)
Polynomial Order Eligible five Years Before (θ5)
One
All Thresholds -0.089 -0.228 -0.107 0.045 -0.112 -0.102
(0.277) (0.347) (0.394) (0.347) (0.388) (0.433)
Two
All Thresholds -0.280 -0.441 -0.228 -0.314 -0.165 0.027
(0.370) (0.444) (0.446) (0.487) (0.537) (0.544)
Different Polynomial at each side N N N Y Y Y
Notes: Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered at the family level. All regressions are linear
probability models and all include a polynomial of log income (rescaled to equal zero at the threshold); age and
family size and its squares; year and state dummies. In each column the sample is restricted to observations with
family income levels that falls within the bandwidth indicated. The lagged intention to treat estimates in each
column come from the following model: yit = α+ θτElii,t−τ + fg(zi,t−τ ) + fg(zi,t−τ )× Elii,t−τ + uit. The first
three columns do not allow for different polynomials at each side of the cutoff.
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Chapter 2
Spillovers of Health Education at
School on Parents’ Physical
Activity
(joint work with M. Lucila Berniell and Nieves Valdes)
Abstract
To prevent modern health conditions like obesity, cancer, cardiovascular illness, and dia-
betes, which have reached epidemic-like proportions in recent decades, many health experts
argue students should receive Health Education (HED) at school. Although this type of
education aims mainly to improve children’s health profiles, it might affect other family
members as well. This paper exploits state HED reforms as quasi-natural experiments to
estimate the causal impact of HED received by children on their parents’ physical activity.
We use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1999-2005
merged with data on state HED reforms from the National Association of State Boards of
Education (NASBE) Health Policy Database, and the 2000 and 2006 School Health Poli-
cies and Programs Study (SHPPS). To identify the spillover effects of HED requirements
on parents’ behavior we use a “differences-in-differences-in-differences” (DDD) methodol-
ogy in which we allow for different types of treatments. We find a positive effect of HED
reforms at the elementary school on the probability of parents doing light physical activity.
Introducing major changes in HED increases the probability of fathers engaging in physi-
cal activity by 20 percentage points, although the probability of mothers being physically
active did not seem to be affected. We find evidence of two channels that may drive these
spillovers. We conclude that the gender specialization of parents in childcare activities, as
well as information sharing between children and parents, may play a role in generating
these indirect effects and in turn, in shaping healthy lifestyles within the household.
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2.1 Introduction
Non-communicable diseases such as obesity, cancer, cardiovascular conditions, and diabetes
have reached epidemic-like proportions in recent decades. Physical inactivity is one of the
most important risk factors for these diseases (WHO, 2003). As a result, prevention in-
creasingly involves changes in lifestyles, such as introducing the practice of regular physical
activity in order to reduce risk factors (Kenkel, 2000). In the US, physically active individ-
uals save an estimated US$ 500 per year in health care costs according to 1998 data (WHO,
2003).
Interactions within the family may crucially affect the “production” of healthy lifestyles.
As Kenkel (2000) points out, the family is often identified as the unit of production of
preventive practices. Previous literature on intra-household health decisions has focused on
the interactions between spouses.1 As well, the literature on intergenerational transmission
of characteristics such as health, ability, education or income, has focused on the effects that
parents’ decisions can have on children’s behaviors and outcomes.2 However, little research
has been done to evaluate the impact of children on parents’ decisions, in particular on
healthy lifestyle choices.
Schools can play a fundamental role in providing children with information about healthy
lifestyles and health decisions, which may complement what they learn at home. At school,
the knowledge about health is transferred to children through the implementation of specific
curricular modules, often known as Health Education (HED).3 Although HED is likely to
affect children’s health behaviors, it may be the case that parents are also affected by the
education about preventive health care that their children acquire at school.4 Moreover, the
indirect effect of HED on parents may in turn enhance the effectiveness of HED delivered
in the school setting in changing children’s health behaviors.
The first goal of this paper is to assess the existence of spillover effects of Health Education
received by children at school on their parents.5 We exploit the quasi-experiment provided
by the changes in the state-level HED requirements in elementary schools implemented
between the school years 1999/2000 and 2005/2006 in the US to quantify the effects of
1 For instance, see Clark and Etile (2006) on spousal correlation of smoking behavior.
2 There are numerous studies quantifying the role of intergenerational transmission of parents’ charac-
teristics and behaviors on children’s outcomes (Currie, 2009).
3 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) “Health Education is a planned,
sequential, and developmentally appropriate instruction about Health Education designed to protect, promote,
and enhance health literacy, attitudes, skills, and well-being” (Kann, Telljohann, and Wooley, 2007).
4 As stated by WHO (1999), there are several reasons for promoting healthy behaviors through schools.
Schools are an efficient way to reach school-age children and their families in an organized way and students
spend a great portion of their time in schools, where education and health programs can reach them at
influential stages in their lives.
5 For instance, providing physical education at school has proven to be an effective way to improve
healthy habits in children (Cawley, Meyerhoefer, and Newhouse, 2007).
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these programs on parents’ physical activity.6 Thus, the focus is on a policy that does not
imply any transfer of resources to children -the targeted individuals- but instead provides
them with new information. A second goal of this paper is to discuss the plausible channels
through which children receiving HED at schools may affect the probability that their
parents engage in physical activity.
To identify the spillover effects of HED policies, we use a “differences-in-differences-in-
differences” (DDD) strategy, exploiting not only the time series and cross-state variation,
but also within-state variation. The time dimension allows us to include year effects in
order to capture national trends in physical activity. The variation across states allows for
controlling for systematic differences in physical activity between people living in states
that change their HED policies and people living in states that do not change their HED
policies. The variation within states makes possible controlling for state-specific time trends
that can be correlated with the change in HED policies. We are able to exploit the third
difference because within each state there are individuals who were exposed to the treatment
and others who were not. We show in Section 2.3 that there are remarkable differences in
the pre-treatment trends in the outcomes of experimental versus non-experimental states,
indicating that the implementation of HED policies is correlated with the behavior of the
outcome of interest, which makes the use of a DDD estimator crucial here. The data we use
is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1999-2005, merged with
data on state HED reforms from the State School Healthy Policy Database of the National
Association of State Boards of Education (NASBE), and the 2000 and 2006 surveys of the
School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS).
Our results show evidence of a positive effect of HED received by children in elementary
schools on their fathers’ probability of engaging in physical activity. Introducing major
reforms in HED in elementary schools makes a father exposed to this policy 20 percentage
points more likely to be physically active than a comparable father not affected by the policy.
We do not find evidence that the policy under analysis affects the decision of mothers to
engage in physical activity.
We explore the channels behind these results, and find two non-exclusive explanations.
First, we argue that a “role model” channel may explain the differential impact according
to parent gender. In effect, the roles that mothers and fathers play for their children in
the activities they usually do together are important for this result. Parents usually spend
more time with their children doing gendered activities, such as physical activity in the
case of fathers. Therefore, the promotion of healthy behaviors at school is more likely to
have an effect on the behavior of fathers than that of mothers. Second, we find evidence
consistent with an “information sharing” channel. We analyze the differential impact of
HED reforms on individuals with low and high education and income levels and find greater
6 Further details on these policy reforms can be found in Section 2.2.
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effect on individuals with lower education and income levels. The existence of spillovers of
HED on parents’ lifestyles indicates that the interaction between children and parents plays
a role in the formation of healthy lifestyles within the household, which must be taken into
account to properly design policy interventions aimed at increasing the adoption of healthy
lifestyles in a given community.
We perform a number of robustness checks that support the causality of the link between
HED received by children in elementary schools and the probability of their fathers engaging
in physical activity. First, we show that HED reforms do not affect outcomes that are
not related to health behaviors, such as labor force participation. Second, we perform a
“placebo” test on adults that were not exposed to the potential indirect effect of HED. The
test shows that the placebo treatment group is not affected by the HED reforms, indicating
that our results are not driven by other shocks contemporaneous to HED changes that
systematically affected parents in the treatment group. Finally, we show that our results
are also robust to alternative definitions of the control group.
This work is related to two strands of literature. First, it is related to the literature on
policy evaluation that focuses on measuring the spillover effects of policy interventions on
non-targeted individuals, also known as Indirect Treatment Effects (ITE). We focus on
spillovers of a program targeting children on parents’ behavior. We know of two inter-
ventions explicitly designed to have school-age children affecting their families and other
community members health behaviors. Harre and Coveney (2000) evaluate two pilot stud-
ies implemented in a New Zeland school that taught children aged 7-11 years about burns
and scalds hazards, and encouraged changes to the home environment and family practices
through a take-home exercise. The intervention was designed to have an impact on the
safety knowledge and behavior of primary school children and their parents. Nandha and
Krishnamoorthy (2007) describe the role and effectiveness of school-based HED for social
mobilization to promote the use of a fortified salt in an Indian district where lymphatic
filariasis is endemic. HED through classroom sessions was the main motivational strategy
used in this intervention that targeted community members to receive the message through
children. Regrettably, both case studies lack the ability to state causality since the interven-
tions were not randomly assigned and affected few individuals. There are a small number
of works in the economic literature assessing the existence of spillovers on non-targeted
individuals within the household that present reliable results by using neat identification
methodologies. One exception is Bhattacharya, Currie, and Haider (2006), who analyze
the effects of the School Breakfast Program (SBP) in the US on not only targeted children
but also on adult (non-targeted) family members. They find that the SBP improves the
quality of diets even for family members who were not directly exposed to the program.7
7 Jacoby (2002) and Shi (2008) also analyze the effects of policies directed at children on non-eligible
members of the household. They do not find evidence of family spillover effects. Jacoby (2002) analyzes
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The explanation for family spillover effects in this work is that the particular program re-
duces family budgetary constraints, freeing resources that may be redirected towards other
household members. In contrast, we explore family spillovers occurring for non-budgetary
reasons. There are also some works in this literature evaluating external effects at the com-
munity level instead of the family level. Some examples are Angelucci and Giorgi (2009),
Lalive and Cattaneo (2006), and Miguel and Kremer (2004).8
The second strand of literature related to our work consists of recent research evaluating
the direct impact of particular aspects of health education at the school level on students’
health outcomes and behaviors. Cawley, Meyerhoefer, and Newhouse (2007) find positive
effects of physical education requirements on the amount of time high school students
engage in physical exercise, although they do not find any impact on Body Mass Index
(BMI) or the probability of students being overweight. Also, McGeary (2009) assesses
the effects of state-level nutrition education program funding on the BMI, the probability
of obesity, and the probability of above normal weight.9 Her results suggest that this
funding is associated with reductions in BMI and in the probability of an individual having
an above-normal BMI. Kahn, Ramsey, Brownson, Heath, Howze, Powell, Stone, Rajab,
and Corso (2002), Salmon, Booth, Phongsavan, Murphy, and Timperio (2007) and van
Sluijs, McMinn, and Griffin (2007) summarize the results of several interventions aimed at
evaluating the effectiveness of HED programs in changing children’s physical activity. The
three articles agree that the interventions reviewed provided insufficient evidence to assess
the effectiveness of classroom-based HED and family-based social support interventions in
increasing levels of physical activity or improving fitness because of inconsistent results
among studies and various limitations in the studies design.10
the impact of a school meals program in the Philippines on caloric intake of targeted and non-targeted
individuals in the family, whereas Shi (2008) studies resource reallocation in the household after a child
receives a subsidy to cover school fees in rural China. These two papers find evidence of intra-household
flypaper effects, that is no sizable reallocation of resources after children receive subsidies.
8 Angelucci and Giorgi (2009) evaluate the spillover effects of an aid program (PROGRESA) on entire
local economies (villages) where the program was implemented. Lalive and Cattaneo (2006) find that
PROGRESA significantly increases school enrollment among non-eligible families in the villages and that
this rise is driven by a peer effect. Using evidence from a randomized experiment, Miguel and Kremer (2004)
show that a deworming program substantially improved health and school participation among untreated
children in both treatment schools and neighboring schools.
9 This funding is allocated to public-school systems, public-health clinics, as well as public-service an-
nouncements and advertisements. McGeary’s analysis goes beyond the effects of education at school, and
therefore she computes the estimates for the entire population in each state.
10 Among the several limitations in the studies the authors single out the lack of information on the
randomization procedure, short duration of follow-ups, lack of precision of the physical activity outcome
measures, and small sample sizes.
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2.2 Health Education Policies in the US
In the 1970s and 80s, research studies showed that healthy kids did better in school and
scored higher on achievement tests. As a consequence, some states started to develop and
implement HED programs in public schools. In the 1990s, many educators called for the
creation of a set of national health education standards that states could use as a template.
In 1995, the National Committee for Health Education Standards created national health
education standards with K-12 benchmarks covering several content areas of health. In
1998, the Congress urged the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to “expand
its support of coordinated health education programs in schools” (Wyatt and Novak, 2000).
As Kahn, Ramsey, Brownson, Heath, Howze, Powell, Stone, Rajab, and Corso (2002)
explain, “HED classes that provide information and skills related to decision making are
usually multicomponent, with the curriculum typically addressing physical activity, nutri-
tion, smoking, and cardiovascular disease. HED classes, taught in elementary, middle, or
high schools, are designed to effect behavior change through personal and behavioral factors
that provide students with the skills they need for rational decision making”.
State HED programs are typically characterized by two dimensions. The first is the health
education curricula indicating the health related topics schools are required to teach. Panel
A of Table 2.1 lists the topics included as potential HED requirements. We focus in these five
topics because all of them may affect the knowledge about the benefits of being physically
active.11
The second dimension is specific regulations to guarantee and strengthen the effective and
coordinated implementation of health education in schools. We broadly refer to these regu-
lations as enforcements. Panel B of Table 2.1 describes the three specific state requirements
enforcing HED we focus on.12
In the period 1994 and 1999 school health policies at the state level generally remained
unchanged, but important changes were detected between 1999 and 2005.13 During this
period, states either implemented HED programs for the first time or expanded one or both
dimensions of pre-existing programs.
2.2.1 Databases for HED programs: NASBE and SHPPS
The information we use to define which states have HED programs and the degree of
development of such programs -i.e., which topics were required and which enforcements
were mandatory at different points in time- comes from two complementary sources: the
11 Table 2.10 in the Appendix shows other topics that could potentially be included in an elementary
school HED curriculum, but we do not take them into consideration because they are more related to sex
education.
12 The full list of potential requirements is shown in Table 2.10 in the Appendix.
13 See Kann, Brener, and Allensworth (2001) and Kann, Telljohann, and Wooley (2007) for more details
on these changes in policies.
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Table 2.1: HED Programs
A) Curricula: Topics covered
1) Alcohol- or Other Drug-Use Prevention
2) Emotional and Mental Health
3) Nutrition and Dietary Behavior
4) Physical Activity and Fitness
5) Tobacco-Use Prevention
B) Enforcements
1) State requires districts or schools to follow national or state
health education standards or guidelines
2) State requires students in elementary school to be tested
on health topics
3) State requires each school to have a HED coordinator
NASBE State School Health Policy Database and the School Health Policies and Programs
Study (SHPPS).
The NASBE Database is a comprehensive set of laws and policies of all states in the US on
more than 40 school health policies. It began in 1998 and is maintained with support from
the Division of Adolescent and School Health (DASH) of the CDC. The database contains
brief descriptions of laws, legal codes, rules, regulations, administrative orders, mandates,
standards, resolutions, and other written means of exercising authority. While authoritative
binding policies are the primary focus of the database, it also includes guidance documents
and other non-binding materials that provide a detailed picture of a state’s school health
policies and activities.
The NASBE Database was designed to build upon the SHPPS, conducted by the CDC every
6 years since 1994. SHPPS is a nationwide survey that gathers detailed and comparable
information about the characteristics of HED programs at the state level across elementary,
middle, and high schools.14 While SHPPS collects state policy information by means of
survey questionnaires that are completed by state education agency personnel, the NASBE
Database provides the legal support for the policies reported in SHPPS.
Using the information provided by both sources we classified each state as either an “Ex-
perimental State”, if the state changed the HED program between 1999 and 2005, or as a
“Non-Experimental State”, if no changes were introduced in the state HED program dur-
ing the period. Tables 2.11 and 2.12 in the Appendix give a detailed description of HED
programs in all states in 1999 and 2005.
14 SHPPS also gathers information about health-related programs at the district, school, and classroom
levels. SHPPS analyzes eight components, one of which is the HED component. The remaining seven
components are physical education and activity, health services, mental health and social services, nutrition
services, a healthy and safe school environment, and faculty and staff health promotion.
50
Chapter 2 Spillovers of Health Education at School on Parents’ Physical Activity
2.3 Identification Strategy and Data
Our goal is to identify the spillover effects of elementary school HED policies implemented in
certain states (the “experimental states”) on the behavior of parents of elementary school-
age children (the treatment group). Identifying this effect requires, as stated in Gruber
(1994), controlling for any systematic shocks to the parents’ outcome behavior in the ex-
perimental states that are correlated with, but not due to, changes in HED policies. To
do so, we use a “differences-in-differences-in-differences” (DDD) approach that allows us
to exploit the variation of HED policies across time (time dimension), across states (geo-
graphical dimension), and across different groups of individuals residing in the same state
(individual dimension). That is, we compare the treatment individuals in experimental
states to a set of control individuals in those same states and we measure the change in the
treatments’ relative outcome, relative to those of states that did not change HED policies.
The identifying assumption requires that there is no contemporaneous shock affecting the
relative outcome of the treatment group in the same state-year as the change in the HED
policy.
We use a DDD identification strategy instead of the more commonly used “difference-in-
differences” (DD) because it does not require the common trend assumption for treatment
and control groups. We consider that this assumption will most likely be violated given
the characteristics of the policy we are analyzing. In particular, the DD estimator of
the spillover effects of HED policies on parents will be biased if the states that increased
their HED requirements between 1999 and 2005 were those where health indicators were
deteriorating more rapidly. To explore this possibility, we looked at health indicators of
the population of adults with children below 18 years of age for pre-treatment periods
(1994-1998), using data from the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS).15
As shown in Table 2.2, the proportion of individuals at risk because of overweight or obesity
has increased more rapidly in experimental states than in non-experimental states. As well,
between 1994 and 1998 the proportion of individuals with sedentary lifestyles has increased
more in experimental than in non-experimental states. Therefore, the different trends in the
outcomes of experimental versus non-experimental states indicate that the implementation
of HED policies is correlated with the evolution of the outcome of interest, which makes
the use of a DDD estimator crucial here.
Formally, let y1it be the outcome for individual i at time t if she/he is exposed to the treat-
ment. The outcome for the same individual if not exposed to the policy is y0it. Consequently,
the impact of the policy on individual i is y1it − y0it. The average treatment effect across
treated individuals is E(y1it− y0it|elem = 1, S = 1), where elem = 1 denotes individuals who
15 Note that we made use of this other dataset to evaluate the pre-treatment trends because the PSID
does not contain information on health issues for this period of time.
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Table 2.2: Lack of common trends between experimental and non-experimental states.
Year Obesity 1 (%) Obesity 2 (%) Sedentary lifestyle (%)
Non-exper. Exper. Non-exper. Exper. Non-exper. Exper.
states states states states states states
1994 33,1 32,8 28,3 28,4 59,5 56,9
(22824) (13693) (22824) (13693) (22824) (13693)
1996 35,7 35,6 30,7 31,5 59,0 59,4
(24612) (16470) (24612) (16470) (24612) (16470)
1998 36,9 39,8 32,4 34,9 57,0 59,1
(29052) (20767) (29052) (20767) (29052) (20767)
Var. % (’94-’98) 11,6% 21,3% 14,4% 22,7% -4,2% 4,0%
Source: BRFSS 1994, 1996, and 1998. Sample sizes in parentheses. Definitions: Obesity 1 (%):
Percentage of population (with children under 18 years old) at risk for obesity (greater than 120% of
weight for height percent median). Obesity 2 (%): Percentage of population (with children under
18 years old) at risk for overweight based on BMI. At risk defined as: >27.8 for males and >27.3 for
females. Sedentary lifestyle (%): Percentage of population (with children under 18 years old) at risk
for sedentary lifestyle (sedentary or irregular physical activity profile).
have elementary school-age children –the treatment group– and S = 1 denotes individuals
who reside in a state where HED requirements changed between 1999 and 2005 –the ex-
perimental states–. The treated individual has both, elem = 1 and S = 1. In our setup,
the methodological challenge is to obtain a way to estimate the missing counterfactual
E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1), where τt is a dummy variable, equal to one in 2005.
The population under analysis includes adults who have children living with them. The
specification for the outcome is
yit = β0 + β1τt + β2elemi + β3Si
+ β4(elemi × τt) + β5(Si × τt) + β6(elemi × Si)
+ β7i(τt × elemi × Si) + uit,
(2.1)
where i = 1...N indexes individuals, and t = 0, 1 indexes time (0=before the policy change,
1999; 1=after the policy change, 2005). As stated before, τt is a dummy variable, equal
to one in 2005, so it captures a nationwide time trend in the outcome; elemi is a dummy
variable that takes the value one if individual i has at least one child of elementary-school-
age, reflecting a group fixed effect in the outcome; and Si is a dummy variable equal to
one if individual i resides in an experimental state, that is, a state where the HED pol-
icy has changed between 1999 and 2005, allowing for an experimental-state fixed effect
in the outcome. Moreover, the outcome may present differential time trends: (1) between
parents of elementary school-age children versus parents of children of other ages and (2) be-
tween individuals living in experimental states and those living in non-experimental states.
(elemi×τt) and (Si×τt) are the group-trend and the experimental state-trend respectively.
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Since parents of elementary school-age children in experimental states may have a differ-
ent outcome than parents of children below and above elementary school age also living
in experimental states, we include the group-state fixed effect captured by the interaction
(elemi×Si). Finally, the triple interaction (τt× elemi×Si) is equal to one only for treated
individuals in the after-policy-change time period: these are the parents of elementary
school-age children residing in experimental states in 2005.
The treatment effect for individual i is β7i, and the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT) is E(β7i|elemi = 1, Si = 1). The ATT can be recovered by sequential differences, up
to the unobserved temporary individual-specific shocks uit, that is
ATT = E(β7i|elemi = 1, Si = 1)
= [E(yi1 − yi0|elemi = 1, Si = 1)− E(yi1 − yi0|elemi = 1, Si = 0)]
− [E(yi1 − yi0|elemi = 0, Si = 1)− E(yi1 − yi0|elemi = 0, Si = 0)],
(2.2)
only if:
E(ui1 − ui0|elemi = 1, Si = 1)− E(ui1 − ui0|elemi = 1, Si = 0)
= E(ui1 − ui0|elemi = 0, Si = 1)− E(ui1 − ui0|elemi = 0, Si = 0).
(2.3)
The assumption (2.3) will hold if the outcome of parents in the treatment group in exper-
imental states relative to the outcome of the same group of parents in non-experimental
states is affected in the same way by idiosyncratic temporary shocks as the relative outcome
of parents in the non-treatment group in experimental and non-experimental states.
The sample analog of equation (2.2) is the DDD estimator of the ATT:
ÂTT = (y¯1,11 − y¯1,10 )− (y¯1,01 − y¯1,00 )
− [(y¯0,11 − y¯0,10 )− (y¯0,01 − y¯0,00 )],
(2.4)
where y¯elem,St is the average of the estimated outcome among individuals in group elem,
residing in states S, at time t.
We can derive the same estimator for the ATT by recovering the missing counterfactual
E(y0it|elemi = 1, Si = 1, τt = 1), and rewriting the ATT as a function of unobserved
counterfactuals using equation (2.1).
2.3.1 Database
We analyze the impact of HED policies on the behavior of adults who have children at-
tending elementary school using data from two sources. The information on HED policies
is obtained from the NASBE Database and the SHPPS, and the information on individuals
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comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).
The PSID is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of individuals in the US (men,
women, and children) and the family units in which they reside. In 1999, the PSID has
expanded the set of health-related questions for the heads of family units and spouses,
gathering information on health status, health behaviors, health insurance, and health care
expenditures. We concentrate on the indirect effect of HED policies on levels of physical
activity, which is one of the health behaviors reported in this survey. The PSID also provides
detailed information about family income, as well as family composition and demographic
variables, including the ages of family members, race, marital status, employment status
and education. The PSID covers all states.
We base our analysis on the PSID survey years 1999 and 2005, using 1999 as the pre-reform
period. The DDD design we use to identify the effect of interest does not require the use
of a panel, but the identification is improved by using longitudinal data. Even though we
do not specify a model for panel data, in our final sample about 90% of the observations
correspond to individuals in a panel.
Our final sample consists of 10,663 observations that include parents of children living with
them, who participated in the 1999 and/or 2005 PSID. It is worth noting that for most
of the individuals we also have her/his spouse or partner in the sample. Given the way in
which the PSID is designed, for some of the individuals we also have another relative in
the sample, for instance siblings. This feature of our data makes it important to estimate
robust standard errors clustered at the family level.
Besides the PSID, there are other household and individual surveys containing informa-
tion about health lifestyles. However, these surveys do not include all the variables we
require to conduct our analysis for the years in which we can identify HED policy changes.
The National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and the National Health and Nutrition Ex-
amination Survey (NHANES) gather rich information about health, health behaviors, and
socio-demographic characteristics. However, in both surveys the public-use data files do not
include the state identifiers necessary to create HED reform variables at state level. Also,
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) has information about health
behaviors and demographic variables, but its information on the age of children is incom-
plete.16 Finally, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) recovers some
information about health behaviors, but the information about adult’s physical activity is
not available for the years for which we can construct the policy reform variables.
16 In the 1999 BRFSS survey, there are some available variables indicating the number of children younger
than 5 years old, the number of children between 5 to 12 years old, and the number of children who are 13
through 17 years old within the household. Since November 2004 information about one randomly selected
child, including age of the child, is available for some households. Hence, in those households where there is
one child only, information about its age is available but there is missing information about the age of the
other children in households with more than one child.
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In the NASBE Database and in the SHPPS surveys we found that HED policies across
states are highly heterogeneous, not only in terms of whether the state has implemented
a HED program, but also regarding the scope and effectiveness in the implementation of
such programs. Accordingly, we divided the non-experimental and experimental states into
several groups. The non-experimental states are those states that did not change their
HED policies between 1999 and 2005. We classified the non-experimental states into two
groups: (1) States without HED programs in 1999 and 2005; (2) States with HED programs
implemented by 1999, and without changes in 2005. We name groups (1) and (2) S1 and
S2, respectively.
The experimental states are those that introduced any HED reforms between 1999 and 2005.
There are three types of treatments (policies) that define three types of experimental states.
Group S3 are states that, while having some topics in their HED curricula in 1999, did not
introduce changes in those topics by 2005, but introduced some reforms in enforcements.
Group S4 are states that, while having some topics required in 1999, increased the number
of topics required by 2005, without introducing changes in enforcements. We consider that
these two policies involve only minor changes in the already implemented HED programs, so
in what follows we refer to these groups of states as “Moderate changes A” and “Moderate
changes B”, respectively. Finally, we include in the group S5 those states that for the
first time introduced required topics at state level in their HED programs by 2005. We
consider this policy to be a deep reform in HED, so we refer to group S5 as “Major
changes”. Some of the states introduced topics for the first time by 2005, while they did
not make changes in enforcements, as were the cases of Arkansas and Florida. New Mexico
and Wyoming introduced topics as mandatory by 2005, and simultaneously strengthened
their HED policies by introducing new enforcements. A particular case is Texas, where
all districts had a mandatory HED program in 1999 designed and implemented following
district rules. It was not until 2005 that Texas implemented a coordinated HED program
requiring all public schools in the state to have all topics in curriculum that followed national
HED guidelines.
The information available in the NASBE database and SHPPS surveys regarding HED in
the District of Columbia, Minnesota, and New Hampshire was not conclusive, so we could
not classify these states and, consequently do not include them in our sample. We do
not use states in our estimations for which the sample size was insufficient to control for
temporal and group trends within the state.17 Table 2.3 presents the aforementioned state
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Table 2.3: States classification by changes in HED requirements between 1999 and 2005.
Group Type of policy Num. of Num. of
states Observations
Non- S1 Does not have HED in 1999 and 2005 2 707
Experimental S2 Existing HED in 1999 remains unchanged in 2005 18 6,417
S3 Moderate changes A 5 1,099
Experimental S4 Moderate changes B 5 1,156
S5 Major changes 3 1,284
Total 33 10,663
Source: NASBE State School Health Policy Database, SHPSS surveys, and PSID database. The number
of observations is the number of individuals in each group of states.
classifications and the sample sizes for the states included in our sample.18
We modify the specification in equation (2.1) to introduce the previous classification of
states, and to allow for differential effects of the policy across different types of treatment
yit = β0 + β1τt + β2elemi +
5∑
k=2
β3,kSki
+ β4(elemi × τt) +
5∑
k=2
β5,k(Ski × τt) +
5∑
k=2
β6,k(elemi × Ski)
+
5∑
k=3
β7,k(τt × elemi × Ski) + uit,
(2.5)
where, as before, i = 1...N indexes individuals, and t = 0, 1 indexes time (0=before policy,
1999; 1=after policy, 2005), and now k = 1, ..., 5 indexes state groups.19
In our setting, treated individuals, those exposed to changes in HED policies, are adults
who reside in an experimental state, and who have elementary school-age children (6-
10). The PSID does not provide information on whether a child is attending elementary
school. However, it provides information on the age of children, allowing us to determine
if individuals have school-age children.20
The control group consists of individuals who were unaffected by changes in state HED re-
quirements; it includes adults who have elementary school-age children (6-10) living in states
17 States excluded from our database due to small sample size are Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, West
Virginia, and Wyoming. To check that the exclusion of these states does not drive our results we estimate
the effect of interest including the states with small sample size and the results are comparable.
18 The complete list of states in each group, and the number of observations in each state are reported in
Table 2.13 in the Appendix.
19 S1 is the group of reference.
20 Note that the dropout rate in elementary school is very low in the US. Therefore, by knowing the age
of the children we are able to know whether the child is attending elementary education.
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that did not change HED policies, that is, living in states that either did not implement
HED policies or that, while having HED requirements in 1999, did not introduce any reform
during the period. Furthermore, to control for possible correlation of state HED policies
with unmeasured state trends in health and health behaviors, we use a sample of adults who
have children living with them but not of elementary school age as a within-state comparison
group. We group the non-treated individuals in three different control groups. We include
in the Treatment-Non-Experimental group (Control 1) individuals with elementary school-
age children residing in non-experimental states. The Control-Experimental group (Control
2) includes individuals with children not of elementary school-age residing in experimental
states. Finally, in the Control-Non-Experimental group (Control 3) we include individuals
with children above and below elementary school age residing in non-experimental states.
2.3.2 The outcome variable
Our outcome variable is light physical activity. PSID respondents are asked about their
physical activity habits through two questions, the first about how often they do light
physical activity and the second about the frequency of these activities (daily, weekly,
monthly or annually). Based on these two questions we construct a variable indicating the
number of times per week individuals do light physical activity. It is an ordinal variable
with 49 different values, from 0 to 21. Its histogram is shown in Figure 2.1, according to
which 15.4% of parents in the sample reported not doing any physical activity at all, while
the remaining 84.6% reported engaging in light physical activity some number of times per
week. Two well-differentiated mass points, at values 0 and 7, can be identified. As well,
more than 12% of the observations lie in the interval (0,2), while another 34% are in the
interval [2,7).
One limitation to using the number of times per week of light physical activity directly as
our outcome variable is that there is no information in the PSID about the amount of time
(minutes, hours) individuals spend each time they do physical activity. For example, in our
database an individual that reports doing light physical activity three times per week is not
necessarily doing more light physical activity than an individual that reports one session
per week. This makes it very difficult to compare individuals who are physically active.
To overcome this problem, we use as the outcome variable a binary variable that reflects
whether an individual reports engaging in light physical activity at least once a week.
In what follows, the outcome variable is
yi =
{
1 if i does light physical activity at least once a week,
0 otherwise.
The two graphs in the left panel in Figure 2.2 show the proportion of physically active
individuals by gender in 1999 and 2005 for the treated and control groups. We observe a
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Figure 2.1: Histogram for the variable “frequency of light physical activity” (times per
week).
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downward trend in all groups for both genders. In particular for the treated groups, the
proportion of physically active individuals goes down by 7 percentage points for males, and
by 12 percentage points for females. This simple Before-After estimator tells us that HED
policies have had a negative impact on the outcome of interest. However, these estimates
are obviously biased given that the average of the outcome variable in the three control
groups also has a downward trend.
Exploring gender differences, we can see that females in the Treatment-Experimental group
(Treated) present a larger drop in the proportion of physically active individuals than that
observed for males in the same group. This suggests the need to take gender differences
into account when estimating the effect of HED policies.
As we discussed above, the implementation and modification of HED policies between 1999
and 2005 were not homogeneous across states. Therefore, we can expect differences in
the temporal evolution of the outcome of interest for treated individuals across the three
groups of experimental states. The two graphs in the right panel in Figure 2.2 show the
proportion of physically active treated individuals, by gender and by group of experimental
states. In the first graph we see that in states belonging to group S5, the states that
introduced major HED changes, the downward trend in the proportion of physically active
males is substantially smaller than the corresponding downward trend in groups S3 and
S4, the groups of states that introduced moderate HED changes. Moreover, the reduction
in the proportion of physically active males in the group S5 is lower than the fall in all
three control groups. This relatively moderate downward trend for treated males in S5
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Figure 2.2: Proportion of physically active individuals by treated/control groups (left
panel), and treated individuals by treatment groups (right panel), and by gender, in 1999
and 2005.
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Notes: Treated: individuals with elementary school-age children in experimental states. Control 1: indi-
viduals with elementary school-age children in non-experimental states. Control 2: individuals without
elementary school-age children in experimental states. Control 3: individuals without elementary school-
age children in non-experimental states. The type of policies corresponding to the groups of states Sk are
as follows. S3: Moderate changes A; S4: Moderate changes B; S5: Major changes. Source: PSID.
experimental states suggests a positive effect of HED policies on the outcome variable,
although it does not seem to be the case for females.
2.3.3 DDD estimation in a simple linear model
Table 2.4 presents the DDD estimate of the effect of changes in HED policy on the behavior
of fathers for the group of states that introduced major HED changes, S5.21
Panel A compares the change in the proportion of physically active males with elemen-
tary school-age children residing in S5 states to the change for the group of fathers with
elementary school-age children in non-experimental S1 or S2 states. Each cell in the first
two columns contains the proportion of physically active individuals for the corresponding
21In Table 2.14 in the Appendix we report results for a similar exercise on mothers.
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group, before and after the HED reform, along with the standard errors and the number
of observations. The Before-After estimate (∆TE) of the effect is shown in the third col-
umn. There is a non-significant decrease in the proportion of physically active fathers with
elementary school-age children in experimental states, and a significant fall in the propor-
tion of physically active fathers with children of the same age in non-experimental states.
The diff-in-diff estimator (∆TE −∆TNE), reported at the bottom of Panel A, is positive but
non-significant. However, the DD estimate could be downwardly biased because, as we
showed with the data from the BRFSS, the policy changes occurred in those states where
health outcomes and health behaviors were deteriorating more rapidly. Hence, to control
for potential state-specific trends, we additionally look at the evolution of outcomes for a
control group within each state.
Table 2.4: DDD estimator for males in S5.
Before HED After HED Time
change change difference
A. Treatment individuals: with elementary school-age children
Experimental states 0.851 0.843 -0.009 ∆TE
( 0.036) ( 0.035) ( 0.050 )
[ 101 ] [ 108]
Non-experimental states 0.908 0.821 -0.087*** ∆TNE
( 0.012) ( 0.016) ( 0.020 )
[ 606] [ 563]
Difference in difference 0.078
(0.054 )
B. Control Individuals: without elementary school-age children
Experimental states 0.918 0.766 -0.152*** ∆CE
(0.023) (0.030) ( 0.038 )
[ 147] [ 201]
Non-experimental states 0.896 0.803 -0.093*** ∆CNE
(0.011) (0.012) ( 0.016 )
[ 834] [ 1,162]
Difference in difference -0.059
( 0.041 )
C. Non-parametric DDD estimator
DDD = (∆TE −∆TNE)− (∆CE −∆CNE) 0.138**
(0.068)
Notes: Cells contain proportion of physically active individuals for the group identified. Standard errors
are given in parentheses, and sample sizes in brackets. The non-experimental states are groups of states
S1 and S2. Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
In Panel B of Table 2.4 we perform the same exercise for the groups of fathers with children
above and below elementary school age. We find a larger fall in the proportion of physically
active individuals in the experimental states, relative to the other states, as was expected
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according to the pre-treatment trends observed in the BRFSS data.
In panel C we compute the difference between the two DD estimators in panel A and
B. This non-parametric DDD estimator indicates that there is a 13.8 percentage points
significant increase in the relative proportion of physically active fathers of elementary
school-age children, compared to the change in the relative proportion of physically active
fathers with no elementary school-age children. This statistically significant DDD estimate
provides some evidence on the existence of spillovers of HED on the physical activity of
fathers.
In the following subsections we discuss how the DDD design can be expressed in a regression
framework that will allow us to control for observable differences between individuals in
the treated and control groups, as well as explicitly modeling the discrete support of the
outcome variable.
2.3.4 Allowing for covariates and gender differences
In Table 2.5 we report average values and standard errors of the outcome variable, and
other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics for treated and control individuals in
1999 and 2005.
For each group, we find evidence of statistically significant differences in some observable
characteristics between 1999 and 2005. These differences may produce changes in the
observed proportion of physically active individuals between 1999 and 2005 that are not
a consequence of changes in HED programs. To avoid a biased estimation of the effect of
interest, we use a regression framework that allows us to control for temporal differences in
observable characteristics.
Given the existence of different time trends on the frequency of light physical activity
between females and males observed in Figure 2.2, in the model that we estimate we include
interactions of all the parameters related to the identification of the HED effect with a
gender dummy.
The outcome equation with interactions by gender and with covariates has the following
form
yit = β0 + β1τt + β2elemi +
5∑
k=2
β3,kSki + β4femalei + β5(τt × femalei) + β6(elemi × femalei)+
5∑
k=2
β7,k(Ski × femalei) + β8(elemi × τt) + β9(elemi × τt × femalei) +
5∑
k=2
β10,k(Ski × τt)+
5∑
k=2
β11,k(Ski × τt × femalei) +
5∑
k=2
β12,k(Ski × elemi) +
5∑
k=2
β13,k(Ski × elemi × femalei)+
5∑
k=3
β14,k(Ski × elemi × τt) +
5∑
k=3
β15,k(Ski × elemi × τt × femalei) + β16Xit + uit,
(2.6)
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Table 2.5: Descriptive statistics: All individuals in the sample.
Treated individuals Control individuals
1999 2005 Difference 1999 2005 Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Frequency of light physical 4.31 3.82 -0.49*** 4.37 3.75 -0.62***
activity (times per week) (3.09) (3.26) (3.09) (3.23)
Body Mass Index 27.11 27.59 0.48 26.53 27.74 1.21***
(5.77) (5.67) (5.30) (5.96)
Proportion with Health condition 0.11 0.14 0.03* 0.14 0.17 0.03***
that limits daily activity (0.32) (0.35) (0.34) (0.37)
Proportion of Female 0.56 0.57 0.01 0.55 0.57 0.02*
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Age 36.13 36.15 0.02** 37.17 39.46 2.29***
(6.34) (6.84) (8.25) (9.92)
Years of Education completed 13.01 13.22 0.21 12.79 13.05 0.26***
(2.38) (2.25) (2.74) (2.49)
Num. of Children 2.62 2.58 -0.04 2.34 2.31 -0.03
(1.33) (1.26) (1.25) (1.20)
Num. of Children 1.26 1.28 0.03 0.45 0.31 -0.14***
in elementary school (0.50) (0.52) (0.72) (0.60)
Proportion of White 0.53 0.50 -0.03 0.56 0.54 -0.02*
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Proportion of Married 0.77 0.75 -0.02 0.78 0.76 -0.02**
(0.42) (0.43) (0.42) (0.43)
Proportion of Unemployed 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01**
(0.21) (0.19) (0.17) (0.19)
Proportion of Retired 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10)
Proportion of Disabled 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.01***
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
Proportion of Full time 0.74 0.70 -0.03 0.77 0.73 -0.03***
workers (0.44) (0.46) (0.42) (0.44)
Labor income 13,621 17,723 4,102*** 14,878 19,765 4,887***
per capita (16,916) (28,353) (15,911) (29,240)
Total income 16,392 27,805 11,413*** 17,721 23,605 5,884***
per capita (20,049) (214,424) (21,151) (33,232)
Sample size 679 661 4,061 5,262
Notes: Standard errors reported in parentheses below the corresponding average. Stars in columns (3)
and (6) show statistical significance of differences in proportion or distribution of the referred variable,
between years 1999 and 2005. We perform tests of difference in proportion for the dummy variables
White, Health condition that limits daily activity, Married, Unemployment, Retired, Disabled, and Full-
time workers. We perform tests of differences in distribution for the categorical variables Frequency
of light physical activity, Age, Education, Number of Children, and Number of Children in elementary
school, and for the continuous variables Body Mass Index, Labor income, and Total income. Significance
levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
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where i = 1...N indexes individuals, t = 0, 1 indexes time (0=before policy, 1999; 1=after
policy, 2005), and k = 1, ..., 5 indexes state groups.22
The DDD estimates in this model are the estimates of β14,k for males, and β14,k + β15,k
for females. If the parameter β15,k is significantly different from zero, there is evidence of
a different impact of HED policies between fathers and mothers. Xit is a set of observable
individual characteristics including age, race, gender, health conditions that limits daily
activity, body mass index, marital status, number of children, children of high-school-age,
education level, employment status, full-time/part-time employment, total family income,
and state of residence.
2.3.5 Empirical implementation: DDD in a non-linear model
To simplify notation, in this section we use the specification of the outcome equation in
(2.1), which does not include state classification, covariates, and gender interactions.
Considering that the outcome variable is binary, the expectation of the outcome equation
measures the probability of doing light physical activity any positive number of times per
week, and has the following form
E[yit|elemi, Si, τt] = f
[
β0 + β1τt + β2elemi + β3Si
+ β4(elemi × τt) + β5(Si × τt) + β6(elemi × Si)
+ β7(τt × elemi × Si)
]
,
(2.7)
where f is the cumulative distribution function of idiosyncratic shocks (uit).
As remarked in Blundell and Dias (2009), applying DD and DDD methods imposes additive
separability of the error term conditional on the observables, an assumption that does not
hold when the outcome of interest is a dummy variable. To overcome this limitation, we
follow Blundell, Dias, Meghir, and Reenen (2004) by imposing the identifying assumption
in equation (2.3) over the index, rather than over the probability itself. Assuming that the
inverse probability function, f−1, is known, the DDD estimator of the ATT is
ÂTT = y¯1,11 − f
{
f−1(y¯1,10 ) + [f
−1(y¯1,01 )− f−1(y¯1,00 )]
+ [f−1(y¯0,11 )− f−1(y¯0,10 )]− [f−1(y¯0,01 )− f−1(y¯0,00 )]
}
,
(2.8)
where y¯elem,St is the average of the estimated outcome over individuals in group elem,
residing in states S, at time t.23
Assuming that the idiosyncratic shocks have a normal distribution, f is the normal cumu-
22 S1 is the group of reference.
23In Section 2.7.1 in the Appendix we show how we obtain the expression for the DDD estimator.
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lative distribution function. We estimate the parameters of interest by maximum likelihood
and compute robust standard errors clustered at the family level. A report of the estimated
coefficients can be found in Table 2.15 in the Appendix.
With the estimated parameters we compute the Indirect Average Treatment effects on the
Treated (IATT), using equation (2.8), including the state classification (discussed in Section
2.3.1), gender interactions, and covariates (both presented in Section 2.3.4).
2.4 IATT estimates
Table 2.6 shows the IATT for the three types of treatment, by gender. The “OLS” column
presents the IATT estimates obtained using a linear probability model. The “Probit”
column presents the IATT estimates obtained using equation (2.8) and assuming a normal
distribution for idiosyncratic shocks.
Table 2.6: IATT by type of treatment, and by gender.
Group of Male Female
experimental states OLS Probit # obs OLS Probit # obs
S3: Moderate changes A -0.009 -0.039 3,628 -0.042 -0.028 4,595
(0.071) (0.080) (0.065) (0.085)
S4: Moderate changes B -0.035 -0.055 3,678 0.023 0.034 4,602
(0.064 ) (0.065 ) (0.059 ) (0.081)
S5: Major changes 0.122* 0.199* 3,722 -0.056 -0.088 4,686
(0.068 ) (0.107 ) (0.054 ) (0.061)
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis clustered at the family level. Robust standard
errors computed by bootstrap using 1000 replications in Probit specification.“OLS” columns present
the IATT estimates obtained using a linear probability model. The “Probit” columns present the
IATT estimates obtained using equation (2.8) and and probit specification. The regressions include
the following covariates: age, race, gender, health status, marital status, number of children, children
of high school-age, education level, employment status, full-time/part-time employment, total family
income level, and state of residence. Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
We find evidence of a positive effect of HED education at the elementary school level on
the probability of parents engaging in light physical activity. A noteworthy change in the
HED program (S5 group of states) raises the probability of fathers doing physical activity.
Looking at the results of the probit column we can see that the probability of fathers
affected by this policy doing physical activity is 19.9 percentage points higher than that of
fathers not affected by the policy. The positive and statistically significant effect on fathers
is also obtained by using a linear probability model. The effect on the probability that
mothers engage in light physical activity is never statistically significant, but the signs are
the opposite to those found for fathers.
The estimated effects are not statistically significant for males and females residing in the
64
Chapter 2 Spillovers of Health Education at School on Parents’ Physical Activity
group of states S3 and S4. These results suggest that moderate changes in HED programs
do not produce indirect effects.
The interpretation of the estimated IATT can be clarified by looking at the averages of the
estimated outcomes in Table 2.7. Let’s consider the results for treated fathers residing in the
group of states S5. On average, the estimated percentage of physically active fathers in the
pre-treatment period, 1999, is 84.9%. In 2005, after major changes in HED programs, we
estimate that 84.3% of fathers were engaged in light physical activity. Nevertheless, if HED
programs had not been subject to profound changes in this group of states, we estimate
that only 64.4% of fathers of elementary school-age children would have engaged in light
physical activity in 2005. In other words, due to the major changes in HED programs,
the percentage of physically active fathers fell from 84.8% to 84.3%, instead of falling to
64.4% had HED not been modified. The effect of major reforms on HED was to soften the
declining trend in the proportion of physically active fathers.
Table 2.7: IATT and averages of the estimated outcomes for treated individuals, by type
of treatment and gender.
Estimated Average Outcomes
Group of for Treated Individuals
experimental states IATT Post-treatment period Pre-treatment period
with without without
treatment treatment treatment
S3: Moderate change A Male -0.039 0.810 0.848 0.919
Female -0.028 0.759 0.787 0.884
S4: Moderate change B Male -0.055 0.848 0.903 0.928
Female 0.034 0.796 0.762 0.863
S5: Major change Male 0.199 0.843 0.644 0.849
Female -0.088 0.766 0.854 0.924
Notes: IATT and estimated outcomes obtained using equation (2.8) and a probit specification. Each
cell contains the estimated proportion of physically active individuals. Pre-treatment period is 1999,
and post-treatment period is 2005. The IATT is obtained as the estimated average outcome in the
post-treatment period under treatment minus the missing counterfactual, that is, the estimated average
outcome in the post-treatment period without treatment.
We conclude that there are positive spillovers of introducing major changes in existing HED
programs on the probability of fathers engaging in light physical activity, while for mothers
we do not find a statistically significant effect of these reforms.
2.4.1 Plausible explanations for our results
We can think of two channels to explain our results. When children start receiving HED
at school their parents are confronted with two new sets of factors that might potentially
affect their health-related behaviors. First, parents may optimally react to HED in schools
by complementing this education with the incorporation of healthy lifestyles into their own
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daily activities. We refer to this potential channel as “role modeling”. On the other hand,
there is the effect of the arrival of new information that the child receives at the school. In
particular, parents are confronted with knowledge that the child brings to the household
from the health education curricula given at the school, and they may adjust their health
behaviors in response to it. We refer to this potential channel as “information sharing”. In
what follows we provide evidence of the existence of both channels.
2.4.1.1 Role models
Parents may do more physical exercise in response to the knowledge children acquire via
HED, not because they were not already aware of the benefits of exercising but because
they want to complement the instruction received by the child so as to form the desired
healthy lifestyle in the child.
The estimates from the model interacting the policies with a dummy variable for gender
provide some insights on the operation of the “role model” channel. Parents usually spend
more time with their children doing gendered activities. Figure 2.3 in the Appendix shows
some evidence on this respect with data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS).
Women spend roughly twice as much time in childcare as do men, a pattern which holds true
for all subgroups and for almost all types of childcare, except for “Recreational” childcare.
This type of childcare activity includes playing games with children, playing outdoors with
children, attending a child’s sporting event or dance recital, going to the zoo with children,
taking walks with children, etc. In the case of “Recreational” childcare, mothers allocate
relatively less of their time with children than do fathers. Thus, this is evidence that
fathers are more likely to do stereotypically male activities with their children, among
them physical activity. Accordingly, the impact of HED reforms on physical activity is
more likely to appear for fathers rather than for mothers.
2.4.1.2 Information sharing between children and parents
Individuals with a lower stock of information are expected to be more affected by HED
changes. We explore the existence of the information-sharing channel by analyzing the
differential impact of HED reforms on individuals with low and high education levels and
with low and high income levels. Since lower levels of education and socioeconomic status
are related to less knowledge about health (Kenkel, 1991; Tinsley, 2003), we expect to
obtain a greater effect of HED reforms on individuals with lower levels of education and
income.
Exploiting the non-linearity of the model specified we estimate the IATT evaluated at
particular values of the covariates of interest. We report the results in Table 2.8 for treated
fathers residing in states that belong to group S5. According to these results, the policy
has a higher effect on lower educated males relative to higher educated males, on non-white
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males relative to white males, and on males that have a lower income than those having a
higher income. The policy raises the probability of lower educated males being physically
active relative to higher educated males in 4.9 percentage points, while the increment is 4.2
percentage points for non-white males relative to white males.
Table 2.8: Differences in IATT estimates evaluated at particular values of the covariates,
for males in S5.
Income IATT Education IATT Race IATT
Low 0.198* Low 0.211* No White 0.207*
(20th percentile) (0.108) (0.114) (0.116)
High 0.193* High 0.162* White 0.165*
(80th percentile) (0.106) (0.096) (0.099)
Difference 0.005* 0.049** 0.042**
(-0.003) (0.021) (0.020)
Notes: The IATT is obtained using equation (2.8) and a probit specification. Robust standard errors in
parentheses clustered at the family level, and computed by bootstrap using 1000 replications. We find
no differences for males in health status (measured using the existence of a health condition that limits
the daily activity and the body mass index), family size, labor force participation, full-time/part-time
employment, and marital status. There are no differences for females in all the dimensions analyzed.
Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
2.5 Robustness
2.5.1 Validity of the identifying assumption
Our identifying assumption requires that, in the absence of HED reforms, state specific
trends of the proportion of parents physically active in the treatment group (those with
elementary school-age children) is the same as that of parents in the control group (those
with children bellow or above elementary school-age). This assumption will be violated if
there is a shock contemporaneous to HED reforms that systematically affects the relative
outcome of parents of elementary school-age children.
In order to check the robustness of our identifying assumption we perform two tests. First,
we estimate the effect of the HED reform on the labor force participation of parents. Labor
participation is a decision that should be not affected by the policy under analysis. If HED
changes are not the only shock that affects the relative outcomes of treated versus control
individuals between 1999 and 2005, we may observe that the labor force participation among
individuals in the treatment group changes relative to that of individuals in the control
group. Results for the group of states S5 are presented in Table 2.9. The two estimates tell
us that between 1999 and 2005 there were no significant changes in the relative decision of
participating in the labor market of treated and control parents. This constitutes evidence
that there was no other labor market related shock systematically affecting the relative
outcomes of treated and control parents between 1999 and 2005.
Second, we estimate the effect of HED reforms in elementary school on individuals that are
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not likely to be affected by such reforms: the group of adults without children. If there
had been no other shock contemporaneous to the HED reforms, the outcome of adults
without children relative to a control group should remain unchanged between 1999 and
2005. To perform this test, we keep only individuals without children. Individuals in a given
state are then assigned to one of two groups, the “placebo” treatment and the “placebo”
control group. The classification is done in such a way that the “placebo” treatment
group resembles, at least in observable characteristics, the true treatment group of adults
with children in elementary school. This classification is necessary to have a within state
control group (the third dimension) in the sample of adults without children, required to
implement a DDD estimator. If our classification is correct, we should find no effect of
HED reforms on the “placebo” treated individuals. Details on how we select the “placebo”
treated individuals can be found in the Appendix in Section 2.7.2. We present the results
using the non-parametric DDD estimator computed in Section 2.3.3 for the group of states
S5.
24 The effect of HED on the “placebo” treated males is 0.062 (standard error: 0.097),
and the effect on the “placebo” females is -0.047 (standard error: 0.097). Reassuringly,
the estimated coefficients are smaller than those in the baseline model and not significantly
different from zero.25
2.5.2 Sensitivity analysis
Parents in the treatment group, that is parents of elementary school-age children, may also
have other children below and/or above elementary school age. In order to have individuals
in the control group comparable to those in the treatment group in the same state, we
consider that the appropriate group of control individuals should include parents of children
of ages below and above elementary school age. Nevertheless, to determine whether our
results are sensitive to this definition, we perform two tests. First, we use parents with at
lest one child below elementary-school-age as non-treatment individuals. Second, we use
parents with at least one child above elementary-school-age as non-treatment individuals.
Estimates of the effects of HED reforms on the group of states S5 are very similar to those
obtained with the baseline model, as can be seen in Table 2.9.26
2.6 Conclusion
We find evidence for positive spillovers of HED imparted in elementary schools on the
probability of parents engaging in light physical activity. However, our results suggest
24 We cannot obtain the estimates of the probit or OLS models because the sample size of adults without
children is not large enough.
25 We also perform the placebo test for the group of states S3 and S4 and results and conclusions are
similar to those obtained with the group of states S5.
26 We perform both tests for the group of states S3 and S4 and results and conclusions are similar to
those obtained with the group of states S5.
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Table 2.9: Robustness check: Effect of HED reforms on labor market participation (Panel
A), and Sensitivity of control groups (Panel B and C), for group of states S5.
Male Female
OLS Probit # obs OLS Probit # obs
PANEL A: Effect of HED reforms on
labor market participation
IATT 0.029 0.107 3,722 0.029 0.017 4,686
(0.054) (0.098) (0.065) (0.066)
PANEL B: Using as control individuals
only parents of children below elementary-school-age
IATT 0.098 0.220 2,360 -0.012 -0.010 2,930
(0.073) (0.144) (0.070) (0.093)
PANEL C: Using as control individuals
only parents of children above elementary-school-age
IATT 0.135* 0.188 2,894 -0.083 -0.117* 3,735
(0.081) (0.113) (0.061) (0.062)
Notes: The IATT in columns “OLS” are obtained using a linear probability model. The IATT in columns
“Probit” are obtained using equation (2.8) and a probit specification. Robust standard errors reported
in parenthesis clustered at the family level. Robust standard errors computed by bootstrap using 1000
replications in Probit specification. The regressions in Panel A include the following covariates: age,
race, gender, health status, marital status, number of children, children of high school-age, education
level, total family income level, and state of residence. The regressions in Panel B and Panel C include
the previous covariates and employment status, and full-time/part-time employment. Significance levels:
* = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
that fathers and not mothers are those affected by the HED reforms. We also analyze the
differential impact of HED reforms on fathers and mothers as a way to explore the nature
of the channels driving the spillovers.
We argue that a “role model” channel can explain the differential impact on fathers and
mothers. The idea is based on the different role models that mothers and fathers play
for their children. Parents usually spend more time with their children doing gendered
activities. Since physical activity can be included in the group of typically male-activities,
the effect of promoting the advantages of doing physical activity is more likely to appear for
fathers rather than for mothers. We also explore the existence of a second channel driving
our results -the “information sharing” channel- by analyzing the differential impact of HED
reforms on individuals with lower and higher education levels, and obtain the expected
greater effect on less educated individuals and individuals with lower socioeconomic status.
Our results also highlight the importance of clearly distinguishing the existence of several
dimensions in the implementation of a policy. In our case, it is important for policy evalua-
tion to consider the two dimensions in HED reforms, changes in topics and enforcements, as
well as the distinction between “Moderate changes” and “Major changes” in HED require-
ments. Our main result shows spillovers only in states that carried out profound reforms
in their HED programs.
Spillovers of HED on parents’ lifestyles indicate that the interaction between children and
parents plays a role in the formation of healthy lifestyles within the household. Therefore,
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taking these spillovers into account is important in the cost-benefit analysis of health edu-
cation in schools. In addition, the conclusion that implementing minor reforms in existing
HED programs is not enough to obtain spillovers at the family level helps to properly design
policy interventions aimed at increasing the adoption of healthy lifestyles.
2.7 Appendix
Table 2.10: HED topics and enforcements. Full list.
Topics List
1) Alcohol- or Other Drug-Use Prevention
2) Emotional and Mental Health
3) Nutrition and Dietary Behavior
4) Physical Activity and Fitness
5) Tobacco-Use Prevention
6) Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) prevention
7) Accident or injury prevention
8) Sexually transmitted disease (STD) prevention
9) Pregnancy prevention
10) Suicide prevention
11) Violence prevention, for example bullying, fighting, or homicide
Enforcements List
1) State requires districts or schools to follow national or state health education standards or guidelines
2) State requires students in elementary school to be tested on health topics
3) State requires each school to have a HED coordinator
4) State uses staff development for HED teachers to improve compliance with HED standards or guidelines
5) State uses written reports from districts or schools to document compliance with HED standards or guidelines
6) State provides a list of one or more recommended elementary school HED curricula
7) State provides a chart describing the scope and sequence of instruction for elementary school HED
8) State provides lesson plans or learning activities for elementary school HED
9) State provides plans for how to assess or evaluate students in elementary school HED
10) State adopts a policy stating that newly hired staff who teach HED at the elementary school level
will have undergraduate or graduate training in HED
11) State offers certification, licensure, or endorsement to teach HED
12) State adopts a policy stating that teachers will earn continuing education credits
on HED topics to maintain state certification, licensure, or endorsement to teach HED
Notes: The topics and enforcements considered for the analysis are in italics.
70
Chapter 2 Spillovers of Health Education at School on Parents’ Physical Activity
Table 2.11: HED programs: health topics required, by state and year.
1999 2005
State topic 1 topic 2 topic 3 topic 4 topic 5 topic 1 topic 2 topic 3 topic 4 topic 5
Alabama yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Alaska no no no no no no no no no no
Arizona no no no no no no no no no no
Arkansas no no no no no yes no yes yes yes
California yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Colorado no no no no no no no no no no
Connecticut yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Delaware yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
District of Columbia yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Florida no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
Georgia yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Hawaii yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Idaho yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Illi0is yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Indiana yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Iowa yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Kansas . . . . . . . . . .
Kentucky yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Louisiana yes no no no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Maine yes yes yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Maryland yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Massachusetts yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Michigan yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Minnesota . . . . . . . . . .
Mississippi no no no no no no no no no no
Missouri yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Montana yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Nebraska yes no no no yes yes no yes yes yes
Nevada yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
New Hampshire . . . . . yes yes yes yes yes
New Jersey yes no no yes yes yes no yes yes yes
New Mexico no no no no no yes yes yes yes yes
New York yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
0rth Carolina yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
0rth Dakota yes no no no yes yes no no yes yes
Ohio yes no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Oklahoma no no no no no no no no no no
Oregon yes no no no yes yes no no no yes
Pennsylvania yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Rhode Island yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
South Carolina yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
South Dakota no no no no no no no no no no
Tennessee yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Texas . . . . . yes yes yes yes yes
Utah yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Vermont yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Virginia yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Washington yes no yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
West Virginia yes no yes yes yes yes no yes yes yes
Wisconsin yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Wyoming no no no no no no yes no no no
Source: NASBE Database and School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS).
Notes: The data contained in this table was constructed cross-checking the information from both sources, and in most of the cases
survey information from SHPPS coincides with the legal information summarized in NASBE. In those cases in which there is no
coincidence, we rely on NASBE information only. In few cases NASBE does not provide complete information -i.e., cases in which
the regulations contained in NASBE are not informative about the characteristics of the policy the state implements-, then we rely
on SHPPS. Missing values indicate that the information cannot be recovered from any of the two sources.
Topic 1:Alcohol or other drug-use prevention; Topic 2: Emotional and mental health; Topic 3: Nutrition and dietary behavior;
Topic 4: Physical activity and fitness; Topic 5: Tobacco-Use prevention.
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Table 2.12: HED programs: enforcements required, by state and year.
1999 2005
State enf 1 enf 2 enf 3 enf 1 enf 2 enf 3
Alabama yes no no yes no yes
Alaska no no no no no no
Arizona yes no no yes no no
Arkansas yes no no yes no no
California no no no no no no
Colorado no no no no no no
Connecticut no no no no no no
Delaware yes no yes yes no yes
District of Columbia . . . . . .
Florida yes no no yes no no
Georgia yes no no yes no no
Hawaii yes no no yes no no
Idaho no no no no no no
Illinois yes no no yes no no
Indiana yes no no yes no no
Iowa no no no no no no
Kansas . . . . . .
Kentucky no yes no yes yes no
Louisiana yes no no yes no no
Maine yes yes no yes yes no
Maryland yes no no yes no no
Massachusetts yes no no yes no no
Michigan yes no no yes no no
Minnesota . . . . . .
Mississippi no no no no no no
Missouri yes yes no yes yes no
Montana yes no no yes no no
Nebraska no no no no no no
Nevada yes no no yes no no
New Hampshire . . . yes . .
New Jersey . . . yes . .
New Mexico no . . yes . .
New York no . . no . .
north Carolina yes no no yes no no
north Dakota no no no no no no
Ohio . . . . . .
Oklahoma no no no no no no
Oregon no no no yes no no
Pennsylvania yes . . yes . .
Rhode Island yes yes no yes yes yes
South Carolina yes no no yes yes no
South Dakota no no no no no no
Tennessee yes no no yes no no
Texas no no no yes no no
Utah yes no no yes yes no
Vermont yes no no yes yes no
Virginia yes no no yes no no
Washington yes yes no yes yes no
West Virginia yes no no yes no no
Wisconsin no no no no no no
Wyoming no no no yes no no
Source: NASBE Database and School Health Policies and Programs Study (SHPPS).
Notes: The data contained in this table was constructed cross-checking the information from both sources, and in most of the cases
survey information from SHPPS coincides with the legal information summarized in NASBE. In those cases in which there is no
coincidence, we rely on NASBE information only. In few cases NASBE does not provide complete information -i.e., cases in which
the regulations contained in NASBE are not informative about the characteristics of the policy the state implements-, then we rely
on SHPPS. Missing values indicate that the information cannot be recovered from any of the two sources.
Enforcement 1: State requires districts or schools to follow national or state health education standards or guidelines.
Enforcement 2: State requires students in elementary school to be tested on health topics.
Enforcement 3: State requires each school to have a HED coordinator.
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Table 2.13: States classified by groups Sk.
NON-EXPERIMENTAL EXPERIMENTAL
State # of obs. State # of obs.
S1 S3
Alaska 14 Alabama 138
Colorado 246 Kentucky 169
Mississippi 521 Oregon 208
Oklahoma 62 Rhode Island 10
South Dakota 59 South Carolina 564
Utah 100
S2 Vermont 7
Arizona 178
California 1,218 S4
Connecticut 79 Georgia 414
Delaware 14 Louisiana 209
Hawaii 4 Maine 30
Idaho 25 Nebraska 106
Illinois 397 New Jersey 336
Indiana 363 North Dakota 16
Iowa 264 Washington 218
Kansas 81
Maryland 450 S5
Massachusetts 258 Arkansas 278
Michigan 613 Florida 450
Missouri 340 New Mexico 16
Montana 13 Texas 691
Nevada 72 Wyoming 18
New York 493
North Carolina 605
Ohio 505
Pennsylvania 476
Tennessee 238
Virginia 373
West Virginia 24
Wisconsin 183
Notes: We do not include the District of Columbia, Minnesota, and New Hampshire since the information
regarding HED policies for these states is not precise in terms of when HED was implemented, making
impossible their classification.
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Table 2.14: DDD estimator for females in S5.
Before HED After HED Time
change change difference
A. Treatment individuals: with children in elementary school
Experimental states 0.922 0.767 -0.155*** ∆TE
( 0.024) ( 0.035) ( 0.042 )
[ 128 ] [ 146 ]
Non-experimental states 0.914 0.798 -0.116*** ∆TNE
( 0.010) ( 0.015) ( 0.018 )
[ 758 ] [ 753 ]
Difference in difference -0.039
( 0.046 )
B. Control Individuals: without children in elementary school
Experimental states 0.874 0.785 -0.089** ∆CE
( 0.025) ( 0.025) ( 0.035 )
[ 183 ] [ 270 ]
Non-experimental states 0.910 0.796 -0.114*** ∆CNE
( 0.009) ( 0.011) ( 0.014 )
[ 984 ] [ 1,464]
Difference in difference 0.025
(0.038 )
C. Non-parametric DDD estimator
DDD = (∆TE −∆TNE)− (∆CE −∆CNE) -0.063
(0.060)
Notes: Cells contain proportion of physically active individuals for the group identified. Standard errors
are given in parentheses, and sample sizes in brackets. The non-experimental states are groups of states
S1 and S2. Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
The upper part of the Table shows important falls in temporal trends of the proportions of physically
active mothers of elementary school-age children residing in both, experimental and non-experimental
states. As a consequence, the difference-in-difference estimator is not statistically significant. We can
observe a similar pattern for mothers of children below and above elementary school age. Finally, the
triple difference estimator does not provide evidence of an effect of HED on the proportion of physically
active mothers.
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Table 2.15: Probit Model: Probability of doing light physical activity at least once a week.
Number of obs= 10,663 Wald chi2(83) = 795.28
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Log pseudo-likelihood = -4157.416 Pseudo R2 = 0.0914
(Std. Err. adjusted for 1818 clusters at family level)
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.) Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
τ -0.183 (0.215) married 0.05 (0.059)
elem 0.201 (0.214) widowed -0.192 (0.187)
S2 -0.18 (0.280) separated 0.011 (0.073)
S3 0.062 (0.281) divorced -0.077 (0.087)
S4 -0.044 (0.311) fulltime -0.088∗∗ (0.044)
S5 -0.022 (0.282) nchildren 0.027∗ (0.015)
elem× τ -0.081 (0.122) pclabinc 0.032∗∗∗ (0.008)
S2× τ -0.206 (0.220) limit -0.053 (0.046)
S3× τ -0.238 (0.281) bmi -0.005∗ (0.003)
S4× τ 0.025 (0.290) on leave -0.113 (0.140)
S5× τ -0.426 (0.280) unemployed -0.075 (0.078)
S2× elem -0.088 (0.212) retired -0.261 (0.168)
S3× elem -0.027 (0.322) disabled -0.568∗∗∗ (0.094)
S4× elem -0.029 (0.350) housekeeper 0.035 (0.065)
S5× elem -0.514∗ (0.308) student 0.284∗∗ (0.144)
S3× elem× τ -0.094 (0.345) stated3 -0.227 (0.253)
S4× elem× τ -0.206 (0.357) stated5 0.169 (0.181)
S5× elem× τ 0.583∗ (0.317) stated7 -0.132 (0.281)
τ × female -0.067 (0.265) stated10 -0.12 (0.130)
elem× female 0.135 (0.262) stated11 -0.182 (0.160)
S2× female 0.236 (0.223) stated14 0 (0.193)
S3× female 0.077 (0.272) stated15 0.032 (0.211)
S4× female 0.13 (0.305) stated16 0.08 (0.209)
S5× female -0.141 (0.280) stated18 -0.246 (0.187)
elem×τ ×female -0.003 (0.157) stated21 0.037 (0.193)
S2× τ × female -0.071 (0.268) stated22 -0.187 (0.212)
S3× τ × female 0.148 (0.355) stated23 -0.014 (0.189)
S4× τ × female -0.13 (0.364) stated25 -0.367∗∗ (0.160)
S5× τ × female 0.367 (0.343) stated26 0.044 (0.190)
S2× elem× female -0.228 (0.254) stated31 -0.314∗ (0.187)
S3× elem× female -0.317 (0.409) stated33 -0.136 (0.191)
S4× elem× female -0.548 (0.410) stated34 0.031 (0.199)
S5× elem× female 0.538 (0.395) stated36 0.011 (0.189)
S3× elem× τ × female -0.027 (0.457) stated38 -0.173 (0.203)
S4× elem× τ × female 0.371 (0.406) stated39 -0.104 (0.195)
S5× elem× τ × female -0.924∗∗ (0.396) stated41 -0.305∗∗ (0.152)
jhs 0.067∗ (0.039) stated43 0.113 (0.211)
gender -0.096 (0.212) stated44 -0.005 (0.125)
age -0.002 (0.014) stated47 -0.1 (0.202)
age2 0.000 (0.000) stated48 -0.171 (0.176)
white 0.376∗∗∗ (0.043) stated50 0.410∗ (0.229)
edu 0.065∗∗∗ (0.007) Intercept 0.431 (0.344)
Notes: Significance levels: * = 10%; ** = 5%; *** = 1%.
Variable names: tau: time fixed effect; elem: group of parent’s of elementary school-age children fixed effect
(group fixed effect); Sk: groups of states k fixed effect (region fixed effect); elem × τ : group time trend control
(group-time interaction); Sk× τ : group of states’ time trend control (region-time interaction); Sk× elem: region-
group interaction; Sk × elem × τ : triple interaction (region-group-time interaction); all variables of the form
X × female are X variables interacted with the gender dummy female; jhs: dummy variable equal to one if the
individual has at least one children of junior-high-school age; age: age in years; age2: square of age; white: white
race dummy; edu: year of education completed; married: married or permanently cohabiting dummy; widowed:
widowed dummy; separated: separated dummy; divorced: legally divorced dummy; fulltime: equal to one if
the individual works less than 36 hours a week during the last year; nchildren: number of children (all ages);
pclabinc: per-capita family labor income in dollars; limit: health condition that limits daily activity dummy; bmi:
body mass index; onleave: only temporarily laid off, sick leave or maternity leave dummy; unemployed: looking
for work, unemployed dummy; retired: retired dummy; disabled: permanently or temporarily disabled dummy;
housekeeper: housekeeper dummy; student: student dummy; statedj: state j fixed effect.
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2.7.1 Average Treatment Effects: More details
ATT as a function of missing counterfactuals
We can recover the missing counterfactual E(y0it|elemi = 1, Si = 1, τt = 1) using equation
(2.1), since if we assume that equation (2.3) holds, we have
E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1) = E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 0)
+ [E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 0)]
+ [E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 0)]
− [E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 0)].
(2.9)
We can rewrite the ATT as a function of the unobserved counterfactual E(y0it|elemi =
1, Si = 1, τt = 1)
ATT = E(y1it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 0)
− [E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 0)]
− [E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 0)]
+ [E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 1)− E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 0)].
(2.10)
The sample analog of equation (2.10) is the DDD estimator of the ATT
ÂTT = (y¯1,11 − y¯1,10 )− (y¯1,01 − y¯1,00 )
− [(y¯0,11 − y¯0,10 )− (y¯0,01 − y¯0,00 )],
(2.11)
where y¯elem,St is the average of the estimated outcome over individuals in group elem,
residing in states S, at time t.
ATT in a non-linear model
We rewrite the identifying assumption as follows
f−1[E(uit|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(uit|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 0)]
− {[f−1[E(uit|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(uit|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 0)]}
= f−1[E(uit|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(uit|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 0)]
− {f−1[E(uit|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 1]− f−1[E(uit|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 0)]}.
(2.12)
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If equation (2.12) holds, the missing counterfactual is
E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1) = f
{
f−1[E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 0)]
+ {f−1[E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 0, τt = 0)]}
+ {f−1[E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 1, τt = 0)]}
− {f−1[E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 1)]− f−1[E(y0it|elem = 0, S = 0, τt = 0)]}
}
,
(2.13)
and the ATT = E(y1it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 1) − E(y0it|elem = 1, S = 1, τt = 0), can be
estimated replacing the expected values by their sample analogs
ÂTT = y¯1,11 − f
{
f−1(y¯1,10 ) + [f
−1(y¯1,01 )− f−1(y¯1,00 )]
+ [f−1(y¯0,11 )− f−1(y¯0,10 )]− [f−1(y¯0,01 )− f−1(y¯0,00 )]
}
,
(2.14)
where y¯elem,St is the average of the estimated outcome over individuals in group elem,
residing in states S, at time t.
2.7.2 Robustness: effect of HED on “placebo” treated individuals
To simulate the effect of HED reforms in elementary school on adults without children we
need to assign to each individual without children an artificial number of children. Addi-
tionally, we need to simulate whether each individual has elementary school-age children
and/or of junior-high-school age.
To predict the number of children we proceed as follows:
1. Using the sample of parents we estimate by OLS the parameters in the equation
nchildren = Xα+ u,
where X includes age, race, gender, marital status, education level, employment status,
full-time versus part-time job, total family income level, a set of variables reflecting health
status, and state of residence.
2. Using the estimated parameters we predict the number of children in the sample of
adults without children
̂nchildren = Xαˆ,
3. To obtain an integer number of children we correct the previous estimation
̂nchildren =
{
0 ̂nchildren < 0.5
a a− 0.5 ≤ ̂nchildren < a+ 0.5 for a = 1, 2, ..., 12.
To predict the dummy variable jhs, that is a variable equal to one if the individual has at
least one child of junior-high-school-age, we proceed as follows:
1. Using the sample of parents we estimate with a probit model the parameters in the
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equation
Pr(jhs = 1|X) = Φ(Xγ),
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function, and X includes number of
children, age, race, gender, marital status, education level, employment status, full-time
versus part-time job, total family income level, a set of variables reflecting health status,
and state of residence.
2. Using the estimated parameters we predict the probability of having at least one child
of junior-high-school age in the sample of adults without children as
̂Pr(jhs = 1|X) = Φ(Xγˆ),
3. To obtain a binary variable we correct the previous estimation
ĵhsi =
 1 ̂Pr(jhsi = 1|Xi) >
∑ ̂Pr(jhsi=1|Xi)
N
0 otherwise
Where
∑ ̂Pr(jhsi=1|Xi)
N is a group of states and gender specific average. To predict the
dummy variable elem, that is a variable equal to one if the individual has at least one child
of elementary-school-age, we proceed as follows:
1. Using the sample of parents we estimate with a probit model the parameters in the
equation
Pr(elem = 1|X) = Φ(Xδ),
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative density function, and X includes number of
children, indicator of child of high-school-age, age, race, gender, marital status, education
level, employment status, full-time versus part-time job, total family income level, a set of
variables reflecting health status, and state of residence.
2. Using the estimated parameters we predict the probability of having at least one child
of elementary-school-age in the sample of adults without children as
̂Pr(elem = 1|X) = Φ(Xδˆ),
3. To obtain a binary variable we correct the previous estimation
êlemi =
 1 ̂Pr(elemi = 1|Xi) >
∑ ̂Pr(elemi=1|Xi)
N
0 otherwise
Where
∑ ̂Pr(elemi=1|Xi)
N is a group of states and gender specific average.
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Figure 2.3: Ratios father-mother of means of time spent in childcare activities (hours per
week), by demographic subgroups.
Source: Ratios computed using data in Table 1 in Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (2008) based on the 2003-2006 waves
of the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Childcare activities are classified into: “Basic” childcare (breast feeding,
rocking a child to sleep, general feeding, changing diapers, providing medical care to child, grooming child, etc.);
“Educational” childcare (reading to children, teaching children, helping children with homework, attending meetings
at a child’s school, etc.); “Recreational” childcare (playing games with children, playing outdoors with children,
attending a child’s sporting event or dance recital, going to the zoo with children, taking walks with children, etc.);
“Travel” childcare (any travel related to any of the three other categories of childcare). Samples include all individuals
between the ages of 21 and 55 (inclusive) who had time diaries summing to a complete day and at least one child
under the age of 18.
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Chapter 3
Estimating a Dynamic Discrete
Choice Model of Health
Prevention Decisions: An
Application to Flu Vaccination.
Abstract
In this paper I conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of flu vaccination deci-
sions. Flu vaccination behavior in the adult population (above 65 years old) tends to be
highly persistent; additionally, the probability of vaccination increases with age and tends
to be higher for individuals with worse health outcomes. To study individual’s preventive
behavior, I first formulate a stylized life cycle model of prevention decisions using a human
capital approach, that highlights the importance of the dynamic dimension in these deci-
sions. The main aspects of the model are: i) Influenza immunization is a health investment,
which affects the evolution of future health stock and hence, affects individuals’ future util-
ity. This investment implies some monetary and non-monetary costs; ii) Vaccination has
higher returns for individuals with health conditions that increase the risk of influenza-
related complications; iii) Experience with the vaccine in the previous period reduces the
cost of current prevention effort, generating habit persistence. I estimate a reduced-form
of the demand function of vaccination implied by the model using dynamic probit models,
that allow me to disentangle how much of the observed persistence in vaccination decisions
are due to state dependence (habit persistence), unobserved heterogeneity, and health risks
or other observable characteristics. I also analyze whether individuals’ incentives to pursue
prevention change through the life cycle. I use data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey for the period 2001-2004. Results suggest that the three sources −state dependence,
unobserved heterogeneity, and health risks and other individual characteristics− play a role
in explaining the persistence in vaccination decisions. However, health risks and individual
characteristics have a lower effect once state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity are
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taken into account. The results also show that the incentives to vaccinate change with age
but not with self-assessed health status.
3.1 Introduction
Influenza is an infectious disease that can have severe health consequences for the adult
population, pneumonia being the most frequent complication. Influenza and pneumonia
are the sixth cause of death for the population above 65 years old in the US, with a
mortality rate of 140 per 100,000 inhabitants.1 According to the Agency for Health Care
Research and Quality, during the period 1997-2006 these illnesses accounted for 6% of total
hospital stays for the elderly. Each hospital stay implied an average cost of 9,500 dollars
for influenza and above 14,000 dollars for pneumonia.2 Hence, influenza is an important
public health concern.
Given that influenza immunizations have been demonstrated to be cost-effective for per-
sons aged 65 and older (Maciosek, Solberg, Coffield, Edwards, and Goodman, 2006), various
public health organizations, including the World Health Organization, recommend annual
vaccination for the elderly (Stohr, 2003). Persons with chronic health conditions who face
a higher risk of influenza-related complications, such as heart and lung diseases, are par-
ticularly encouraged to vaccinate. In the US, even though Medicare subsidizes the annual
influenza immunization for its beneficiaries, the coverage rate only reached 65% of the pop-
ulation 65 years old and older in 2000 and this percentage remained almost constant since
then.3 Increasing vaccination coverage is one of the objectives in the agenda of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. Reaching a vaccination coverage of 90% by
2010 was an unmet objective of the Healthy People initiative but it is still the target to be
achieved by 2020.4
In this paper I conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of individuals’ vaccination
decisions. First, I formulate a stylized life cycle model of primary prevention decisions using
a human capital approach.5 I estimate a reduced-form model of the demand function of
1According to data from the National Center for Health Statistics, Trends in Health and Aging, for the
year 2004.
2The average length of stay due to influenza in the period 1997-2006 was 4.7 days for people aged 65-84
and 5.8 for those aged 85 and older. For pneumonia the average length of stay was 6.5 for people 65 years
old and older. See more details on hospitalizations in Table 3.11 in Appendix 3.7.1.
3Medicare part B covers both the costs of the vaccine and its administration by recognized providers.
Medicare part A does not cover this benefit, but only a small share of the Medicaid population is covered
by part A alone. The data for vaccination coverage comes from the National Center for Health Statistics
(National Health Interview Survey, sample adult questionnaire).
4“Healthy People 2010 was an initiative carried out by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, who set a comprehensive nationwide health promotion and disease prevention agenda designed to
enhance population health through preventive behaviors. Healthy People 2010 contained 467 objectives de-
signed to serve as a framework for improving the health of all people in the United States during the first
decade of the 21st century”(Healthy People 2010 Database, NCHS). Healthy People 2020 sets the objectives
to be achived by 2020.
5Preventive measures can be classified according to their effects on health (Kenkel, 2000), and vaccination
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vaccination implied by the model. I use dynamic panel probit models and I contrast the
results with the predictions of the theoretical dynamic model. Using panel data from the
Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) for the period 2001-2004, I disentangle the
effects of state dependence (habit persistence), unobserved heterogeneity, and health risks
and other time-invariant observable characteristics, on the probability of vaccination.6 I
also analyze the effect of age and self-assessed health status on vaccination decisions, as
well as the effect of other individual characteristics that change over time.
In order to capture the main features of vaccination decisions I construct a simple dynamic
discrete choice model of prevention decisions. In the model, individuals face the following
trade-off. Prevention generates a benefit in terms of better health in the long run at a cost
today, for instance, exerting some effort −time, search for information− or incurring some
monetary costs. Individuals with worse health status may suffer greater health losses when
getting the flu, which implies that prevention has higher returns for them. Additionally,
the model allows for current immunizations decisions to have a direct effect on the cost
of future decisions, by assuming that past experience with the vaccine reduces the cost of
current prevention effort. For example, for the case of Medicare, Parente, Salkever, and
DaVanzo (2005) argue that through the experience with the vaccine individuals learn that
vaccination is a benefit fully covered for Medicare beneficiaries, i.e., it is free of charge.
In the empirical analysis I use the approaches proposed by Heckman (1981) and Wooldridge
(2005) to deal with the endogeneity problem generated in this type of dynamic models
by the presence of the lagged dependent variable as a regressor, together with unobserved
heterogeneity (usually called in the literature the “initial condition problem”). Additionally,
I compare the results of the dynamic models estimated with the Wooldridge and Heckamn
approaches with models that ignore state dependence, which I refer to as static models.
Understanding the determinants of individuals’ preventive behavior is important to im-
prove the design of policies aimed to increase flu vaccination coverage. Previous empirical
works have studied how health status (Mullahy, 1999; Wu, 2003), consumer knowledge (Par-
ente, Salkever, and DaVanzo, 2005), physician quality (Schmitz and Wubker, 2010; Maurer,
2009), and perceived risks (Mullahy, 1999; Ayyagari, 2007), affect vaccination decisions of
the older population. My paper builds upon this literature and analyze the determinants
of vaccination in a dynamic setting. Most of the analysis in the previous literature have
been carried out using cross-sectional data. A complete theoretical framework incorpo-
rating prior experience with the vaccine was considered in the work by Mullahy (1999),
but due to data limitations prior experience was not introduced in the analysis. Although
belongs to what is called primary prevention. Primary preventive measures allow to reduce the probability
of occurrence of a disease. This category comprises also public sanitation policies and individual lifestyles
(as regular exercise and non-smoking).
6The dependence of current decision on lagged ones is known in the empirical literature as “true state
dependence” (Heckman, 1981).
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Parente, Salkever, and DaVanzo (2005) consider state dependence in their empirical anal-
ysis, they do not deal with the potential endogeneity problems introduced by the lagged
dependent variable.7 Compared to the previous literature, the use of panel data allows to
test not only the importance of health conditions and other individual characteristics on
the vaccine demand, but also to disentangle the relative importance of state dependence
and unobserved heterogeneity. As I show in Section 3.3, individual vaccination decisions
are highly persistent over time. The nature of this persistence is important for policy de-
sign purposes. The presence of state dependence, for instance, implies that the any public
campaign that induces individuals to get the vaccine for the first time, will have persis-
tent effects in subsequent periods, while this would not be the case if persistence is due to
unobserved time-invariant characteristics.
The results suggest that the three possible sources of persistence (state dependence, unob-
served heterogeneity, and health risks and other time-invariant individual characteristics)
do play a role in explaining it. The Heckman model provides a better fit to the observed
data than the Wooldridge approach, hence it is the preferred specification. I find that in-
dividuals who get the vaccine in a given year are, on average, between 12 to 14 percentage
points more likely to get the vaccine in the next year than those who did not get it. Also,
individuals’ choices depend to a large extent on unobserved heterogeneity, which accounts
for 60% to 80% −depending on the estimation strategy− of the total variance of the error
term. Preexisting chronic conditions, such as diabetes or arthritis rheumathoid, increase
the probabilty of vacicnation by 4 percentage points. Other socioeconomic characteristics
that are constant over time, such as more education or being white increase the probabilty
of vacicnation by 5 percentage points.
I also find that individual’s behavior adjusts to changes in the perceived risks of influenza-
related complications, which are not necessary constant over time. For example, I find
that individuals do increase their likelihood of vaccination if in the previous period they
experienced a health shock (a new episode of respiratory illness or stroke). Also, as in
previous literature, I find that married individuals, white, and with supplemental private or
public health insurance are more likely to engage in vaccination. I show that the incentives
to vaccinate change with age although it does not change with self-assessed health status,
as opposed to the findings in Wu (2003) and Mullahy (1999). Vaccination propensities
tend to increase with age but showing a slight slowdown at advanced ages. Finally, the
comparison of the preferred dynamic and static specifications show that conclusions do not
change qualitatively when controlling for state dependence, but the dynamic model fit the
data better to predict the sequence of vaccination decisions.
7Parente, Salkever, and DaVanzo (2005) point out that prior vaccination use increases consumer knowl-
edge about Medicare benefits through experience and hence, it makes individuals more likely to get the
vaccine in the next year. Also, individuals without previous experience may also underestimate the risk of
exposure to the illness, the severity of the disease, or the effectiveness of the vaccine to prevent the disease.
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The implications of these results for public health policy purposes are, at least, twofold.
First, given that individuals do internalize the fact that certain health risks increases the
benefit of vaccination, this channel can be exploited to increase even further vaccination
take-up rates. For instance, public campaigns alerting the population that influenza-related
complications are more acute for individuals with certain health conditions, would increase
vaccination coverage. Second, any public campaign that induces individuals to get vacci-
nated for the first time, will have effects on subsequent periods through the habit persistence
channel.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents the conceptual framework that
guides the empirical application. Section 3.3 describes the data and the sample selection.
Section 3.4 describes the empirical strategy I follow for the reduced form estimation, as well
as the econometric issues related to the estimation of dynamic probit models. Section 3.5
presents the results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
In this section I present a model of vaccination decisions which is characterized by two main
features. First, the time dimension is introduced in the problem solved by the individual,
i.e., decisions are made in a life-cycle context. The second feature of the model is the
introduction of uncertainty, since the evolution of the health stock is stochastic. Vaccination
constitutes a means to reduce uncertainty, as it reduces the probability of occurrence of a
particular illness.
In the model, individuals maximize the present value of their lifetime utility. Own health
stock is a consumption good, i.e., it enters in the utility function, as well as human capital
that can be modified through individual actions. I assume that health stock has a stochastic
component that accounts for the uncertain evolution of health. Every period, individuals
are exposed to the occurrence of a negative health shock, the flu. If the individual receives
the negative health shock, there is positive probability of recovering from it and maintaining
his health stock unchanged. Nevertheless, the shock may produce a deterioration in the
health stock that remains for more than one period.8 Individuals are concerned with the
magnitude of these effects because it is in their interest to increase the probability of being
in good health in the future.
Individuals may affect the transition probabilities between health states using prevention
methods that reduce the probability of occurrence of the negative shocks, acting as “self-
insurance”. Under this setting, the dual role of health as a consumption good and a human
capital is key in determining individual’s incentives to pursue prevention.
8Long lasting effects of influenza and pneumonia are more likely to occur among the elder individuals
and among those with chronic conditions because of the high risk of complications due to the flu.
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In the model, individuals face a trade-off between the long-run benefits of using prevention
measures, i.e., the higher expected health stock in the future which increases the present
value of expected utility, and the current monetary and non-monetary costs associated
with these measures. In this model, the experience with the vaccine in the previous period
reduces current non-monetary costs of prevention.
Timing. Individuals have a finite life time t = 1, ..., T . However, it is possible that
individuals die before time period T . At the beginning of each period an individual decides
whether to pursue primary prevention, given his health stock, ht, his previous prevention
decision, dt−1, and other individual characteristics, wt, in order to reduce the probability
of receiving a negative health shock that may occur at the end of the period.9 Prevention
reduces the probability of occurrence of a negative health shock and, as a consequence,
increases the probability of enjoying better health in the next period. Prevention also
increases the probability of surviving. The decision variable is denoted by dt and it may
take two values dt ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether the individual gets the vaccine. Every period,
only one health shock may occur, st ∈ {0, 1}, and its realization is unknown at the moment
the prevention decision is made. If death occurs it is assumed to happen at the end of the
period.
Preferences. The current period utility function is modeled as an additive separable
random utility given by the following expression:
Ut(ht, dt, dt−1, wt, t) =
{
u(ht, wt) + 0,t if dt = 0
u(ht, wt) + 1,t − Cp(dt−1, ht, wt) if dt = 1
where Cp(1, ht, wt) < Cp(0, ht, wt).
The current health stock, ht, enters the utility function because health is perceived as a
consumption good; current prevention effort, dt = 1, generates desutility in the current
period, Cp, which reflects monetary and non-monetary costs of prevention. These costs
depend on individual health, ht, other individual characteristics, wt, and past experience,
dt−1. I consider that part of non-monetary costs are related to knowledge referred to the
vaccine uptake and its characteristics, and they are reduced if the individual experienced
with the vaccine in the past.10 Finally, utility is affected by an idiosyncratic choice-specific
preference shifter, jt.
9 I omit in this section the use of the subscript i to refer to individuals.
10Notice that part of these informational costs may be a fixed cost that would disappear the first time
the vaccine is consumed. I do not model this possibility because in the data set there is no information
about the time in which individuals got the vaccine for the first time.
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Health production. The health of each individual is assumed to evolve stochastically
as a function of current health, ht, health investments, dt, and individual characteristics,
wt. Prevention activities are the only form of health investments. I assume that there is a
finite number, H, of health states. For simplicity, I assume that there are only two possible
health states, good, hg, and bad, hb.
Uncertainty about future health outcomes is modeled in the following way: first, individuals
face the possibility of contracting the illness, st = 1. The probability of contracting the
illness, S(ht, wt, dt), is a function of the individual’s current health stock, ht, individual
characteristics, wt, and current prevention decision, dt. By assumption this probability
is always greater than zero and it decreases if the individual gets the vaccine, that is
S(ht, wt, 0) > S(ht, wt, 1) > 0. Also, it depends negatively on the level of health stock, that
is S(hb, wt, dt) > S(hg, wt, dt).
The health stock evolves according to a first order Markov process with transition matrix
Π. These transitions are conditional upon survival and depend on current health stock,
ht, the realization of the shock, st, and individual characteristics, wt. Once the shock is
realized, health transition probabilities do not depend on dt. Each element of the transition
matrix is denoted by piml(wt, st), which correspond to the probability of being in the next
period in the health state hm given that current health state is hl, for m and l ∈ {g, b},
individual characteristics are wt and the realization of the shock is st. If the individual
contracts the illness (st = 1) I assume that, other things equal, an individual with bad
health, hb, is less likely to be in good health than someone with good health, hg. This is to
say, pigl(wt, st) < pigg(wt, st), for l ∈ {g, b}.
At the moment the individual takes the prevention decision, the negative health shock
has not been realized, which implies that when solving his dynamic problem he needs to
integrate out the health shock. Then, health transition probability at the moment the
decision is made can be written as:
F (hm|hl, wt, dt) = S(hl, wt, dt)piml(wt, 1) + (1− S(hl, wt, dt))piml(wt, 0),
for m and l ∈ {g, b}. (3.1)
Given previous assumptions, we have that F (hg|hl, wt, 1) > F (hg|hl, wt, 0) for l ∈ {g, b}.
Survival probability. The probability that an individual survives until the end of the
period is denoted by psu(ht, wt, dt). I assume that the probability of survival increases with
the use of the vaccine but it decreases with age, which is one of the variables in the vector
wt. Also, I assume that the ratio
psu(ht,wt,1)
psu(ht,wt,0)
, which measures the effectiveness of the vaccine
in terms of extending life, decreases as age increases, t→ T , but this ratio is always higher
for individuals in bad health status.
Maximization problem. Individuals maximize their lifetime discounted utility by making
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sequential choices over health prevention, dt, in each time period. Individuals are forward
looking. In any period τ the individual solves the following maximization problem:
max
dt∈{0,1}t=Tt=τ
Eτ [Uτ (hτ , dτ , dτ−1, wτ , τ )
+
T∑
t=τ+1
βt−τpsu(ht−1, wt−1, dt−1)Ut(ht, dt, dt−1, wt, t)|hτ , wτ , dτ−1] (3.2)
We can rewrite this problem as a dynamic programming problem. At any period t = 1, ..., T
the problem for any individual consists on maximizing the expected present value of the
remaining lifetime rewards. Lets define Ωt = (ht, wt, dt−1, t) as the vector of state variables.
Then, the maximum expected present value of lifetime utility at time t given Ωt is:
Vt(Ωt) = max
dj∈{0,1}
{ U(ht, dj , dt−1, wt, t) + ps(ht, wt, dj) βE(Vt+1(Ωt+1)| ht, dj , wt)} (3.3)
I define the alternative-specific value function at time t as V jt (Ωt), for the alternatives of
not doing prevention (j = 0) and doing prevention (j = 1). Every period, an individual
compares the present discounted expected utility over the remaining lifetime from doing
prevention today and making optimal decisions in the future, V 1t (Ωt), with the respec-
tive discounted value of not doing prevention and making optimal decisions in the future,
V 0t (Ωt), that is Vt(Ωt) = max
{
V 0t (Ωt), V
1
t (Ωt)
}
. He decides to pursue prevention if and
only if V 1t (Ωt) ≥ V 0t (Ωt). That is,
V 1t (Ωt) ≥ V 0t (Ωt)
v∗t − Cp(dt−1, ht, wt) + ut ≥ 0 (3.4)
where
v∗t = ps(ht, wt, 1) βE [Vt+1(Ωt+1)| ht, 1, wt]− ps(ht, wt, 0) βE [Vt+1(Ωt+1)| ht, 0, wt]
and ut = 
1
t − 0t .
In the Appendix 3.7.2 I solve the model under a particular set of assumptions and I present
a numerical example. The implications derived from it are the following. First, if previous
experience with the vaccine reduces the current cost of prevention, then individuals that
get the vaccine in one period are more likely to do it again in the following period, compare
with those who do not get the vaccine. Second, the probability to get the vaccine increases
with age, for a given health status, although there is a slowdown at the end of life. Third,
only at advanced ages individuals with worse health status are more likely to get the vaccine
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relative to those in better health. The gap increases with age and then closes at the end of
life. At younger ages, it could be the case that individuals in better health are more likely
to get the vaccine than individuals in worse health. This could happen because although
the expected gains from vaccination in terms of health are lower than for individuals in
worse health, life expectancy is higher so they have a longer time horizon to enjoy the
health gains from vaccination.
3.3 Data and sample selection
3.3.1 Data description
I use annual data from the Access to Care Files of the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey
(MCBS) for the years 2001 to 2004. Respondents for the MCBS are sampled to be rep-
resentative of Medicare population as a whole. The MCBS is a longitudinal survey where
sampled individuals are interviewed during four years.
This dataset collects survey’s information on a broad spectrum of individual’s health and
socioeconomic characteristics, as well as health related behavior. Additionally, it collects
information about access to care, insurance coverage, financial resources, and potential
family support.
The Access to Care files sample the “always enrolled” Medicare population, which consists
of those enrolled in one part of Medicare, Part A or B, or enrolled in both parts on January
1 of that year and who remain enrolled through the end of December.
The MCBS survey’s data is matched with administrative records, that register the indi-
viduals’ claims with a detailed description of the use of health care services during a year.
The claims record the utilization of services rendered and reimbursed under fee-for services
during a calendar year. The services that Medicare beneficiaries have access to are of 7
different types: inpatient hospital stays, skilled nursing facility, home health care, hospice
care, outpatient services, physician’s services, and durable medical equipment. Any indi-
vidual may use any of these services during a calendar year, and each time a service is used
it is registered as a claim record. Each claim registers the diagnosis the patient presents
each time he uses health care services, according to the International Classification of Dis-
eases, 9th Revision, Clinical Modification medical codes (ICD-9), and the date in which the
service is used.
I consider a balanced sample of respondents who were not living in facilities, such as nursing
or retirement homes, during the whole period under analysis.11 The sample is also restricted
11Given that I am dealing with an old population, some attrition is expected due to death, serious
illnesses, or people moving to institutionalized care. So, people who remain in the balanced panel are more
likely to be healthier. This may affect the estimated effect of the measures of health status on vaccination
decisions, but the direction of the bias is not clear. On the one hand, as healthier individuals remain in
the balanced sample, the effect of the health measures I control for (heart problems, stroke, chronic lung
disease, respiratory illnesses, self reported health status, change in health relative to previous year) on the
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to individuals aged 65 and over giving a pooled sample size of 5313 observations.
The outcome of interest is whether the respondent had the flu vaccine during the influenza
season. Individuals are asked whether they had a influenza shot during the last winter.
Given the data available, I am able to construct a binary indicator of vaccination for the
2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 flu seasons. Flu seasons run from October
to April in the US and outbreaks are more likely to occur from late December to early March
(ACIP, 2008). The optimal time for immunization of high-risk groups is recommended
between October and November.
To account for the multiple dimensions of health, I consider different measures of health
status available from the MCBS. I give a possible interpretation of each of these variables
in the context of the theoretical model and I define the expected effects of these variables
on the vaccination decision.12
Risk factors. As an overall measure of health I use self-reported health status. The survey
ask individuals to assess their health, explicitly indicating to compare it with respect to
individuals of the same age. I construct three categories (Good, Regular, and Bad) and
interact these variables with age. According to the predictions of the theoretical model,
individuals’ incentives to pursue prevention change through the life cycle and they may differ
for individuals with different perceived health status. In particular, vaccination propensity
should increase with age, because age is a risk factor, but it may slowdown at advanced ages,
because the planning horizon is shorter. Additionally, the gap of vaccination propensities
between individuals with worse health and better health may increase as individuals get
older.
A second set of variables are indicators of diseases that are recognized to increase the risk
of influenza-related complications, such as cancer, heart disease, diabetes, chronic lung
disease, stroke, and arthritis rheumatoid. I construct indicators that take the value one
if the individual reports to had suffered some of these diseases prior to the beginning of
the sample period. Hence, these are preexisting health conditions for the window of time
analyzed and all of them are expected to increase the likelihood of taking the vaccine.
Finally, a third set of risk factors are indicators of recent health events (health “shocks”)
that increase the risk of influenza related complications. I include two variables that indicate
if new events of heart disease or new events of stroke occurred in the previous year. These
indicators are based on answers given to the questions in the survey.
Although I do not modeled it in the theoretical framework, I additionally include an indi-
cator of the occurrence of respiratory illnesses during the period prior to the vaccination
probability of taking the vaccine could be underestimated. Those who remain in the sample are healthier
and, hence, less likely to take the vaccine than those that are dropped from the sample. On the other hand,
individuals not in the sample could be those less likely to pursue health preventive activities and, hence,
more likely to suffer health shocks. If this is the case, the effect of health outcomes could be overestimated.
12See the appendix 3.7.4 for a detailed description of the variables.
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decision. As pointed out by Ayyagari (2007) and Mullahy (1999) individuals may associate
this shock to an increase in the risk of getting the flu, which in turn increases their incen-
tives to get the vaccine in the next period. To construct the indicator that refers to the
occurrence of respiratory illness I use administrative information on Medicare claims. I con-
struct a binary variable which takes the value 1 if during a given period any disease, coded
as influenza, pneumonia, or other respiratory disease, is present in the diagnosis of any of
the individual’s claims, and 0 otherwise. I am able to construct health shock variables for
the periods prior to the flu seasons 2001-2002, 2002-2003 and 2003-2004.13
Physical limitations. Individuals with physical limitations may find more costly to get
vaccinated. For instance, they may require the company of other person to go to the place
to get the flu shot. I consider three variables that may capture physical limitations: a
binary variable that indicates whether the individual had a broken hip last year and a
variable that counts the number of limitations with activities of daily living (ADLs)
Planning horizon. There is empirical evidence (Benitez-Silva and Ni, 2008) of the positive
relation between self-reported health changes and expected longevity. Hence, I use an
indicator that takes the value one if the individual reports that his or her health is worse
or much worse than in the previous year as a proxy for expected longevity. According to
the theoretical model, individuals reporting that their health is worse relative to previous
year may be less likely, ceteris paribus, to get the vaccine, as the time horizon to enjoy the
benefits of the vaccine is shorter.
Individual characteristics. Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics may be also
important factors determining preventive behavior. Through all the analysis I consider
marital status, gender, race, and education. Education is a particularly important factor
since there is evidence that more educated individuals have a greater knowledge of health
related issues, and therefore, they may be more likely to pursue health preventive activities
(Kenkel, 1991; Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2006; Park and Kang, 2008; Parente, Salkever,
and DaVanzo, 2005). I also consider whether individuals have an additional source of health
insurance coverage (public or private) that complements Medicare benefits or whether indi-
viduals have Medicare part A only and, as a consequence, free vaccination is not available
for them.
13Influenza, pneumonia and other respiratory illness shocks are identified using the diagnosis codes based
ICD-9 medical codes which are 487, 480-486 and 460-519, respectively. The construction of health shock
variables from Medicare claims data relies on the assumption that any disease the individual had (sufficiently
acute to demand medical services) should be captured by Medicare claims. Specifically, I am assuming that
individuals do not resort to medical services outside the Medicare orbit in the event of illness and that
diagnosis done by doctors are correct. An individual who did not use any Medicare service during the
period is considered as not suffering any disease during it.
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3.3.2 Summary statistics
A salient characteristic of individual vaccination decisions that motivates the study of vac-
cination decisions in a dynamic framework is that they are highly persistent over time.
Table 3.1 shows that flu vaccination has a clear persistent pattern. Approximately 95% of
individuals who get the vaccine in a given year are expected to get it again in the following
year. Also, 76% of individuals who do not vaccinate in a given year are likely to continue
with the same behavior in the next period.
Medicare part B covers both the costs of the vaccine and its administration by recognized
providers. Hence, all Medicare part B beneficiaries can potentially get the vaccine for free
every year. One way through which Medicare beneficiaries learn about this benefit and the
need of receiving a flu shot, is through an annual guide send by the Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Services (CMS) that contains information about health plans, prescription drug
plans, and rights and protections. In particular, beneficiaries receive information indicating
which preventive services are covered. This could in part explain the persistent behavior.
However, this information does not reach all beneficiaries since the most common reason
beneficiaries gave for failing to get a flu shot was that they did not know that the federal
government recommends and pays for it (B. Baker, 1999). Other reason could be that
individuals with health problems receive systematically advice of their doctors to receive
the shot. A third reason, as suggested by Parente, Salkever, and DaVanzo (2005), is that
as beneficiaries experience once with the vaccine they learn that vaccination is a benefit
fully covered for Medicare beneficiaries.
Table 3.1: Transition rates. Individuals aged 65+, living in the community.
Year t status Year t+ 1 status 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
No vaccination No vaccination 0.765 0.796 0.761
Vaccination 0.235 0.204 0.239
Vaccination No vaccination 0.054 0.055 0.047
Vaccination 0.946 0.945 0.953
N 2,325 2,325 2,325
Source: MCBS.
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics on a selection of relevant socioeconomic and health
status variables for the full sample in the year 2001 and for subgroups classified according
to their vaccination sequence during the period 2001-2004. There are 16 possible decision
paths, but I restrict to five mutually exclusive cases: the subsample of individuals who get
the vaccine each year of the sample period (column 3); individuals who skip the vaccine
each year (column 2); individuals who experiment a single transition from vaccination
to no vaccination (column 4), that is, sequences ’1000’, ’1100’ and ’1110’; individuals that
experiment a single transition from no vaccination to vaccination (column 5), with sequences
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’0001’, ’0011’ and ’0111’; and individuals that experiment multiple transitions (column 6).
To asses if the different sequences of vaccination are explained by observed characteristics,
columns (2) to (6) of Table 3.2 show summary statistics for the five subsamples classified
according to the sequence of decisions. The differences among subsamples can be summa-
rized as follows. Regarding the socioeconomic characteristics and comparing to the average,
individuals that engage in prevention every year −column (3)− are older, better educated,
and are more likely to be white, married, and to have supplemental health insurance. On
the contrary, individuals who never engage in prevention −column (2)− are more likely
to be younger and less educated, and they are less likely to have a supplemental health
insurance, than the average.14
Health differences are also well established between these two extreme groups: individuals
pursuing prevention each year of the sample period have in general worse health than the
average, while individuals who skip prevention are in better health than average. Indeed,
almost all measures of health status at the beginning of the sample period are worse for
the always takers than for the never takers.15 This could be in part explained by a supply
effect, i.e., doctors recommend their patients to take the flu shot.
Individuals that present a single transition from vaccination to no vaccination−column (4)−
are less educated and more likely to be white and married. Individuals in this group are
more likely to have antecedents of heart attack and more likely to have had a broken hip last
year and to have more limitations with activities of daily living.16 Individuals experiencing
a single transition from no vaccination to vaccination −column (5)− are younger, more
likely to have supplemental insurance, but there is no a clear pattern about their health.
The patterns that arise when comparing columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.2 are consistent with
the determinants of prevention suggested by some of the the existing empirical literature: 1)
Health seems to affect individual incentives to get the vaccine; 2) Socioeconomic variables
−education, race, marital status, and supplemental insurance coverage− seem to play an
important role on individual behavior as well.
3.4 Empirical strategy
I estimate a reduced-form demand function of preventive care, dt, implied by equation (3.4),
which indicates that the individual will pursue prevention if v∗t −Cp(dt−1, ht, wt) + ut ≥ 0.
Let subscript i denote individual observations and let’s assume that the cost associated
to prevention is Cp,it = ςit − γdi,t−1. The cost of prevention is assumed to depend on
individual characteristics, captured in the term ςit. I make the simplifying assumption that
14In all cases the differences are statistically significant.
15The differences between theses two groups are statistically significant for self-reported health status,
hypertension, angina, other health problems, and diabetes.
16In all cases the differences are statistically significant.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics, year 2001
Sequence of vaccination decisions 2001-2004
Single transition Single transition
Full Never have Always have from vacc. to from no vacc. Multiple
Sample Vaccine Vaccine non-vacc. to Vacc. Transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Individual Characteristics
Age 74.63 73.49 75.38 75.55 73.23 73.56
Female 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.64 0.57 0.63
White 0.87 0.85 0.91 0.62 0.80 0.74
Education 0.69 0.63 0.72 0.57 0.66 0.62
Married 0.55 0.51 0.58 0.42 0.54 0.49
Insurance coverage
Medicare Part A Only 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.04
Supplemental Insurance 0.92 0.87 0.93 0.89 0.96 0.87
Health measures
Health Good 0.48 0.55 0.48 0.43 0.43 0.43
Health Regular 0.32 0.29 0.32 0.28 0.34 0.34
Health Bad 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.28 0.23 0.23
Hypertension 0.53 0.44 0.56 0.49 0.53 0.54
Heart Attack 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.21 0.10 0.15
Angina 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.06 0.05
Other Heart Problems 0.27 0.19 0.30 0.23 0.27 0.24
Stroke 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.11
Cancer 0.16 0.13 0.17 0.09 0.15 0.19
Chronic Lung Disease 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.09 0.12
Diabetes 0.17 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.20
Arthritis Rheu 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.08
Broken Hip 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03
Number of ADLS 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.83 0.59 0.50
N 1771 339 1039 53 223 117
(19%) (59%) (3%) (13%) (7%)
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the effect of previous experience, di,t−1, affects all individuals in the same way and generates
a reduction of prevention costs. The dynamic discrete choice equation for individual i in
period t is then:
dit =
{
1 if v∗it − ςit + γdi,t−1 + uit > 0
0 otherwise
(3.5)
The variable v∗it can be considered a latent variable representing the expected increment to
future utility for individual i if he vaccinates in period t. To parameterize the reduced-form
model, I assume v∗it − ςit follows a linear model in parameters:17
v∗it − ςit = xitβ + ci, (3.6)
where xit is a vector of covariates, including individual characteristics, measures of health
status, year, and geographical dummies, and ci captures individual unobserved characteris-
tics that remain unchanged through time. Replacing (3.6) into (3.5) we obtain the following
latent variable version of the demand for prevention:
d∗it = xitβ + γdi,t−1 + vit (3.7)
The lagged decision, di,t−1, is a binary variable which takes value 1 if the individual was
immunized in the previous year. In the dataset I observe the actual decisions, dit, therefore,
the estimated model is the following:
dit = 1(d
∗
it > 0) = 1(xitβ + γdi,t−1 + vit > 0) (3.8)
The error term vit has the following structure:
vit = ci + uit (3.9)
uit ∼ iid Normal(0, 1) (3.10)
Although the errors uit are assumed serially independent, the composite error term, vit =
ci + uit, will be correlated over time due to the individual-specific time invariant term, ci.
The specific form of unobserved heterogeneity assumed, i.e., additive, individual-specific,
and time invariant, implies equi-correlation between the vit component in any two different
periods:
17Under this setting ς is the parameter associated with the current monetary and non-monetary costs of
prevention.
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ρ = Corr(vit, vis) =
σ2c
1 + σ2c
t, s = 2, ..., T ; t 6= s (3.11)
Note that the cross-period correlation, ρ, also measures the proportion of the total unob-
served variability due to unobserved individual heterogeneity. In general, for the specifi-
cations with state dependence it is necessarily to assume that the explanatory variables
are strictly exogenous, that is, the xit are uncorrelated with uit for all t and s.
18 I also
assume that dynamics of decisions are of first order, once xit and ci are conditioned on.
Under these assumptions, the probability of vaccination conditional on the regressors and
the unobserved individual effect is:
P (dit = 1|di,t−1, ..., di0, Xi, ci) = P (dit = 1|di,t−1, xit, ci) = Φ(xitβ + γdi,t−1 + ci), (3.12)
where Xi = (xit, xi,t−1, ..., xi0) and Φ is the standard normal cdf. The second equality
follows from the normality assumption of the error term uit.
Given the assumptions, we can write the joint density of the sequence of decisions between
period 1 and T , di = (di1, ..., diT ), given (Xi, di0, ci) as:
f(di|Xi, di0, ci; θ) =
T∏
t=1
f(dit|di,t−1, ..., di0Xi, ci; θ) (3.13)
=
T∏
t=1
f(dit|di,t−1, xit, ci; θ) (3.14)
=
T∏
t=1
Φ [(xitβ + γdi,t−1 + ci)(2dit − 1)] (3.15)
The presence of a lagged dependent variable as a regressor together with unobserved het-
erogeneity raises what has been called the “initial conditions problem”, because the first
observed decision in the data for individual i, di0, can be correlated with the unobserved
component, ci, introducing endogeneity problems. Treating ci as parameters to be esti-
mated, results in inconsistent estimates for β and γ as as N goes to infinity and T is fixed
−the incidental parameters problem. To estimate the parameters θ = (β, γ), unobserved
18The regressors I consider as exogenous are socioeconomic characteristics such as education, marital
status, gender, race, and age. I control for chronic illnesses suffered in periods prior to the period in which
the first choice di0 is observed. I also control for time-varying health measures, like the number of limitations
with activities of daily living (ADLS), self-assessed health status, self-reported health changes, and health
shocks. These variables are constructed based on survey information prior to the period in which vaccination
decision is made, as well as health shocks indicators, which are are constructed using claims in the year
prior to the one in which the vaccination decision is made. . Finally, I also assume exogenous whether
the individual has a supplemental health insurance and whether it only has Medicare part A (hence, flu
vaccination is not free of charge).
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heterogeneity ci must be integrated out. I describe below two solutions proposed in the
literature where the estimation of θ = (β, γ) is carried out by integrating the unobserved
heterogeneity component ci.
3.4.1 Wooldridge approach
One of the solutions proposed to tackle the initial conditions problem in dynamic, nonlinear
panel data models is the conditional maximum likelihood approach proposed by Wooldridge
(2005). The procedure consists in finding a density for the sequence of observed choices
from period 1 to T , di, conditional on the first observed choice, di0, and all the exogenous
variables in all periods, Xi. This can be done finding a density for ci conditional on di0 and
Xi, say h(c|d0, X; δ), where δ are the parameters of this density function.
Assuming that h(c|d0, X; δ) is the correctly specified density, then the joint density of the
sequence of choices di, given (Xi, di0) is:
f(di|Xi, di0; θ, δ) =
=
∫ ∞
−∞
{
T∏
t=1
Φ [(xitβ + γdi,t−1 + c)(2dit − 1)]
}
h(c|di0, Xi)dc (3.16)
We can allow for correlation between the observed regressors and the unobserved indi-
vidual effect. Following the specification of Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984), I
parameterize the distribution of the unobserved effect as:
ci = ψ + λdi0 + x¯iα+ ai, (3.17)
ai ∼ N(0, σ2a), (3.18)
ai independent of di0 and x¯i, (3.19)
and x¯i are the within individual mean (over time) of the time-varying regressors. As
indicated in Contoyannis, Jones and Rice (2004), three features of this specification should
be noted. First, the specification implies that the identified coefficients for time-invariant
regressors are composite effects of the direct effect of these variables on vaccination decision,
and the correlation between the time invariant-variable and the unobserved time invariant
error term, captured by the relevant elements in β and α. Second, all time dummies
must be dropped from x¯i to avoid perfect collinearity. Finally, the estimate of λ will
be of interest to assess the relationship between the initial vaccination decision and the
unobserved individual effect.
Under these assumptions the conditional density of c is given by h(c|di0, Xi) ∼ N(ψ+λdi0+
x¯iα, σ
2
a) and characterized by the parameters δ = (ψ, λ, α, σ
2
a).
For this particular case, the joint distribution of di conditional on observable regressors in
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equation (3.16) is:
f(di|x¯i, di0; θ, δ) =∫ ∞
−∞
{
T∏
t=1
Φ [(xitβ + γdi,t−1 + ψ + λdi0 + x¯iα+ ai)(2dit − 1)]
}
g(a)da = (3.20)
=
∫ ∞
−∞
{
T∏
t=1
Φ [(xitβ + γdi,t−1 + ψ + λdi0 + x¯iα+ ai)(2dit − 1)]
}
1
σa
φ(
a
σa
)da (3.21)
where φ is the standard normal distribution function.19 The density in equation (3.21) is
the expression of the standard random effects probit model, where the set of regressors is
now Wi = (xit, di,t−1, di0, x¯i), and can be estimated as a standard random effects probit
model to obtain estimates for ψ, β, γ, λ, α and σ2a.
20
3.4.2 Heckman approach
The approach to the initial conditions problem proposed by Heckman (1981) involves finding
a distribution for the first observed choice, g(di0|zi0, ci), where zi0 is a vector of exogenous
instruments. The solution proposed is to specify a linearized approximation to the reduced
form equation for the initial value of the latent variable in the following way:
d∗i0 = zi0pi + ηi (3.22)
where zi0 is a vector of exogenous instruments, which includes pre-sample variables and
also the exogenous variables in period 0, xi0. The unobserved component ηi is assumed to
be correlated with ci but not with uit. I assume the following specification:
ηi = ϑci + ui0, (3.23)
where ci and ui0 are independent. If the initial condition, di0, is correlated with the unob-
served effect, ci, then ϑ 6= 0, a condition that can be tested. The error term ui0 satisfies the
same distributional assumptions as uit for t = 1...T , that is ui0 ∼ N(0, 1). Plugging (3.23)
into (3.22), the latent variable for the initial period becomes:
19 Equation (3.21) uses the fact that since ai ∼ N(0, σ2a) then aσa ∼ N(0, 1). Then
g(a) =
1
σa
√
2pi
exp(− a
2
2σ2a
) =
1
σa
(
1√
2pi
exp(− (a/σa)
2
2
)
)
=
1
σa
φ(
a
σa
)
20 This approach has the advantage that it can be estimated using standard software. In STATA, random
effects probit models can be estimated using the xtprobit command.
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d∗i0 = zi0pi + ϑci + ui0 (3.24)
Then,
P (di0 = 1|zi0, ci) = Φ(zi0pi + ϑci) (3.25)
The joint probability of the whole sequence of decisions for individual i, including the initial
observation, (di0, ..., dit), given ci is:
Li =
∫ {
Φ(zi0pi + ϑci)×
T∏
t=1
Φ [(xitβ + γdi,t−1 + c)(2dit − 1)]
}
1
σc
φ(
c
σc
)dc (3.26)
with ci ∼ N(0, σ2c ). Correlation between the unobserved effect, ci, and the regressors, Xi,
is allowed using, for instance, the Chamberlain-Mundlak method.21
3.4.3 Model selection
To assess the statistical fit for different specifications I use the maximized log likelihood. To
enable comparison between the results from the Wooldridge and Heckman estimators, the
log likelihood of the Wooldridge estimator based on t ≥ 1 is combined −added− with the
log likelihood of a simple probit model estimator for vaccination decision t = 0 (Stewart,
2007).22 The Akaike and Bayesian information Criteria (AIC and BIC) are also reported.
These measures capture the trade-off between the model fit −measured by the maximized
log likelihood− and the principle of parsimony that favors a simple model. AIC and BIC
are calculated as follows:
AIC = −2 lnL+ 2q, BIC = −2 lnL+ (lnM)q (3.27)
where q represents the number of parameters in each specification and M denotes the
number of observations. The difference between the two is that BIC penalizes more the
model complexity.
3.5 Results
In this section I present the results for a variety of probit specifications of vaccination models
discussed in Section 3.4. Before showing the results for the dynamic models, I estimate static
21 The integral over c can be evaluated using Gaussian-Hermite quadrature. The program redprob
(Stewart, 2006) in STATA provides a maximum likelihood estimation of equation (3.26).
22The Heckman approach estimates simultaneously the probit model for vaccination decision in t = 0 and
the dynamic model of decisions for t ≥ 1. See equation (3.26).
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models that do not allow for state dependence. To the extent that observable differences can
explain the observed serial persistence in vaccination decisions, very simple static models
will be sufficient to explain the participation decision. The results of the static models
will provide a benchmark to compare with previous literature that have mainly focused on
static models and to assess the role of state dependence in vaccination decisions.
3.5.1 Static Models
Table 3.3 contains the results for models that focus on risk factors and socioeconomic and
demographic characteristics as main determinants of flu vaccination. All specifications
ignore possible dynamic effects of previous vaccination on current decisions.
Column (1) presents the results of a simple pooled probit model that also ignores possible
correlation between decisions in different periods due to time-invariant unobserved hetero-
geneity. The results indicate that vaccination propensity increases with age for individuals
in good health (the baseline category), with a slowdown as age increases (the coefficient
of the age squared is negative although not significant).23Being in regular health or bad
health increase the probability of vaccination for individuals aged 65.
Results from the pooled probit also indicate that preexisting health conditions like cancer,
heart disease, diabetes, and chronic lung diseases make individuals more likely to get the
vaccine. Suffering respiratory diseases in the previous period increase the probability of
current vaccination as well. Individuals may associate the occurrence of this health shock
to a higher risk of getting the flu, which in turn increases their likelihood of vaccination,
as is found in Ayyagari (2007) and Mullahy (1999). Other health shocks that occurred
recently and that individuals may associate to an increase in their risk of complications in
case they get the flu, like heart problems and stroke in the last period, do not seem to affect
current decisions.
Additionally, the results indicate that physical limitations impose a significant cost in pursu-
ing prevention. Finally, according to this specification, married, white, and more educated
individuals are more likely to get the vaccine. Females as well as individuals that have
supplementary health insurance have also higher incentives to get the vaccine.
Columns (2) and (3) present the results for random effects probit models that allow for
a time-invariant unobserved component in the error term. The correlated random effects
(CRE) probit model in column (3) allows for correlation between the explanatory variables
and the unobserved heterogeneity following the Mundlak-Camberlain specification. We can
see in the last row of column (3) of Table 3.3 that the null hypothesis, stating that the
explanatory variables are not correlated with the unobserved time-invariant error term, is
rejected. Hence, I will concentrate now in the results of column (3) and compare them
with the model in column (1) that ignores this unobserved heterogeneity. The fit with the
23Age is normalized relative to the minimum age observed in the sample, which is 65.
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Table 3.3: Static Probit Models of Vaccination Decisions.
Pooled Random Correlated
Probit Effects Random Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics
Education 0.185*** 0.758*** 0.775***
(0.043) (0.237) (0.241)
Female 0.108** 0.285 0.340
(0.042) (0.225) (0.228)
White 0.185*** 0.899*** 0.885***
(0.057) (0.317) (0.318)
Married 0.231*** 0.572*** 0.633***
(0.043) (0.200) (0.201)
Supplementary Health Insurance 0.259*** 0.310 0.262
(0.065) (0.244) (0.244)
Medicare A Only -0.025 -0.365 -0.181
(0.117) (0.453) (0.450)
Risk factors: age and subjective health
Age 0.090*** 0.261** 0.349***
(0.033) (0.114) (0.123)
Age2 -0.004 -0.009 -0.015
(0.003) (0.009) (0.010)
Health Regular 0.528*** 0.865** 0.605
(0.167) (0.437) (0.463)
Health Bad 0.346* 0.721 0.503
(0.204) (0.523) (0.558)
Age× Regular -0.133** -0.134 -0.069
(0.053) (0.137) (0.145)
Age2 × Regular 0.010** 0.007 0.002
(0.004) (0.011) (0.012)
Age× Bad 0.011 -0.079 -0.112
(0.089) (0.173) (0.185)
Age 2 × Bad -0.005 0.002 0.009
(0.008) (0.015) (0.016)
Risk factors: preexisting health conditions
Cancer ini 0.089* 0.366 0.390
(0.054) (0.291) (0.295)
Heart Conditions ini 0.202*** 0.690*** 0.669**
(0.045) (0.230) (0.269)
Diabetes ini 0.172*** 0.600** 0.524*
(0.055) (0.290) (0.297)
Chronic Lung Disease ini 0.168** 0.744** 0.468
(0.066) (0.347) (0.363)
Stroke ini -0.019 -0.236 -0.095
(0.070) (0.369) (0.404)
Arthritis Rheumatoid ini 0.104 0.386 0.395
(0.072) (0.389) (0.396)
Risk factors: Health shock previous year
Heart Disease last year -0.039 -0.059 -0.031
(0.062) (0.145) (0.151)
Stroke last year 0.171 0.738** 0.747**
(0.150) (0.352) (0.364)
Respiratory Disease last year 0.265*** 0.418*** 0.274**
(0.045) (0.119) (0.127)
Physical limitations
Broken hip last year -0.390* -1.599** -1.665**
(0.232) (0.645) (0.702)
Number ADLS -0.080*** -0.087 -0.006
(0.019) (0.058) (0.067)
Planning horizon
Health worse than last year -0.109** -0.381*** -0.364***
(0.054) (0.130) (0.135)
N 5313 5313 5313
ρ (cross-period correlation) 0.926 0.925
Log-likelihood -2891.6 -1937.1 -1919.7
AIC 5865.2 3958.1 3951.4
BIC 6134.9 4234.4 4319.8
Wald Statistics for H0: CRE=0 (p-value) (0.003)
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients of probit models. All specifications include year and regions dummies. Age is
normalized to be 0 for individuals aged 65, the minimum age observed in the sample. Standard errors are in parenthesis. Pooled
probit in column (1) pools all years and assumes iid errors across i and t. The CRE model in column (3) expresses ci as a linear
function of the means of the time-varying regressors. Specifically, ci = ψ + x¯iα + ai, where ai ∼ N(0, σ2a), x¯i are the within
individual mean of the time varying regressors, and ai is independent of x¯i. The coefficients of the probit model in column 1 are not
directly comparable with the RE probits in columns 2 and 3. To make comparisons, multiply the coefficients of the RE models by
(1− ρ)1/2. In both RE specifications (1− ρ)1/2 is approximately 0.27.
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CRE probit model largely improves, according to both the AIC and BIC criterion. The
model indicates that the estimated unobserved individual heterogeneity, captured by the
parameter ρ in equation (3.11), is an important factor for vaccination decisions, accounting
for 92.5 percentage of the variability of the error term.
The magnitude of the effect of age and health variables changes when unobserved hetero-
geneity is allowed. Is worth noting that the coefficients of the pooled probit in column (1)
are not directly comparable to those of the random effects probit models in columns (2) and
(3) because of the different normalizations of the variance of the error term (Arulampalam,
1998). To make them comparable, one should multiply the coefficients of the RE models
by (1− ρ)1/2 (0.27 for the CRE probit model of column (3)).
Under the CRE specification in column (3), age is still an important factor determining
vaccination of individuals with good health, and the magnitude of the effect is almost the
same as in the pooled probit model (the coefficient of age is 0.095 after the adjustment
versus 0.090 in the pooled probit). However, the effect of age for individuals in regular and
bad health does not seem to be significantly different than for those with good health. The
magnitude of the level effect of having regular health is reduced by more than 2/3 in the
CRE model (0.165 after the adjustment versus 0.528 in pooled probit) as well as the level
effect of being in bad health (0.137 versus 0.346).
Heart disease and diabetes are the only preexisting conditions that significantly affect vac-
cination decisions when unobserved heterogeneity is introduced. Respiratory shocks and
stroke in the last year also increase the probability of getting the vaccine. For all these
variables, the magnitude of the effect is lower than in the pooled probit model. Reporting
worse health relative to previous period and physical limitations (except for the number of
ADLS) are still negatively correlated with the vaccination decision. More educated, white,
and married individuals are more likely to pursue prevention, and the magnitude of the
effects remains roughly the same than the pooled model.
3.5.2 Dynamic Models
Estimates of the dynamic random-effects probit models of the probability of vaccination
using both Wooldridge and Heckman estimators are given in Table 3.4. The two models are
also compared to a model that ignores the endogeneity of the initial vaccination decision.
The three specifications allow for correlation between the unobserved time-invariant error.
Column (1) in Table 3.4 presents the results of the model specification that assumes that
the initial condition is exogenous. State dependence takes a predominant role in explaining
the time persistence of the vaccination decisions (the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable in absolute value is the largest of all regressors), while the estimated unobserved
heterogeneity is irrelevant (ρ ≈ 0). This pattern changes substantially when the exogeneity
assumption is relaxed.
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The Wooldridge and Heckman models in columns (2) and (3) account for the “initial con-
dition problem” and in both cases the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable drops
dramatically relative to column (1). At the same time, the proportion of the total vari-
ance of the errors explained by unobserved heterogeneity raises to 59% according to the
Wooldridge approach and to 82% according to the Heckman model. The fit of the model
also improves with the Wooldridge or Heckman approach.
The results in Table 3.4 also highlight the importance of accounting for the endogeneity of
the initial condition since the correlation between the first observed decision, di0, and the
unobserved component, ci, is statistically different from zero. In the Wooldridge approach,
this correlation is captured by the coefficient associated with the dependent variable in
period 0 −the parameter λ in equation (3.17). The estimated value of λ is 2.7, statistically
different from zero and approximately 3 times higher than the estimated coefficient of
the lagged dependent variable, γ. Under the Heckman specification, the correlation is
captured by the parameter ϑ in equation (3.24). The results show that this parameter is
approximately 1 and statistically different from zero. Ignoring this correlation I would have
attributed a higher effect to state dependence in detriment of unobserved heterogeneity.
According to either AIC and BIC we see that there are not significant differences in the fit
to the data that the Wooldridge and the Heckman approaches provide.24
Both models differ in the estimated magnitude of some of the coefficients of the explanatory
variables. Particularly, when the Heckman specification is used, some characteristics as
more education, white, and married, have a higher impact on the probability of vaccination
than under the Wooldridge specification. Also age and diabetes have higher impact under
the Heckman specification.
3.5.2.1 State dependence and individual unobserved heterogeneity
The dynamic models allow to disentangle two sources of persistence in vaccination decisions:
persistence due to unobserved individual heterogeneity and persistence attributed to state
dependence. The results from the Wooldridge and the Heckman approaches suggest that
both sources are important.
The first row of Table 3.5 compares the estimates of ρ, the proportion of the total un-
explained variation that is attributed to the unobserved individual effect, obtained from
24I computed the predicted sequence of decisions, to asses the ability of the model to fit the path of
observed vaccination decisions in three periods using the Person goodness-of-fit statistic computed as
GOF =
J∑
s=1
(ns − nˆs)2
nˆs
, (3.28)
where ns is the observed frequency, nˆs is the predicted frequency, and J is the number of cells for the
alternative decision paths (8 possible paths in three years). The Heckman model gives a better fit than the
Wooldridge apporach (GoF Static CRE=1311.3, GoF Wooldridge=8915.8, GoF heckman=251.2).
102
Chapter 3 Estimating a Dynamic Discrete Choice Model of Health Prevention Decisions:
An Application to Flu Vaccination.
Table 3.4: Dynamic Probit Models of Vaccination Decisions.
CRE-Initial Conditions Wooldridge Heckman
Exogenous Approach Approach
(1) (2) (3)
Flu shot t-1 (γ) 2.430*** 0.926*** 0.889***
(0.052) (0.144) (0.156)
Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics
Education 0.102* 0.196* 0.402**
(0.058) (0.114) (0.163)
Female 0.015 -0.046 0.185
(0.057) (0.110) (0.154)
White 0.128* 0.219 0.638***
(0.072) (0.140) (0.223)
Married 0.136** 0.244** 0.446***
(0.057) (0.109) (0.143)
Supplementary Health Insurance 0.247*** 0.381** 0.389**
(0.087) (0.153) (0.154)
Medicare A Only -0.104 -0.130 -0.226
(0.153) (0.273) (0.265)
Risk factors: age and subjective health
Age 0.005 -0.005 0.139***
(0.019) (0.037) (0.053)
Age2 0.000 0.001 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Health Regular 0.555** 0.590** 0.652**
(0.230) (0.288) (0.294)
Health Bad 0.163 0.170 0.239
(0.313) (0.382) (0.389)
Age × Regular -0.101** -0.081 -0.097*
(0.041) (0.052) (0.054)
Age2 × Regular 0.004** 0.003 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age × Bad -0.019 0.005 -0.013
(0.057) (0.071) (0.072)
Age2 × Bad 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Risk factors: preexisting health conditions
Cancer ini 0.080 0.234 0.221
(0.072) (0.143) (0.184)
Heart Conditions ini 0.076 0.071 0.289
(0.067) (0.128) (0.183)
Diabetes ini 0.097 0.173 0.347*
(0.073) (0.142) (0.206)
Chronic Lung Disease ini -0.063 -0.267 0.177
(0.089) (0.171) (0.275)
Stroke ini 0.070 0.110 -0.130
(0.099) (0.190) (0.280)
Arthritis Rheumatoid ini 0.191* 0.424** 0.349
(0.098) (0.193) (0.280)
Risk factors: Health shock previous year
Heart Disease last year -0.086 -0.047 -0.046
(0.107) (0.136) (0.138)
Stroke last year 0.627** 0.746** 0.770**
(0.264) (0.333) (0.340)
Respiratory Disease last year 0.114 0.210* 0.207*
(0.087) (0.112) (0.114)
Physical limitations
Broken hip last year -1.269*** -1.500*** -1.531***
(0.406) (0.545) (0.565)
Number ADLS 0.022 0.003 0.007
(0.047) (0.059) (0.061)
Planning horizon
Health worse than last year -0.285*** -0.338*** -0.344***
(0.095) (0.120) (0.122)
N 7,084 7,084 7,084
ρ (cross-period correlation) 0.0000 0.594 0.822
Log-likelihood -2553.9 -2470.7 -2466.7
AIC 5287.84 5123.45 5125.34
BIC 5905.75 5748.22 5784.44
Wald Statistics for H0: CRE=0 (p-value) 20.31 (0.062) 76.1 (0.000) 40.01(0.021)
Flu shot ini (λ) 2.748***(0.329)
ϑ (Correlation between ci and di0) 1.041***(0.162)
Note: This table reports the estimated coefficients of probit models. All specifications include year and regions dummies. Age is
normalized to be 0 for individuals aged 65, the minimum age observed in the sample. Standard errors are in parenthesis. All
specifications allows for correlated random effects (CRE), with ci as a linear function of the means of the time-varying regressors.
The log likelihood of the Wooldridge estimator based on t ≥ 1 is combined with the log likelihood of a simple probit model estimator
for t = 0.
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static and dynamic models. Excluding the dynamic model in column (3) of Table 3.5 that
considers the initial condition exogenous, we see that the inclusion of state dependence
has important effects on the estimated unobserved heterogeneity, dropping from 0.92 in
the static models, to 0.59 and 0.82 in the Wooldridge and Heckman dynamic estimators,
respectively. Despite the difference between estimates of ρ in the Wooldridge and Heckman
approach is about 20 percentage points, the results from both approaches coincide in that
there is still a great proportion of the variability in individual decisions explained by unob-
served heterogeneity and not captured by other observable characteristics included in the
model.
The effect of state dependence is measured by the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable, γ, and they are shown in the panel B of Table 3.5. All the estimates are positive
and statistically significant. In order to assess the effect of the lagged dependent variable on
the probability of vaccination, I calculate the partial effect of this variable averaged across
all individuals (APEs). Both models, Wooldridge and Heckman, produce almost the same
estimate of the APE. Experience with the vaccine in the previous year increases on average
between 12 and 13 percentage points the probability of current vaccination.
Table 3.5: State dependence and unobserved heterogeneity
Static Models Dynamic Models
RE CRE CRE Probit Wooldridge Heckman
Probit Probit (initial cond. exog.) Approach Approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Unobserved heterogeneity
Cross-period correlation (ρ) 0.926 0.925 0.0000003 0.594 0.822
(0.008) (0.008)
B. State dependence
Coeff for Flu shott−1 (γ) - - 2.430 0.926 0.889
(0.052) (0.144) (0.156)
APE 0.718 0.130 0.114
APE (given di0 = 0) 0.219
APE (given di0 = 1) 0.084
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. Under the Wooldridge specification, the average partial effect (APE) is estimated by the
difference of the counterfactual outcome probabilities taking di,t−1 equal 1 and equal 0, respectively, and evaluating the observed
regressors xit at their observed values:
N
−1
N∑
i=1
(
(Φ(xiβˆa + γˆa + ψˆa + λˆadi0 + x¯iαˆa))− Φ(xβˆa + ψˆa + λˆadi0 + x¯iαˆa)
)
(3.29)
where the subscript a denotes that the MLE β¯, γˆ, ψˆ, λˆ, αˆ are multiplied by (1 + σˆ2a)
−1/2 and σˆ2a is the MLE of σ
2
a.
Under Heckman specification the APE is calculated in the same way except that di0 is omitted.
3.5.2.2 Risk factors: age and subjective health status
Table 3.6 reports the estimated average probability of vaccination corresponding to different
ages and health status for the Heckman and Wooldridge models. The table also report the
results of the static CRE probit model. Figure 3.1 graphically displays these results.
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The Wooldrdge and the Heckman approaches give slightly different results. Although vac-
cination propensities tend to increase with age, the pattern is more clear in the Heckman
approach. The later also indicates that there is a slowdown in vaccination propensities
at advances ages, for those in “Good” and “Bad” health, as the theoretical model pre-
dicts. There are no significant difference between vaccination propensities of individuals
with different self-reported health status. This result is similar to the findings in Par-
ente, Salkever, and DaVanzo (2005), who find no effect of self reported health status on
vaccination propensities.25
Table 3.6 also reports the Person goodness-of-fit statistic,26 to compare the estimated age-
health cells frequencies with the observed data. According to this statistic, the Heckman
approach fit the data better than the Wooldridge approach, and gives almost the same fit
than the static model.
Table 3.6: Predicted average probabilities of vaccination conditional on health and age.
Age
65 70 75 80 85 90
A. Wooldridge Approach
Good 0.709 0.672 0.679 0.693 0.714 0.741
Regular 0.773 0.678 0.651 0.656 0.693 0.757
Bad 0.728 0.694 0.705 0.722 0.746 0.775
Goodness of fit 20.7
B. Heckman Approach
Good 0.595 0.643 0.716 0.764 0.791 0.800
Regular 0.689 0.624 0.665 0.709 0.754 0.800
Bad 0.631 0.652 0.722 0.772 0.805 0.825
Goodness of fit 14.5
C. Static CRE Probit
Good 0.547 0.634 0.717 0.767 0.790 0.790
Regular 0.609 0.620 0.687 0.734 0.763 0.778
Bad 0.577 0.634 0.714 0.765 0.793 0.801
Goodness of fit 13.9
Note: These probabilities are averages across individuals, and heterogeneity across individuals comes for the part of the unobserved
heterogeneity that is correlated with the means of the time varying regressors and with di0 in the Wooldridge approach
N
−1
N∑
i=1
(Φ(ziβˆz,a + βˆ
age
a × age + βˆage2a × age2 + βˆ
healthj
a + βˆ
agej
a × age× healthj (3.30)
+βˆ
age2j
a × age2 × healthjS + ψˆa + λˆadi0 + x¯iαˆa)
where z are all the variables, except age and self-reported health status, healthj ∈ {Regular, Bad}. The subscript a denotes that the
MLE β¯, ψˆ, λˆ, and αˆ are multiplied by (1 + σˆ2a)
−1/2 and σˆ2a is the MLE of σ
2
a. Under Heckman specification the APE is calculated in
the same way except for the fact that di0 is omitted.
25They also use the MCBS dataset, for previous year.
26The Pearson goodness-of-fit statistics for the models presented are computed as in equation 3.28, where
J is the number of cells (18 for the case of age-health cells).
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Figure 3.1: Vaccination rates by age and self-reported health status
A. Wooldridge B. Heckman C. Static
3.5.2.3 Risk factors: Preexisting health conditions and health shocks
Results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.4 indicate that, once state dependence is intro-
duced, there is in general a reduction of the effect of health conditions −which are related
with higher risk of influenza-related complications− on the probability of vaccination rela-
tive to the CRE static model (column (3) of Table 3.3). Most of the initial health condions
have not statistically significant effect, and the average partial effects in Table 3.7 indicate
that the effects are slightly lower effects in dynamic models (except for stroke and arthritis
rheumatoid). In all cases the effects of these variables are moderate (of the order of 3 to 5
percentage points).
However, individuals appear to be sensitive to the experience of recent health shocks. I
find a positive and significantly different from zero effect of respiratory illnesses and stroke
experienced during the period prior to influenza season, and the magnitude of these effects
are higher in dynamic models. Those who suffered a respiratory disease in the previous
year are between 2.3-2.5 percentage points more likely to take the vaccine in the following
year, while those who suffered stroke in the previous year are 7.7-8.4 percentage points
more likely.
Table 3.7: Average Partial Effects of Risk Factors.
Static CRE Woolddridge Heckman
Risk factors: preexisting health conditions
Cancer ini 0.032 0.025 0.026
Heart Conditions ini 0.056 0.008 0.035
Diabetes ini 0.043 0.019 0.041
Chronic Lung Disease ini 0.038 -0.030 0.021
Stroke ini -0.008 0.012 -0.016
Arthritis Rheumatoid ini 0.032 0.045 0.041
Risk factors: Health shock previous year
Heart Disease last year -0.003 -0.005 -0.006
Respiratory Disease last year 0.023 0.023 0.025
Stroke last year 0.059 0.077 0.084
106
Chapter 3 Estimating a Dynamic Discrete Choice Model of Health Prevention Decisions:
An Application to Flu Vaccination.
3.5.2.4 Physical limitations and planning horizon
Results in columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.4 also show that there is a significant reduction
on vaccination propensity if an individual suffered a broken hip in the previous year or if
he reports to have experienced a negative health change since last year. Interpreting the
reported change in health status as a proxy for expected longevity (Benitez-Silva and Ni,
2008) the results indicate that individuals experimenting a negative health change are less
likely to get the vaccine next period because their planning horizon is shorter. According to
the average partial effects in Table 3.8, these two effects are larger in the dynamic models
than in the static one. A broken hip in prior year implies a reduction of between 20 and 28
percentage points, according to dynamic models.
Table 3.8: Average Partial Effects of Physical Limitations and Planning Horizon.
Static CRE Woolddridge Heckman
Number ADLS -0.001 0.000 0.001
Broken hip last year -0.155 -0.191 -0.213
Health worse than last year -0.031 -0.038 -0.043
3.5.2.5 Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics
The results suggest that socioeconomic characteristics play an important role in determining
individuals’ preventive behavior in dynamic models as well. According to column (2) and
(3) in Table 3.4, more educated, white, and married individuals are more likely to get
annual flu immunization. Table 3.9 presents the average partial effects of these variables.
Education has a lower effect in dynamic models than in the static model as one may expect
if education is correlated with prior vaccination decisions. There is no a clear pattern
between the dynamic and statics models regarding the effects of race and marital status.
Table 3.9: Average Partial Effects of Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics.
Static CRE Woolddridge Heckman
Education 0.067 0.022 0.050
Female 0.029 -0.005 0.022
White 0.078 0.024 0.082
Married 0.053 0.027 0.054
Supplementary Health Insurance 0.022 0.043 0.049
Medicare A Only -0.015 -0.014 -0.028
Finally, individuals with supplementary health insurance coverage are more likely to engage
in prevention. Comparing to static models, results in Table 3.9 indicate that these effect are
larger in dynamic models. Individuals who have Medicaid part A alone and hence do not
have free vaccination coverage, are less likely to get the vaccine, although the coefficients
are not statistically different from zero.
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3.5.3 Simulated responses
To assess the importance of the dynamic effects generated through state dependence, I
analyze what are the long-run gains of a vaccination campaign that is able to increase
vaccination coverage in about 20 percentage points in a given period. I perform the following
simulation exercise. First, using the Heckman approach estimates (which give a better fit
to the data) and taking as given the initial observed vaccination decisions ( di0) and the
observed individual characteristics (xit) for t = 1, 2, 3), I compute the sequence of predicted
vaccination decisions for periods 1 to 3.
Then, I assume that a vaccination campaign implemented in t = 0 is able to fully cover all
individuals that face a higher risk of influenza related complications (i.e., those with health
conditions like cancer, heart problems, stroke, chronic lung disease, and diabetes). In the
data, this is equivalent to an increase of about 20 percentage points in the proportion of
individuals that take the vaccine in period t = 0 (from 66% to 85%). Conditional on the
simulated initial conditions and taking as given the observed individual characteristics, I
simulate the predicted vaccination decisions in periods 1 to 3. The results are reported in
Table 3.10. According to these results, a policy that increases vaccination converage in 20
percentage points in a given period has long lasting effects, increasing vaccination coverage
in subsequent periods trhough the state dependence effect. The vaccination coverage is 7
percentage points higher after one year, 4 percentage points higher after two years, and 2
percentage points higher after 3 years. Although positive, the magnitude of the long lasting
effect of this policy is moderate, and it may not be enough to sustain high vaccination
coverage through time.
Table 3.10: Predicted Vaccination Probabilities using Heckman model
t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3
Predicted probabilities given observed di0 and xit 65.73 72.05 74.93 80.01
Predicted probabilities given simulated di0 and observed xit 84.47 78.77 79.22 81.99
Difference 18.74 6.72 4.29 1.98
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper I conduct an empirical analysis of the determinants of vaccination decisions
and I contrast the results of my estimations with the predictions of a theoretical dynamic
model of prevention decisions. The empirical regularity that shows that flu vaccination
behavior is highly persistent over time, raises the question of how much of this persistent
behavior is explained just by habit persistence or individual unobserved heterogeneity, and
how much responds to individuals internalizing the costs and benefits of their vaccination
decisions.
My results suggest that the three factors, state dependence, unobserved heterogeneity, and
health risks and other individual characteristics, generate persistence. The results also
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indicate that ignoring state dependence would result in an overestimation of the effects
of health risks and of other individual characteristics (such as education, marital status,
and race). I also show that the incentives to vaccinate increase with age and but show
a slowdown (according to the Heckman approach) at advanced ages. Conditional on age,
there are not significant differences by self-assessed health status.
The implications of these results for public health policy purposes are, at least, twofold.
First, the fact that individuals do internalize that certain health risks increases the benefit of
vaccination, this channel can be exploited to increase even further vaccination take up. For
instance, public campaigns that alert that influenza-related complications are more acute
for individuals with certain health conditions, will increase vaccination coverage. Second,
any public campaign that induces individuals to get the vaccine for the first time, will have
effects in subsequent periods, through the habit persistence channel.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Influenza and Pneumonia: Hospitalization Data
Table 3.11: US Hospital Discharges. Population 65 and older. Average 1997-2006.
Diagnosis Hospital stays Hosp. rate Charges per stay $a
(per Mean ∆ % 97-06
Total (%) 10,000 hab) 65-84 85+ 65-84 85+
Influenza (I) Principal b 12,921 0.10 3.61 9,579 9,698 38% 50%
Secondary c 21,890 0.17 6.12
Pneumonia (P) Principal 737,013 5.67 207.1 15,541 14,075 75% 80%
Secondary 1,337,522 10.29 375.2
I+P Principal 749,934 5.77
Secondary 1,359,412 10.46
All hospitalizations 13,001,225 100 3,650.9 18,330 14,835 111% 108%
Notes: a Dollars 1997. b The principal diagnosis is the condition chiefly responsible for occasioning the admission to the hospital.
The principal diagnosis is always the reason for admission.c The diagnosis is either the principal diagnosis or an additional
condition that coexist at the time of admission. Source: HCUPnet, Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD. http://hcupnet.ahrq.gov.
3.7.2 Numerical Example
In this section I present a numerical example of the model presented in Section 3.2, to
describe some of its properties. I solve a simple version of a dynamic model of discrete
choice and solve the model via dynamic programming. Further assumptions are required
to obtain close form solutions to the model, and they are stated here.
Let’s call Ωt the vector of state variables of individual i in period t and Γt the vec-
tor of the observed state variables − from the econometrician’s point of view − where
Ωt = (ht, wt, dt−1, t) and Γt = (ht, wt, dt−1), where ht is health status, wt are individual
characteristics (for simplicity I assume wt = aget), and dt−1 is the vaccination decision in
the previous period.27
H is the set of possible health levels. There are two possible health states, H = {hg, hb}
and hg > hb.
Utility. The utility function is a linear function given by:
Ut(ht, dt) =
{
ht + 
0
t if dt = 0
ht − c1 + c2dt−1 + 1t if dt = 1
27I eliminate the subscript i through all the section.
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Individuals derive utility from their health level,ht. They also have to bear some costs,
c1, if they decide to pursue prevention, and c2 is the cost reduction gained due to past
experience with the vaccine. The utility is also affected by idiosyncratic choice-specific
preference shifters, jt , which are iid over time, and have a cumulative distribution G(t).
The idiosyncratic preference shifters are independent across alternatives and have an
extreme value type 1 distribution.
Health production. The probability of contracting the illness, S(dt), depends on
the prevention decision and S(dt = 1) < S(dt = 0). Once the health shock,st, is realized, I
assume that the transition between health states only depends on the current health state.
The transition probability from the health state l to health state m, conditional on the
realization of the shock st is denoted piml(st).
The probability of being in health state hm conditional on current health state hl and
current vaccination decision dt can be written as:
F (hm|hl, dt) = S(dt)× piml(st = 1) + (1− S(dt))× piml(st = 0), for m and l ∈ {g, b}.(3.31)
Given previous assumptions, we can show that F (hg|hl, dt = 1) > F (hg|hl, dt = 0)
for l ∈ {g, b}. Also, the following conditional independence condition also holds:
F (ht+1|ht, dt, t) = F (ht+1|ht, dt).
Determining values for S(0), S(1), pigg(0), pigg(1), pigb(0) and pigb(1) we have that the health
transition probability function, F , is characterized by 4 values that indicate the probability
of being in good health next period conditional on the two possible health states and the
current decision.
I further assume that pigb(0) − pigb(1) > pigg(0) − pigg(1), which implies that the net effect
of vaccination over future health is greater for individuals currently in bad health, i.e.,
F (hg|hb, 1)− F (hg|hb, 0) > F (hg|hg, 1)− F (hg|hg, 0).
Survival probability The probability that an individual will survive to the end of
the period is denoted by psu(ht, wt, dt). I assume that the survival probability is zero in
period T .
Solving the model. The solution to the model is obtained by backward induc-
tion. Two critical assumptions − the conditional independence assumption of the evolution
of health states and the distributional assumptions imposed over the unobserved error
terms (preference shifters) − allow to obtain a close form analytical solution of the model
(Rust, 1994). In particular, the value function of individual i at period t, given the state
variables Ωt can written as follows:
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Vt(Ωt) = max{v0t (Γt) + 0t ; v1t (Γt) + 1t } (3.32)
where vjt (Γt) is the “choice specific value function” at period t and depends only on the
observable state variables. For a given period t we have 2 × 2 × 2 choice specific value
functions (dt ∈ {0, 1}, ht ∈ {hg, hb}, dt−1 ∈ {0, 1}). These choice specific value function
have the following closed form:
vjt (Γt) = u(ht, dj , dt−1) + βpsu(ht, aget, dj)×∑
ht+1
{
log
[∑1
k=0 exp
(
vkt+1(Γ
j
t+1)
)]}
P (ht+1|dj , ht) for j ∈ {0, 1} (3.33)
An individual i at period t decides to pursue prevention if the following condition holds:
d∗t (Γt) = 1 ⇔ v0t (Γt) + 0t < v1t (Γt) + 1t
⇔ v0t (Γt)− v1t (Γt) < 1t − 0t
Since ’s are random variables, the optimal decision rule can be expressed in probabilistic
terms as:
Prob (d∗t = 1|Γit) = Prob
(
v0t (Γt)− v1t (Γt) < 1t − 0t
)
=
∫
I
{
v0t (Γt)− v1t (Γt) < 1t − 0t
}
dG(t)
Given that {jt} are iid type 1 extreme value random variables, the multidimensional in-
tegrals in the definition of this conditional choice probability have a close form analytical
expression.
Prob(dt = 1|Γt; θ) = exp{v
1
t (Γt)}∑1
j=0 exp{vjt (Γt)}
(3.34)
3.7.3 Example
• Health states: H = {hg, hb} = {1, 0}
• Vaccination cost: c1 = 0.3, c2 = 0.2
• Health transition matrix: F(ht+1|ht,dt = 0) =
(
Pg,b0 1− Pg,b0
Pg,g0 1− Pg,g0
)
=(
0.65 0.35
0.9 0.10
)
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F(ht+1|ht,dt = 1) =
(
Pg,b1 1− Pg,b1
Pg,g1 1− Pg,g1
)
=
(
0.8 0.2
0.95 0.05
)
• Survival probabilities: Ps(ht, aget, dt) = 11+exp{xtα}
Where
xtα = α1ht + α2(1− ht) + α3aget + α4age2t + α5dt + α6dt(1− ht)
α = (−2.5,−0.7, 0.12, 0.001,−0.1,−0.1)28
According to equation (3.34) the conditional probabilities of vaccination, given a health
state h, age, and past experience, d−1, are given in figure (3.2)
Figure 3.2: Probabilities of vaccination implied by the model
Note: (B, d0)=(Bad Health, dt−1 = 0), (B, d1)=(Bad Health, dt−1 = 1), (G, d0)=(Good Health, dt−1 = 0),
(G, d1)=(Good Health, dt−1 = 1).
28Survival probabilities given good health: approximated to the US white female population survival
probability profile for ages 65 to 100, period 1999-2001. Source US survival probabilities: National Vital
Statistics U.S. Decennial Life Tables for 1999-2001, United States Life Tables. NVSR Volume 57, Number
1. 37 pp. (PHS) 2008-1120.
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3.7.3.1 Implications of the model
The implications derived from the model are the following. First, if previous experience
with the vaccine reduces the current cost of prevention, then individuals that get the vaccine
in one period are more likely to do it again in the following period, compare with those who
do not get the vaccine. Second, the probability to get the vaccine increases with age, for a
given health status, although there is a slowdown at the end of life. Third, only at advanced
ages individuals with worse health status are more likely to get the vaccine relative to those
in better health. The gap increases with age and then closes at the end of life.
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3.7.4 Variables
VARIABLE DEFINITION
Flu shot t-1 1 if individual vaccinated last flu season, 0 otherwise
Education 1 if individual completed high school only, or have some college but not diploma,
or have bachelor degree or postgraduate degree; 0 otherwise
Female 1 if female, 0 otherwise
White 1 if race white, 0 otherwise
Married 1 if individual is married, 0 otherwise ((widowed, single, divorced or separated))
Insurance 1 if individual have supplemental health insurance, 0 otherwise
Medicare A Only 1 if is only covered by Medicare Part A (not Part B), 0 otherwise
Age Age in years
Cancer ini 1 if individual has reported having cancer by 2001 (the initial period) or before, 0 otherwise
Heart Disease ini 1 if individual has reported suffering heart disease by 2001 (the initial period) or before, 0 otherwise
Diabetes ini 1 if individual has reported having diabetes by 2001 (the initial period) or before, 0 otherwise
Chronic Lung Disease ini 1 if individual has reported having Chronic Lung Disease by 2001 (the initial period) or before, 0 otherwise
Stroke ini 1 if individual has reported having stroke by 2001 (the initial period) or before, 0 otherwise
Rheumatoid Arthritis ini if individual has reported having rheumatoid arthritis by 2001 (the initial period) or before, 0 otherwise
Heart Disease, shock last yr 1 if individual that has heart disease experimented a new event related to the illness during the last year,
0 otherwise
Stroke, shock last yr 1 if individual that has stroke experimented a new event related to the illness during the last year,
0 otherwise
Respiratory Illness, shock last yr 1 if individual that has stroke experimented a new event related to the illness during the last year,
0 otherwise
Health change - worse 1 if self reported health compared to previous year is “worse” or “much worse”, 0 otherwise (“better”,
“much better” or “almost the same”
Good Health 1 if self reported health compared to people of same age is “Excellent” or “Very Good”, 0 otherwise
Regular Health 1 if self reported health compared to people of same age is “Good”, 0 otherwise
Bad Health 1 if self reported health compared to people of same age is “Fair” or “Poor”, 0 otherwise
Regions Dummy variables at the Census Region level: Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, South
Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, Mountain, Pacific, or Puerto Rico
Flu shot ini 1 if individual vaccinated in the initial year (2001), 0 otherwise
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